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Parents have been shown to be a crucial driver in a child’s educational outcomes in
both the economics and education literature. However, researchers have yet to understand
the roles that educational interventions, information, and policies might have on parental
behavior and engagement toward their child’s education and, in turn, how to effectively
promote parental engagement for the benefits of children. In my dissertation, I examine
how educational interventions and policies can impact the behavior and decision-making of
parents and in turn affect student achievement. Specifically, I add to the scholarly literature
evidence on (a) how being identified as gifted student affect parental levels of engagement
and time investments, (b) how timely information about academic progress might change
parental behaviors and improve educational outcomes, and (c) how immigrant mothers react
to an expansion of pre-K specifically targeted at their children.
Chapter one examines the short-term and long-term effects of an elementary school gifted
education program in California that clusters 6-8 gifted students in classrooms. While I ex-
amine the academic effects of the program, I emphasize the analysis on the role of parent
engagement and time investments in the lives of gifted children. While the gifted education
literature has studied the causal effects of programs, there is limited evidence on how parent
engagement might change as a result of these programs and its potential as a mechanism
for achievement effects. Therefore, this study contributes to the economic debate of whether
parent engagement is a complement or substitute to education quality. Using a fuzzy regres-
sion discontinuity approach, I primarily find small to no evidence on short-term academic
effects, but stronger effects on longer-term course-taking and college outcomes. On the par-
ent side, I find that while most parents are not more engaged overall, parents of minority
gifted children and low-socioeconomic students are. The implication is that there is hetero-
geneity in the manner by which parents react behaviorally to students that are identified as
gifted.
In Chapter two, a joint paper with Peter Bergman, we run a randomized controlled trial
in West Virginia examining the effects of a high-frequency academic information intervention
on middle and high school student’ academic outcomes. In this field experiment, we send
out three types of alerts to parents – weekly missing assignments, weekly class absences, and
monthly low grade average - during the 2015-16 school year. We find that the intervention
reduces course failures by 38%, increases class attendance by 17%, and increases retention.
We find no evidence that test scores improve, but find that there are significant improvements
on in-class exam scores. The evidence of improvement in test scores show that there are
information frictions between parent and child, and thus parents may have inaccurate beliefs
about their child’s abilities due to a lack of complete information.
Chapter three examines the maternal labor supply and pre-K enrollment effects of a bilin-
gual pre-K policy implemented in Illinois during the 2010-11 school year, which came after
the implementation of a statewide universal pre-K program in 2007. Research has shown the
importance of quality preschool in the development of a child, with minorities particularly
sensitive to the prevalence of quality early childhood education. In this study, I exploit varia-
tion in a policy mandating that any school with at least twenty identified English Language
Learner student of a particular language is required to open up a bilingual classroom for
those students. Using multiple control groups and various difference-in-differences specifica-
tions, I find that there is little to no change in maternal labor supply among Hispanics and
recent immigrants, including the probability of being in the labor force, hours worked per
week, and wage and salary income. However, I also find a significant and robust increase
of 18-20 percentage points in the enrollment of 3- and 4-year olds into pre-K programs in
Illinois. This result shows that, even in a state where there is universal access to pre-K, the
design of such policies might not have sufficient reach to high-need parents.
Taken together, this dissertation helps deepen our understanding of the various roles
parents might affect educational outcomes and inequality. As my results demonstrate, there
are various ways which help and incentivize parents to react in a manner that will improve
childhood and long-term outcomes. Whether by programs, information, or public policy,
the tools are many, yet it is crucial that scholarly work continues to dive deeper into how
parents, children, and other stakeholders react.
Contents
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
Dedication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
1 Student Achievement and Parental Investments: Effects from
a Gifted & Talented Program 1
I Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
II Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
III Background and Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
IV Data and Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
V Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
VI Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
VII Validity and Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
VIII Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
IX Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
X Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
XI Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2 Leveraging Technology in Education: An Experiment Re-
ducing Parent-Child-School Information Problems at Scale 58
I Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
i
II Background and Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
III Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
IV Empirical Strategy & Experimental Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
V Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
VI Conclusion, Scalability and External Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
VII Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
VIII Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3 The Everlasting Quest of ‘Preschool for All’: Enrollment and
Maternal Labor Supply Implications of Bilingual Pre-K 118
I Introduction and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
II Relevant Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
III The Context: Bilingual Pre-K in Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
IV Data and Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
V Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
VI Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
VII Discussion of Results and Internal Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
VIII Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
IX Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142





Figure 1.1 CogAT Assessment Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Figure 1.2 Probability of G&T Enrollment, Students close to the cutoff . . . . . 43
Figure 1.3 G&T Exam Scores around Threshold, Histogram . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Figure 1.4 G&T Exam Scores around Threshold, Density Plot . . . . . . . . . . 45
Figure 2.1 Alert Scripts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Figure 2.2 Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Figure 2.3 School-to-Parent Contact - Control Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Figure 2.4 How often Parent talks to Child about Schoolwork - Control Group . 90
Figure 2.5 How often Parent talks to another Adult about Schoolwork - Control
Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Figure 2.6 Parent Beliefs about Missed Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Figure 2.7 Parent Beliefs about Math Grade minus the True Grade - Control Group 93
Figure 2.8 Parent Beliefs about Missed Assignments versus True Missed Assign-
ments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Figure 2.9 Parent Beliefs about Math Grade versus True Grade . . . . . . . . . 95
Figure 2.10 Endline Survey Letter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Figure 2.11 Endline Survey Letter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Figure 2.12 Endline Survey Letter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Figure 3.1 Percentage and Number of English Language Learners in Illinois . . . . . 143
Figure 3.2 Annual Percentage Changes in Pre-K Enrollments of target groups: Illinois
vs. Neighboring States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
iii
Figure 3.3 Annual Percentage Changes in Pre-K Enrollments: Mandate-Treated Target
Group vs. Control Group within Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
iv
List of Tables
Table 1.1 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Table 1.2 Covariate Balance Across Threshold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Table 1.3 Short-Term (4th Grade) Academic Outcomes: Fuzzy RD Estimates, for
RD sample and subgroups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Table 1.4 Medium-Term (8th Grade) Academic Outcomes: Fuzzy RD Estimates 49
Table 1.5 High School Outcomes: Fuzzy RD Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Table 1.6 Long-term & College Outcomes: Fuzzy RD Estimates . . . . . . . . . 51
Table 1.7 Parent Engagement & Time Investments: By All Parents & Racial
Subgroups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Table 1.8 Parent Engagement & Time Investments: By Lunch Subsidization . . 53
Table 1.9 Tutoring vs. Parental Homework Help . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Table 1.10 4th Grade Student Engagement Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Table 1.11 Teacher Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Table 1.12 Reduced-Form Estimates of Leaving the Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics and Treatment-Control Group Balance . . . . . . 96
Table 2.2 Administrative Data on Alerts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Table 2.3 School to Parent Contact about Child’s Academic Progress . . . . . . 100
Table 2.4 Primary Academic Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Table 2.5 Student Grades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Table 2.6 Assignment Scores, Missed Assignments, Class Exams . . . . . . . . . 102
Table 2.7 Other Academic Outcomes and Behaviors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
v
Table 2.8 Parent Beliefs about Missed Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Table 2.9 Parents’ Behavioral Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Table 2.10 Measures of Attrition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Table 2.11 Correlates of Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Table 2.12 Robustness: Assignment Scores, Missed Assignments, Class Exams . . 107
Table 2.13 Spillover Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Table 2.14 Subgroup of Below Average GPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Table 2.15 Subgroup of High School and Middle School Students . . . . . . . . . 109
Table 2.16 Subgroup of Mothers and Fathers Texted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Table 2.17 Subgroup of Below- and Above-Median Household Income . . . . . . . 111
Table 2.18 Subgroup of Below- and Above-Median Proportion Households with
minimum Bachelors Degree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Table 2.19 Academic Outcomes: Year 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Table 2.20 Alerts by Middle v. High School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Table 2.21 Secondary outcomes and their sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Table 2.22 Secondary outcomes and their construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Table 2.23 Secondary outcomes and hypothesized effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics of Children and Mothers of Pre-K Age in Illinois,
Pre- & Post-Mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Table 3.2 Diff-in-Diff Estimates of Bilingual Pre-K on Enrollment . . . . . . . . 148
Table 3.3 Diff-in-Diff Estimates of Bilingual Pre-K on Enrollment using different
timeframes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Table 3.4 Diff-in-Diff Estimates of Bilingual Pre-K on Mothers’ Labor Supply . . 150
Table 3.5 Diff-in-Diff Estimates of Bilingual Pre-K on Mothers’ Labor Supply
using various timeframes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Table A.1 Short-Term (4th Grade) Academic Outcomes: Sharp RD Estimates . . 166
Table A.2 Medium-Term (8th Grade) Academic Outcomes: Sharp RD Estimates 167
vi
Table A.3 High School Outcomes: Sharp RD Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
Table A.4 Long-term & College Outcomes: Sharp RD Estimates . . . . . . . . . 169
vii
Acknowledgements
This work would not be possible without the help, support, and encouragement of many
faculty, peers, friends, and family. I am especially grateful to my primary advisor and
sponsor, Peter Bergman, who took me on as his first research assistant and afforded me an
opportunity to conduct the research I desired to do. Without the constant opportunities,
encouragement, and guidance that Peter has provided, I would not be where I am today. I
am also grateful for Judith Scott-Clayton, whose causal inference course was the first class
I took as a graduate student, and which I enjoyed so much that I decided to apply to the
Ph.D. program. I also thank the other Teachers College and Columbia University faculty
who have given me so much support, mentorship, and guidance, a long list that includes
Thomas Bailey, Priscilla Wohlstetter, Joydeep Roy, Miguel Urquiola, and Hank Levin. I
also thank my committee members - Peter, Judy, Alex Eble, Sarah Cohodes, and Randy
Reback, for the wisdom and feedback during this process that will be useful going forward
in my career.
The papers presented here benefited from the feedback of many beyond the aforemen-
tioned persons. The list includes Scott Imberman, Seth Gershenson, Elise Marifian, Lesley
Turner, Andrew Barr, Thomas Downes, and various participants at the many seminars and
conferences I have attended. Beyond the dissertation, I could not have persisted without
the constant encouragement of Ph.D. peers, including Vivian Liu, Rina Park, Yuxin Lin,
Florence Ran, Di Xu, and Elise Marifian.
My wife, Vicky, has been my rock throughout this process. She was the one to encourage
me to start and the one who will be there at the end, all the while willing to put up with
the stresses of chores, life, and work when I could not be there for her. Along with her, I
thank my family, Vicky’s family, CGF, BCEC, Yao, and Carla. Last but not least, I must
thank my God, who through trials and hardships have shown me that He does indeed do all
things for the good of those who love Him.
viii
Dedication
This dissertation is dedicated to Vicky,
whose unwavering support pushed me through the hills and valleys.
And for the God of the hills and valleys,
who in this journey has taught me much about perseverance, patience,and joy.
ix
Chapter 1
Student Achievement and Parental Investments: Effects from a
Gifted & Talented Program
1
I Introduction
Despite its popularity, limited evidence is available on the effectiveness of placing gifted
and talented programs on student outcomes. To date, research on the benefits of tracking
gifted and talented students into classrooms are characterized by limited quantity and mixed
results. The most credible quasi-experimental literature to date have generally shown little
to no effects on test scores (Bui et al., 2014; Cohodes, 2015). However, those who do detect
effects have found effects to be driven by minorities (Card and Giuliano, 2015), a group
generally underrepresented in gifted and talented programs (Grissom and Redding, 2015).
We also have a limited understanding of the mechanisms driving the effects of gifted
and talented programs (Betts et al., 2011). One potential mechanism is parental inputs.
While research shows that parents play a substantial role in the educational outcomes of
children (Sacerdote, 2007; Heckman, 2008; Cunha et al., 2013), there is limited evidence on
the determinants of parental investment1 in children and their chosen levels of input.
One economic argument is that parents may perceive their own investments as comple-
ments or substitutes to educational quality, which in turn contributes to their input decision
(Pop-Eleches and Urquiola, 2013). In other words, if a child were to have access to a high-
quality school, would his or her parents choose to invest more or less time, money, and
effort in the child’s education than if the same child were to attend a low-quality school? It
is possible that parents whose children suddenly have access to a higher-quality education
would lower their efforts and investments since a better education could replace some of
the outcomes of their own efforts. These parents may do so by decreasing the time spent
with children on homework, lower tutoring costs, or decrease engagement with their child’s
school. The opposite could also happen. For instance, if a child is suddenly identified as
gifted in a situation where his/her parents previously did not believe them to be gifted,
the parents could choose to increase the time spent with children on homework, increase
1I define parental investments here loosely to include time investments, parental effort, and monetary
investments.
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tutoring costs, or increase engagement. Such behavioral responses to educational quality is
important in understanding the true impacts of educational interventions (Todd and Wolpin,
2003). Given the important role of parents in the education production function and skill
formation, parental responses may act as a mechanism that emphasizes the effects of edu-
cational quality. Yet outside of Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013), who finds that parents in
Romania decrease effort when their child attends a better school, there is limited empirical
evidence of the the direction and magnitude of parental behavioral effects.
In this context, this paper adds to the literature by first providing additional evidence
on the effects of gifted and talented programming and then examining the role that parental
investments may play in the effects. Further, I also examine the changes in student engage-
ment and teacher characteristics, which may also be channels towards higher achievement.
To examine these effects, I use the context of a gifted and talented (G&T) program desig-
nated for fourth to sixth graders in a California school district2. In the District, all third
grade students sit for an exam specifically designed to identify attributes of giftedness. Those
who score above a stated threshold are then granted an offer to enroll in a G&T program
beginning in the fourth grade. Those who choose to enroll in the program are then placed
in clusters of typically six to eight students in a classroom with mainstream students and
taught through the use of differentiated learning. I use a regression discontinuity design to
estimate the effects of a gifted and talented program on children’s short-term and long-term
educational outcomes. I initially find that there are small to no effects on cognitive and
schooling outcomes such as standardized test scores, GPA, attendance, and suspensions.
However, I find strong effects on high school course taking and college quality, especially for
minorities.
I then study how parents and students respond behaviorally to increased educational
quality as a result of their child entering the program, with a specific interest in parental
behaviors. Through a unique dataset combining parent and student engagement surveys
2The school district has yet to allow for public dissemination of the district name, so I will refer to it as
the ‘District.’
3
with the students administrative data, I provide evidence on how parents respond through
in-home, in-school, and external tutoring investments one year after the children are iden-
tified for giftedness. There are three primary findings. First, there are very little to mixed
detectable effects in overall parental responses to an increase in educational quality. How-
ever, this is due to clear heterogeneous effects along along a number of demographic factors.
In general, parents of lower socioeconomic backgrounds and minorities increase their parent
engagement levels, whereas those of higher socioeconomic backgrounds decrease parent en-
gagement levels and increase pecuniary investments in tutoring. Second, an investigation on
the tradeoffs between paid tutoring and parental time spent on homework shows that white
and higher socioeconomic parents are more likely to hire external tutoring help, whereas mi-
norities and lower socioeconomic parents increase homework help efforts but do not increase
external tutoring. Third, students increase their level of engagement and motivation in the
classroom, but this correlates directly with increases in relevant teacher characteristics.
While the internal validity of the regression discontinuity is strong, there are a few major
limitations to this analysis. The first limitation is that I cannot causally infer how each
mechanism might directly affect short- and long-term outcomes. The analysis examines how
changes in educational quality might affect potential mechanisms that could in turn affect
achievement outcomes, rather than how the mechanisms affect achievement outcomes. A
second limitation is that the regression discontinuity framework, by its nature, will only
be generalizable for students who are just above and just below the discontinuous cutoff.
A third limitation is that the context may have limited external validity when compared
to other G&T programs. In particular, the structure of the program combines gifted and
non-gifted students in the same classroom, which is a less common practice in many areas
outside of California. And as the results will note, there are also strong post-G&T tracking
tendencies in the District which may not occur in other districts.
This paper contributes an empirical investigation of the role parents play in educational
quality and its potential to emphasize effects stemming from increased educational quality.
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The overall findings point towards strong heterogeneity in socioeconomic factors, such as
class and race, and cultural factors in how parents view their role and investments in a
child’s education. Higher socioeconomic and white parents behave as if their inputs are
substitutes to educational quality, whereas lower socioeconomic and minority parents conduct
investments as if inputs were more complementary.
Beyond the economic implications, this research also plays an important role for policy
and practice. While my test score results differ from those in Card and Giuliano (2015), it
may also help describe why that paper finds that test scores improve more for minorities than
white students. And similarly, my results also contribute to a case for the additional inclusion
of underrepresented groups into gifted and talented programs. Alternatively, the results
can also help school districts understand where to allocate family engagement resources and
incentives. Given previous findings in the literature (Fryer Jr et al., 2015), parental incentives
in particular has great potential for Hispanics and white families.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. I summarize the relevant literature in
Section II, provide background on the G&T context in Section III, describe the data in
Section IV, provide the empirical methods used in Section V, followed by the results in
Section V, speak on validity of the results in VII, provide more discussion in VIII, and
conclude in IX.
II Literature
This research is related to two areas of economic literature, both of which provide limited
concrete findings to date. The first set of related empirical literature is on the effects of
gifted and talented programs. More broadly, I also speak on the finding on the effects of
educational quality more generally. The second set of literature is the ensuing literature on
the mechanisms by which gifted and talented programs - and increases in educational quality
in general - can affect academic outcomes.
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Research on G&T and Educational Quality Impacts
As mentioned, there has been limited credible literature on the causal effects of gifted and
talented program on academic outcomes. The attempts, though, have been numerous. There
were initial attempts to detect effects using matching strategies (Marsh et al., 1995; Fan
and Nowell, 2011), yet Marsh (1998) showed that matching strategies in this context often
produce biased results. The primary issue is that researchers often match students based
on observable variables that are easy to measure and highly available, such as standardized
test scores and demographic characteristics, yet unobservable factors, such as motivation,
persistence, or grit, are often greater factors that affect whether students are considered
gifted or not.
Other attempts to causally identify the effects of gifted and talented programs on achieve-
ment included Bhatt (2009) and Murphy (2009). Bhatt used an instrumental variables ap-
proach by instrumenting for gifted enrollment with a difficulty measure of the qualification
requirements in a student’s school and finds positive effects on achievement. Unfortunately,
Bhatt’s instrument might be invalid in the case where highly motivated parents of marginally
gifted students seek out schools with less stringent requirements to be identified as gifted.
The second issue was that her instrument was likely a weak instrument. Murphy, on the
other hand, uses a fixed effects strategy and finds only small effects on test scores. However,
her strategy also suffered greatly from potential biases that could not be checked.
The strongest causal evidence in the gifted education literature today is from research
conducted using quasi-experimental identification strategies with the strongest internal va-
lidity. Coincidentally, they have all use regression discontinuity design (RDD) methods3,
which are attractive to researchers in contexts where a hard cutoff threshold allocates stu-
dents to differing programs, but may have limited external validity. In the literature, Card
and Giuliano (2015), Bui et al. (2014), and Cohodes (2015) provide the strongest recent
3Matthews et al. (2012) provide a good introduction into how RDD methods can be used in gifted
education research.
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evidence to date using RDD methods.
Bui et al. (2014) studies a middle school gifted program in southwestern US that uses
well-defined cutoffs on an index score based on achievement tests, a nonverbal ability test,
grades, teacher recommendations, and socioeconomic status that allow them to use a regres-
sion discontinuity design. Overall, they do not find that achievement improve for students
who were just above the cutoff and thus enrolled in the gifted program compared to students
who were right under the cutoff and so did not enroll in the program. They further exam-
ined variation across schools in treatment intensity, and find no achievement gains regardless
of how intensely students were treated. Secondly, they were also able to exploit random-
ized lotteries that determine admission to two middle schools with oversubscribed premier
gifted programs, thus allowing them to compare students who were in a premier program as
compared to those who did not get into the premier program but were in a gifted program
regardless. Once again, they find no achievement effects, with the possible exception of sci-
ence. The limitations of this study was that they could only study short term outcomes one
and half year after enrollment and that they believed that standardized exams are not fully
capable of capturing learning gains by design.
In another study, Cohodes (2015) studies Boston’s program for high-achieving fourth
through sixth grade students, Advanced Work Class. She uses a fuzzy regression disconti-
nuity design to estimate the effects on multiple achievement outcomes, including test scores,
course taking, graduation, and college entrance. She find no effects on test scores overall,
but find that longer-term outcomes are improved. The program increased the likelihood of
AP exam taking, college enrollment, and enrollment in elite higher education institutions.
Positive effects on graduation are seen for minority students. Additionally, she finds sugges-
tive evidence that teacher effectiveness and math acceleration account for the effects, with
no contribution from peer effects.
Card and Giuliano (2015) evaluates a gifted program in an urban district where schools
with at least one fourth grader identified as gifted through strict IQ thresholds would mean
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that a separate classroom must be created for them. In cases where the seats of a gifted
classroom are not filled by gifted students, the seats are filled by non-gifted high achievers as
ranked by previous year standardized test scores. While they find that effects on test scores
are significant overall, they note that effects are concentrated on minority students. Black
and Hispanic students saw a 0.5 standard deviation increase in reading and math scores as
a result of the program. When the minorities are taken out, there are no effects for white
students. Additionally, they also find that there is no evidence of spillover effects on other
students in the same school/grade cohort.
More broadly, there is also mixed evidence of the academic effects of obtaining a high-
quality education. Saavedra (2009), Hoekstra (2009), and Kirabo Jackson (2010) are among
the ones who find positive effects on academic and labor market outcomes, though they
are all take place in either higher education or international contexts. In contrast, Clark
(2010), Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2014), and Sekhri et al. (2010) are among the ones to find
insubstantial evidence of a high-quality education on academic outcomes.
Research on Mechanisms
The second set of related literature is on the causal mechanisms that may be driving ef-
fects from receiving a high-quality education. Various mechanisms have been studied, with
varying degrees of literature on the effects of high-quality peers (Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2014;
Hanushek et al., 2003; Imberman et al., 2009; Carrell et al., 2012; Hoxby, 2000; Patacchini et
al., 2017; Dobbie and Fryer Jr, 2014), ordinal rank (Hoxby and Weingarth, 2005; Weinhardt
and Murphy, 2016; Card and Giuliano, 2015), teacher quality and effort (Cohodes, 2015;
Card and Giuliano, 2015), the “match” between students baseline knowledge/ability and
the level of instruction (Duflo et al., 2011; Zimmer, 2003; Banerjee et al., 2007), educational
dosage (Wai et al., 2010; Rambo-Hernandez and Warne, 2015), and resources (Betts and
Shkolnik, 2000).
One mechanism with limited research are parent’s behavioral responses to educational
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quality. Todd and Wolpin (2003) noted that an understanding of underlying parental (and
student) behavioral responses to policies and interventions is crucial to the determination of
their effects. They develop a simple three-period model of the school quality-achievement
relationship, and in particular distinguished the difference between the production function
parameters and policy effects. Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013) emphasizes the model’s
implication that “policy effects might be different in situations where behavioral responses
take time to unfold, or where these responses only appear when certain interventions reach a
certain scale.” As a result, any estimated policy effect could be less generalizable given that
indirect behavioral could vary across contexts.
Despite its importance, there is limited empirical literature on how parents respond to
educational quality, with Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013) supplying the only direct current
evidence I know of. In the Romanian secondary school context, where students are identified
for access to higher achieving schools, Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013) finds that parents
reduce effort when their children attend a better school. Specifically, using survey results
they find that parents do not increase volunteering participation at school, nor do they
increase their levels of homework help, indicating that parents in this context view effort
and school quality as substitutes.
On the contrary, it may also make sense that parents view effort and school quality
as complements. Pop-Elechs and Urquiola studies a context where there is limited hetero-
geneity in of racial and ethnic demographics. In alternative contexts, it very well may be
the opposite. However, while there is currently no support for this notion, it is possible
that cultural or socioeconomic roles may be significant drivers of parental responses. For
example, in a context such as gifted and talented programs, identification into high-quality
programs may change parental beliefs in their children and result in changes in the levels of
investments in the child (Dizon-Ross, 2014). In the U.S., there is some evidence that parents
of low-socioeconomic status have larger information gaps that leads to inaccurate beliefs in
children’s abilities (Bergman, 2015), which makes the U.S. context worth studying.
9
This paper, then, contributes to both sets of research by first providing additional ev-
idence on the effects of gifted and talented programs, followed by an analysis of parental
responses to educational quality in the U.S. context.
III Background and Context
The study takes place in the context of a large, suburban school district (“District”) in
California. One of the 30 largest districts in California with over 30,000 students, the District
consists of diverse, middle-class neighborhoods that generally have enrollments consist of
about 25% Hispanic and black students, 20% low-income students, and 22% English learners
educated in 42 schools. Academically, the District’s students are above average relative to the
achievement levels of California. Recent district achievement on the California Assessment
of Student Performance and Progress (CAASPP) surpassed California’s “Met/Exceeded”
performance in both ELA/Literacy and Mathematics. The area also has high household
incomes, with median household income close to $105,000 and median property values of
$650,000. The area is predominantly Asian and white. The region also has higher education
levels than average, with 53% of adults with a bachelor’s degree or higher.
As a state, California allows for local control of G&T programs and since 2013-14 no
longer funds G&T programs specifically. Districts are given block grants for categorical
programs and these local education agencies are allowed to fund programs as they see fit.
Where G&T programs are funded at the local level, districts are required to have all students
eligible for the programs regardless of socioeconomic, linguistic background, and/or disabil-
ities and are required to adopt a “differentiated curriculum focusing primarily on depth and
complexity of content, advanced or accelerated pacing of content and novelty” for the G&T
program (California State Board of Education, 2015).
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The District’s G&T Program
The focus of this study is the District’s gifted and talented program. The District’s G&T
program initially identifies students starting in the third grade for enrollment as a gifted
student in the fourth grade. The formal program ends in the sixth grade. Identification is
based on an ability assessment, referred to as the Cognitive Assessments Test or CogAT, that
is popular across the country. All students enrolled in the District are automatically included
in the testing, though parents are allowed to opt out. Only a fraction of a percent of parents
actively opt out each year. Students are allowed to take the G&T cognitive assessment
exam in the third, fourth, or fifth grade for entrance into the fourth, fifth, or sixth grade,
respectively. However, policy dictates that students can only take the assessment once. If
they would like to take it a second time, the district requires a nomination from a teacher,
which is not common practice and tends to be used only in exceptional circumstances. Those
who take the exam in the fourth or fifth grade tend to take the exam only if they are new to
the district. Given the policy, over 96% of all students who enter the G&T program receive
entrance by taking the exam in the third grade and formally enter the G&T program in the
fourth grade.
Prospective students write the assessment in three areas, Math (“Quantitative”), English
(“Verbal”), along with a“nonverbal” portion. The CogAT assessment is specifically designed
to assess reasoning skills in areas that correlate strongly to academic success, including
cognitive development, the ability to learn new tasks, and problem solving skills. Figure
1.1 shows some example questions from the assessment. Students receive acceptance into
the G&T program by scoring a minimum of 92nd to 96th percentile in terms of composite
raw score, a threshold predetermined annually based dependent on resources available and
the number of slots open. While a large majority of students enter by scoring a sufficiently
high percentile, a small share of students (varies between 2-4% of accepted students) receive
entrance by scoring extremely high in one primary subject (Math or English) and fairly well
in the second and third subject. While the cutoffs for these single-subject high scorers differ
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slightly by year, they must generally score in the 98th or 99th percentile in the stronger
subject and a minimum of 90th percentile in the weaker areas. Additionally, professional
judgment may be used to include students not identified, but this is only used in exceptional
circumstances.
For those who sit for the exam, students scoring above the annually designated threshold
would receive an offer of enrollment into the G&T program. Unlike many G&T programs
across the country and those that have been studied recently, which tends to separate gifted
students into homogeneous classrooms or schools, a number of California districts implement
clustering and differentiated instruction as the means toward educating gifted students.
Specifically, the District identifies gifted students, clusters them in group of six to eight,
and placement takes place inside a mainstream classroom in such a way that the classroom
consist of a mix of gifted and mainstream students. Gifted students are instructed through
differentiated instruction, whereby the teacher uses a deeper curriculum than the one for
mainstream students, and assigns more challenging work to gifted students. The classroom
teacher is usually certified in differentiated instruction.
Ability-grouping of students in elementary school in the District may have implications for
future course taking. While not formally District policy, G&T students are often exempt from
taking placement exams into available Honors courses at the middle school levels, whereas
students without G&T designation are often required to take placement exams and/or be
recommended by teachers before taking a placement exam. Students who complete Honors
courses with an A or B are often automatically enrolled in the sequential Honors course the
following school year, depending on the practice of the specific school. Some Honors courses
lead straight into Advanced Placement (AP) courses, such as AP Calculus and AP English,
down the road. While it is District policy that all students have an opportunity to take AP
courses, the number of open seats at the school level are usually limited to seats not taken
by students automatically enrolled.
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IV Data and Descriptive Statistics
Access to student-level administrative data is granted by the school district. The dataset
includes records of all third through fifth grade cognitive assessments exam test takers from
the 2001-02 school year through the 2016-17 school year. For each student from these cohorts,
the district provided longitudinal academic data for as long as the student was a student in
the district. The entire administrative dataset includes the following:
• Student Demographics: Student demographic data, including race/ethnicity, English
Learner status, special education status, gender, and age.
• CogAT Exam scores and G&T Enrollment: Student scores, enrollment in gifted edu-
cation program by year.
• School Enrollment: Schools enrolled in district by year.
• Course Enrollment: Transcript data for course enrollment and grades by year.
• Student Outcomes: Annual attendance (days absent, days in attendance), number of
suspension occurrences annually
• Standardized Testing: Statewide standardized test scores (raw and percentile scores)
by math and English for grades 4 through 11.
• SAT Test-taking and College Enrollment: Data on whether student took the SAT, data
merged with National Student Clearinghouse for students from cohorts with sufficiently
long longitudinal data.
• Parent and Student Engagement Survey Data: Data from surveys parents and students
took in the fourth grade.
One unique aspect of the dataset is that the district is able to merge administrative
data to parent engagement and student engagement surveys that were given to parents and
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students in a majority of elementary schools between 2001 through 2015. The parent survey
includes questions on parental time investments in children, parental contact with schools,
and opinions of their child’s school. The student survey includes simple questions about
student motivation, engagement in class, their sense of parental engagement at home, and
levels of teachers engagement.
Table 1.1 shows the summary statistics for baseline characteristics for all students in
column 1, students enrolled in G&T in column 2, and the regression discontinuity sample in
column 3. The District is largely populated by Asians, and in particular those of Chinese
and Taiwanese descent, and a small amount of blacks. Within the G&T program, there is
generally an overrepresentation of females and Asians, along with an underrepresentation of
Hispanics, blacks, ELLs, and low-income (subsidized lunch) students, numbers that corre-
spond to recent research (Grissom and Redding, 2015). Due to the small number of black
students in the G&T program, I will always group Hispanics and black students together in
a group I refer to as ”minorities.”
Table 2.1 presents the covariate balance across the cutoff threshold, which is relevant for
the regression discontinuity design used. This is a comparison of the baseline covariate means
for those just above the cutoff and those just below the cutoff, with the differences shown in
column (2), the p-values in column (3), and the observations in column (4). Here, I find that
the RD sample is relatively well balanced in terms of observable baseline covariates. The
only significant difference is for those with subsidized lunch, where there are few low-income
students under the cutoff mean, at the 10% level. Given the number of covariates, it is well
possible that this significant difference just incidental noise in the data.
For the study of achievement outcomes, the primary outcomes of interest will be referred
to as short-term, medium-term, and long-term4. In the short- and medium-term, I will
analyze 4th and 8th grade5 exam scores, attendance, and suspension occurrences. I will
4Students are tested for giftedness in the third grade for G&T entrance in the fourth grade. In this paper,
short-term outcomes are defined as fourth grade outcomes. Medium-term outcomes are defined as eighth
grade outcomes. Long-term outcomes are defined as high school (grades 9-12) and college-related outcomes.
5Note that, while I present results for these two grades, I run regressions for all grades that data is
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also examine GPA and advanced course-taking at the high school level, especially since
tracked course-taking is regarded as one of the reasons why gifted education may exacerbate
inequalities. In the long-term, since the program has been around for many years, I am able
to study college entry and quality for several cohorts. The findings are presented in Section
V.6 Given previous findings in the literature, I will separate the results primarily by racial
and income subgroups.
For the examination of behavioral outcomes, all dependent variables will be short-term7.
Specifically, all behavioral outcomes are based on surveys conducted towards the end of the
fourth grade, which is equivalent to almost one school year of treatment. These outcomes
include student engagement outcomes, teacher characteristics, and parent engagement out-
comes. The largest point of focus will be in the parent engagement outcomes. Again, these
estimates will be separated by subgroups of interest. In particular, I wished to test for hetero-
geneity based on demographic and household structure (e.g., number of children) differences.
Behavioral outcomes are completely derived from the fourth grade parent and student survey
responses. The parent engagement response rates are quite high for the primary regression
discontinuity sample, with a response rate around 73%. This could represent the higher
parent engagement levels relative to the rest of the student population in the district, where
the overall response rate is about 65%8. Student engagement surveys, which are required
of students and done in the class environment, are much higher than parent engagement
surveys. For the regression discontinuity sample, the student response rate was 88% and the
available for. I present only two grades here since results are representative of overall results across grades.
6Additionally, after preliminary analysis, I had found and concluded that there were small cognitive
effects in standardized examination and many external effects that are purely cosmetic or in name, such
as effects on what courses students took and what colleges they went to. Some wanted more insight into
whether the G&T program was increasing learning or a mechanism for non-cognitive, cosmetic outcomes.
As a result, while I found that GPA effects were negative (possibly due to taking challenging courses), I have
also included an analysis of how specific GPAs in core requirements at the high school level fared. Thus,
there are multiple GPA outcomes examined.
7Survey results are all from the fourth grade, which makes it all short-term outcomes. Parents and
students are surveyed approximately 80%-90% into the fourth grade school year
8This is still a very high response rate of parental responses. In my previous work experience with the
Boston Public Schools, the typical response rate of parent engagement surveys often hovered in the 20 to 30
percent range. Of course, the district here is a suburban district and quite a bit wealthier overall, so higher
response rates could largely be attributed to demographic differences when compared.
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overall response rate was 84%. One additional check to the validity of surveyed outcomes
is that regression discontinuity samples do not have differential response rates across the
threshold.
V Empirical Strategy
The basic empirical method will be a regression discontinuity (RD) model, a model often
used for causal inference when there is a sharp cutoff for entrance into a program (Lee and
Lemieux, 2010). In this context, the primary reason for internal validity of the RD model
is that we are comparing the effects of a program for students who scored just barely above
the exam threshold and just barely below the threshold. In the absence of manipulation or
cheating, students who score just above and just below the cutoff should be highly similar in
terms of ability, observable characteristics, and non-observable characteristics. While a sharp
RD model would work relatively well, given that the cutoff is a relatively sharp, estimates
could be more conservative than necessary. Thus, due to imperfect compliance I chose to go
with a fuzzy RD model as the preferred specification, where the major assumption is that the
cutoff induces a change in the probability of treatment (Hahn et al., 2001). The estimates
would be a local average treatment effect. This is the same as using an instrumental variables
strategy. The first stage is as follows:
enrollmentist = α0 + α1aboveist + α2gapist + α3gapist ∗ aboveist + λ′Xi + δst + ist, (1.1)
where enrollmentist is G&T enrollment status for student i in school s at year t, aboveist
is the indicator for being above the G&T threshold, gapist is the distance from the testing
cutoff, X1 is a vector of baseline characteristics, and δst are school and year fixed effects.
The second stage is as follows:
Yist = β0 + β1enrollmentist + β2gapist + β3gapist ∗ aboveist + λ′Xi + δst + ist, (1.2)
16
where Yist is the outcome of interest. I include the baseline characteristics and school and
year fixed effects in all regressions. I also cluster all standard errors at the baseline school
level.
In terms of specifications, I estimate optimal bandwidths using the procedure from
Calonico et al. (2014) for all reported estimates. Optimal bandwidths vary slightly by out-
come, but it is usually between 2 to 2.5 percentile points away from the cutoff. Note that
this occasionally changes the number of observations by outcomes9. My preferred specifica-
tions also use triangular kernal weights, which weighs observations closer to the threshold
more than those further from the threshold, for all my specifications. I also tend to report
2SLS coefficient estimates, but reduced form estimates are also available upon request. All
standard errors are clustered at the third grade school level.
Assumptions
In order for the empirical strategy to be internally valid, some assumptions must be met.
One key assumption behind the credibility of an RD design is that the cutoff induces a change
in probability of treatment. Figure 1.2 shows the share of students ever enrolled in the G&T
program by the cognitive abilities exam score and shows that the score clearly increases the
probability of enrollment discontinuously. The score cutoff is an aggregate percentile score
resulting from a student’s score in all three subject areas and each student’s score is provided
by the District. A strong discontinuity occurs at the testing cutoff, which can vary from year
to year depending on the number of seats available but is most often the 93rd percentile. In
this figure, I standardized the running variable to be each student’s percentile points away
from that year’s threshold. There is a minimal share of students - about 6% - just above
the cutoff who choose to not enroll in the program. There are also a minimal amount of
students - about 4% - who ever enroll despite being just below the cutoff.
9Note that there are other reasons for variance in observations, including missing data (e.g., parent did
not answer a certain question). This is particularly obvious for parent engagement surveys, where parents
occasionally skip certain questions either on purpose or inadvertently.
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There are multiple reasons for students below the cutoff to enroll in the GATE program.
In addition to being offered a gifted placement by scoring above the threshold, students
may also be identified by scoring a minimum of 97th or 98th percentile on one subject -
predetermined annually based on seats - and a minimum of 80th percentile in the second
subject. It is also possible to enter the program at a later year in the 5th or 6th grade
and students are allowed to take the entrance exam multiple times. However, only a small
percentage of students - less than 4% - enter after the fourth grade. The general rules of
the District do not make it easy to enter after the fourth grade. These are consistent with
reasons to use a fuzzy RD instead of a sharp RD. The evidence is clear that a fuzzy RD
should be a valid strategy in this context.
A second key assumption is that there is no manipulation or cheating around the threshold
that would change the enrollment probability of the student (McCrary, 2008). To test this,
figure 1.3 shows a histogram of raw exam scores around the threshold, whereas 1.4 shows
the density of raw exam scores around the threshold. Here, I find limited visual evidence
that there is manipulation around the threshold. There is a small possibility that test scores
(or annual predetermined thresholds) were manipulated so that less students are above the
threshold, but it is not visually clear cut. Here, I can also test whether there is a significant
difference at the threshold by running an RD density test as per Cattaneo et al. (2016), and
the p-value is 0.84. This indicates that there is no significant difference between the test
scores just above and just below the threshold.
The slight dip right after the threshold should be investigated a bit more. By restricting
the RD bandwidth to a smaller width around the threshold (1.5 percentile points), I do
find that there is a p-value of 0.1034, indicating that very close around the threshold there
is close to a significant difference in scores at the 10% level. In investigating the potential
for this, one recently retired district administrator informed me that there have been times
when the district would slightly move the predetermined threshold upward as a result of
last minute seat or budget limitations, and always to allow a few less students in than
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anticipated. However, I have no evidence that either students, teachers, or administrators
were able to change the scores themselves. This does not invalidate the RD design, but
it does mean that over time there might be small evidence of bunching just under the
threshold. For instance, if many students scored the exact same score with the exact same
percentile, the district will choose to not offer seats to all of those students rather than to
all those students. Over time, this may create more bunching right under the threshold and
thus the perception of manipulation. However, given that there is no evidence that this is
systematically done to include or exclude certain types of students, the assumption should
still be valid. Additionally, as mentioned there are minor differences in terms of baseline
covariates across the threshold, which gives added comfort that this is not a problem for
internal validity.
VI Results
In this section I first describe the results for academic achievement outcomes in subsection
A, including fourth and eigth grade academics, high school course taking, GPA, and college
enrollment and quality outcomes. Along with these, I describe heterogeneity in effects ob-
served for my subgroups of interest, which are primarily minorities and low-income students.
In subsection B, I describe the results for short-term behavioral results using the parent
and student surveys, along with the heterogeneous effects. I also discuss changes in teacher
characteristics.
A Academic Outcomes
Short- and Medium-Term Academic Results
Table A.1 presents the 2SLS RD estimates for the short-term outcomes, which include fourth
grade10 attendance (in days absent) in column 1, suspension occurrences in column 2, and
10I also examine standardized exams for grades five through eleven and find similar results. For that
reason, I limit the results shown here to fourth grade for the short-term and eighth grade for the medium
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statewide standardized examination scores for math and English Language Arts (standard-
ized to zero for all students by grade/year) in columns 3 and 4. Outcome estimate tables
are presented with the white/Asian subgroup, a minorities subgroup made up of black and
Hispanic students11, and low-income subgroups12. All data are at the student level, and all
specifications have clustered standard errors at the baseline school level.
First, I am unable to detect any significant effects on any outcome in Math or ELA
standardized examination scores, attendance, or the share ever suspended during the fourth
grade among the overall regression dicontinuity sample. The coefficients are inconsistent
in sign and there is limited estimates of significance. Second, there are also no detectable
effects among the subgroups of interest. The G&T program formally lasts through the sixth
grad. After running estimates through the sixth grade, despite a few significant coefficients
in test scores, there are still no robust effects in these outcomes when examines with varying
thresholds.
Further, Table A.2 shows the effects four grade levels after initial enrollment into G&T.
This includes eighth grade standardized examination scores, attendance, suspension occur-
rences, and eighth grade GPA. Consistently, estimates also show small to no effects on
outcomes in the eighth grade with the exception of GPA, which shows a slightly negative
coefficient significant at the 10% level. Coefficients on short- and medium-term standardized
exam scores are generally positive with some significance for the subgroups of interest. How-
ever, theses estimates are neither strong nor robust to varying specifications and bandwidths.
One interesting observation, however, is that GPA coefficients are consistently negative. This
is one phenomenon that continues to be negative even throughout high school and one aspect
I will analyze more in the next section in high school.
The lack of overall academic and achievement outcome effects in the short- and medium-
term as representative examples of results.
11I combined black and Hispanic students together in part due to the sample size of blacks being small.
The effects for Hispanics are not different from the combined minorities group, although for blacks alone
there is limited power. Given that effects in previous literature tend to be stronger for both minority groups,
I chose to group them together in my analysis.
12I used subsidized lunch as a proxy for low-income subgroups
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term is consistent with most of the previous literature. There could be multiple contextual
explanations for the lack of detectable effects. First, the students observed here in both
the treatment and control group are high-ability students regardless of whether they were
identified as gifted or not. Given that I am studying the effects on students at the upper end
of the achievement distribution and the control group is also of high-ability, limited effects
might be expected. Despite similar results, this aspect runs in contrast to Cohodes (2015),
whose G&T context in Boston accepts approximately 20% of students rather than the top
several percent. However, effects on test scores might hinge on many aspects that could be
potential channels for positive or negative effects. Such reasons could include the ability
and effort exerted by teachers to teach the differentiated curriculum, whether the advanced
curriculum covers relevant topics and skills for the exam, that exams are high-stakes enough
for students to exert consistent effort, or that being in classrooms with mainstream students
has positive or negative peer effects. While the coefficients on test scores are generally slightly
positive, one or more of these reasons may offset the estimates and render them insignificant.
High School Results
Table A.3, Panel A, shows the effects on high school course taking on the overall RD sample.
In this subsection, I focus on the first four columns. Here, I specifically study the effects of
course taking given previous suggestions that advanced course-taking could be a channel to
longer-term outcomes (Cohodes, 2015; Bhatt, 2009). I find positive effects on the amount
of honors and advanced placement (AP) courses taken by students. Participation in G&T
increases the amount of honors courses taken by students by 0.92 courses on top of a control
group mean of 3.27 courses. It also increases AP courses by taken 0.36 courses, and increases
the likelihood of taking any AP course by eleven percentage points. The strongest effects
is the increase in the likelihood of taking AP Calculus, where G&T student see gains by 21
percentage points, or about an 81% increase over the control group mean.
Panels B and C divides the subgroups by race/ethnicity. While positive effects are
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apparent for both white/Asian and minorities subgroups, effects are especially strong for
minorities and low-income students. Coefficients are consistently larger across each outcome
for these subgroups. Minorities take 1.53 more honors courses, 0.71 AP Courses, are 19
percentage points more likely to take any AP, and 23 percentage points more likely to take
AP Calculus. The latter coefficient is particularly strong, as this represents a 121% increase
over the control complier mean for AP Calculus.
The magnitudes of effect estimates seem large, particularly in comparison to the effects
on standardized test scores. In conversations with district administrators and a teacher, I
learned that in practice students tend to be highly tracked into more advanced courses after
participation in the the G&T program despite unformalized tracking policies. For example, a
student may be enrolled in the G&T program from fourth through sixth grade, then proceed
to advanced or honors level math courses in middle school. From there, most high schools
automatically enroll students into Honors mathematics courses as long as students arrive
from advanced math course in middle school, and this inadvertent and informal tracking
can last through AP Calculus in high school. As students progress toward the next grade,
students who were not previously in an advanced level course have only limited seats in
which they can apply for to be in the advanced level. The effects seen here are consistent
with the anectodal evidence. However, the caveat here is that this result may be specific to
the context.
Is there increased learning from G&T?
Thus far, the results I have shown include standardized test score coefficients that are mostly
slightly positive and GPA coefficients that are slightly negative, though both indicators are
insignificant. Given the lack of evidence of increases in standardized test scores or GPA,
there is no evidence of increased learning or academic performance as a result of the G&T
program. One possibility is that standardized exams and overall GPAs do not capture
learning or performance at a sufficiently precise level, or contain too much noise. For example,
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standardized exams may not test the knowledge and skills that improve as a result of the
program. Overall GPAs for the treatment group may be incomparable to the control group
since it is clear that G&T students take more challenging courses.
In an attempt to estimate the effects using a more appropriate GPA comparison and to
understand more regarding whether G&T students perform at a higher level than control
group students, I develop a GPA variable using only common courses that were required at
the time students were in high school and where courses did not have advanced sections like
advanced placement or honors. For example, high school students from the third grade cohort
of 2001-02 were required to take a course in Integrated Science, a course in Government and
Economics, and a course in World History, none of which had honors or AP sections available
at the time the cohort were required to take the course. By constructing a variable for their
grades in these required/non-advanced courses, I can estimate GPA comparisons between
former G&T students and their peers to test whether the G&T program instilled some lasting
ability for improved grades beyond the G&T program. The high school estimates for required
course GPA are included in Column 6 of Table A.3, whereas cumulative GPAs are found in
column 5. I find that G&T students perform slightly better than their control group peers
in these required courses, with an estimated GPA increase of 0.22 from a control group mean
of 3.29 significant at the 10% level. This effect is consistent across racial subgroups, though
it is undetectable for those with subsidized lunch. Table A.2, Column 6, also shows similar
estimates for the 8th grade. There are positive coefficients for GPA in required courses but
no significant effects. Given that there are a lot more common required courses in middle
school versus high school, the blend of courses and the skill types required for success in
those courses could well be a driver of grade variation. It is also possible that any additional
gains from G&T are either cumulative and/or interacts with age, growth, or maturity.
Despite the limitations of what GPA can tell us, the estimates could support the notion
that while cumulative GPAs do not necessarily improve significantly from being a part of the
program, there could still be some positive and lasting effects on learning ability. Without
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more fine-grain data, however, it is impossible to know what specific skills might be driving
these results. For example, it could indicate an increase in cognitive skills such as ability to
learn and ability to comprehend, or non-cognitive skills such as time management, organi-
zation skills, or other soft skills. At a minimum, though, this is an indication that there is
some educational value to a G&T education above and beyond a mainstream education. It
is possible that the additional skills do not correlate with improved standardized test-taking
scores, but skills that can help in the classroom. Additional research will be necessary to
dive deeper into these effects.
Long-Term Academic Results
Table A.4 presents the results for long-term college-related outcomes. The long-term out-
comes I examine are ever having taken the SAT, enrollment in any college within six months
of graduation, and enrollment in the most competitive colleges13. I find positive effects on
the probability of students taking the SATs by eleven percentage points, the probability
that they enrolled in any college by eight percentage points, and enrollment in the most
competitive colleges by nine percentage points. The strong college enrollment outcomes are
consistent with that of Cohodes (2015), who find that enrollment in Boston’s Advanced
Work Class increases enrollment in the elite colleges by four percentage points per year of
participation in the program.
Coefficients are particularly strong for the minorities and low-income subgroups. Despite
finding that students seem to have lower cumulative GPAs as a result of G&T, these students
still see strong increases in SAT participation, college enrollment, and enrollment into the
most competitive colleges. Overall, the effects on enrollment in the most competitive colleges
is close to 30% overall, but for minorities and low-income students the increase is closer to
about 47%. The most popular ’most competitive’ colleges with these students are notable
13The most competitive colleges are based on Barron’s selectivity index. I use Barron’s rankings of “most
competitive” and “Highly competitive plus” ” as my ’most competitive’ category. This particular indicator
is a binary outcome that indicates whether it is a school in one of these categories or not.
24
institutions such as UC-Berkeley and UCLA. While these impact estimates are particularly
high, once again it may be driven by the context. College-related results may be directly
correlated with the higher opportunity that students have for advanced course taking, ren-
dering it limited in terms of external validity when compared to other districts with G&T
programs.
B Behavioral Responses
During most years in the relevant time period, parent engagement and student engagement
surveys were sent home to parents during April or May of the fourth grade school year,
equivalent to about seven to eight months into the treatment condition. Using the survey
data, I now investigate whether the G&T program leads to behavioral responses among par-
ents and students. This analysis does not attempt to examine the extent to which behavioral
changes impact academic achievements, but solely to present evidence that may support (or
not) its prevalence in acting as a channel for effects.
Parental Engagement and Time Investments
Table 1.7 reports the estimations on the effects of various outcome variables related to
parental engagement. Panel A presents the results for all parents who took the survey
conditional on being within the regression discontinuity threshold. Each column represents
the 2SLS coefficient estimates for various surveyed outcomes. The survey answers used as
outcomes here arrive from frequency-based statements where parents are asked to respond
on a four-point scale. I converted this four point scale numerically so that “Very Often”
is a 4, “Sometimes” is a 3, “Rarely” is a 2, and “Never” is a 1. The variables themselves
are categorized as in-school and in-home indicators, with three in-school variables and four
in-home variables. The questions, in order by column, are firstly the in-school indicators
“During the past marking period, I have spoken with my child’s teacher”, “During the past
marking period, I have attended a school or class event”, and “During the past marking
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period, I have attended a formal school meeting.” The columns following those are the in-
home indicators “I help my child with their homework”, “I speak with my child about their
school work”, “I take my child to the library to borrow books”, and “I tell my child that
I believe in them.” The surveys are written and printed by an external consulting group
that specializes in engagement surveys. Robust standard errors are clustered at the baseline
school level.
In the overall sample, estimates of coefficients on parent engagement are generally pos-
itive, though the magnitudes tend to be small and there are little in terms of significant
findings. Given the frequency-based scale of the answers, the coefficients also mean little in
practice and are difficult to interpret. The sole survey item with a significant coefficient is
from the question “I tell my child that I believe in them,” which is positive and significant at
the 5% level. However, given that parents do not significantly increase their levels of home-
work help, speaking with the child about school work, and bringing the child to the library,
there is little overall support here for parents viewing their role as either complements or
substitutes of education quality.
Panels B, C, and D break down the estimates by white, Asian, and minorities subgroups.
Parents with Asian backgrounds are primarily made up of Chinese, Taiwanese, and Korean
descent, whereas minorities are defined as Hispanics and African-Americans. Estimates show
substantial variation in effects based on racial/ethnic backgrounds. For instance, estimates
for parents of white students are mostly negative, with six of the seven indicators having
negative coefficients. The most significant negative outcome for white parents is homework
help, which is significant at the 5% level. There are slightly positive coefficients on Asian
parents, though mostly insignificant. However, when we limit it to in-home indicators, three
of four indicators show significant increases, including homework help, speaking to their
child, and telling their child that they believe in them. In contrast to whites, minorities see
the most positive and significant coefficients. Only one of seven indicators is slightly nega-
tive (attending school meetings), and four of the seven indicators are significantly positive.
26
Homework help, speaking to the child, and telling their child they believe in them are all
significant at a minimum the 5% level. Including the coefficient for borrowing books, the four
in-home indicators consistently show positive coefficients. The results provides evidence of
the heterogeneity in how different racial and ethnic groups may view their role in light of ed-
ucational quality. Minority parents may be more likely to view their role as complementary,
whereas white parents are more likely to view their role as substitutionary.
These results also align with informal teacher interviews I conducted. In speaking with
three teachers of gifted students at the school, two of them remarked that that there might
be variation in how parents respond to their child being identified as gifted. One teacher who
previously taught third grade (when parents receive offers for G&T enrollment) remarked
that she finds that minority parents become more passionate about their child’s education
when they find out about their giftedness, whereas many white parents seem to already
know (or assume) that their child is gifted. She also knows that the school receives a lot
more appeals from white parents than minority parents when children do not receive offers,
although she could not provide specific numbers.
Table 1.8 presents the results by subsidized and non-subsidized lunch subgroups. Again,
heterogeneous effects between the two groups are apparent. Parents of low-income students
increase their engagement levels more than those without subsidized lunch. Parents from
subsidized households see significant increases in time spent on homework help, time spent
talking to child about school work, book borrowing, and in telling their child they believe
in them. In contrast, there is limited robust evidence that unsubsidized families increase or
decrease engagement levels.
Unfortunately, the binary nature of the lunch subsidies variable provides little informa-
tion into explaining the variation in the outcome variables, and I have no data on household-
level income. To investigate the income effects further, I match student home addresses with
American Community Survey census tract median income data (2011-2015 estimates). While
not presented here, the results of this analysis show households within the wealthiest quintile
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of neighborhoods have negative parental engagement effects, especially in terms of homework
help and school-level involvement variables such as attendance of schooling events. If one ex-
amines households from the wealthiest neighborhoods to poorest neighborhoods, engagement
estimates, especially that of in-home engagement, increase gradually. This pattern supports
heterogeneous effects in parental engagement by income, with wealthier households treat-
ing parental effort more as a substitute to educational quality and lower-income households
treating it as a complement.
This evidence correlates with two additional analysis I conducted to study heterogene-
ity: household language and parent education. Several major languages are spoken in the
district, including English, Chinese, Korean, Spanish, and Hindi. The District requests the
parent’s language preference during the registration process. The engagement survey itself
is translated into several languages such that a large majority of parents are able to obtain
a form in their first language. In conducting an analysis by household language, I find that
families whose first language are not English show stronger positive effects relative to those
whose household language is English, with the strongest effects coming from Hispanic speak-
ers. There are also mixed results for speakers of the Asian languages. In the analysis by
parental education, I was able to merge adult education levels at the census tract level to
each family’s residence. I find evidence that there is some suggestive evidence that higher
educated parents sees more negative engagement effects, whereas those with lower education
have more positive effects.
Time and Pecuniary Investment Tradeoffs
To provide further evidence for the substitutionary or complementary effects of educational
quality, I examine the tradeoff between the questions ‘how often do you help your children
with homework’ and ‘In the past year, have you paid for tutoring services for your child?’.
Using the entire population of students in the fourth grade, the overall correlation between
these variables are slightly positive for the entire available sample of students, indicating that
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in general parents who tend to help with their child’s homework also provide more tutoring
services for their children. On the contrary, the regression discontinuity sample show a
slightly negative correlation, indicating that families closer to the threshold have tradeoffs
between investing time and investing money in their children’s studies. This correlates with
results from the survey. Parents across all schools and student types have a mean of 2.41 on
the homework help question, whereas parents within the regression discontinuity threshold
have a mean of 2.94 (a higher mean implies that parents spend more time helping child
with homework). A simple t-test shows that this difference is significant at the 1% level,
indicating that parents of high-achieving students already help their child with homework
more than the general population. Therefore, it seems that threshold parents likely face more
time constraints and therefore have more of a need to trade off in-home help for tutoring.
Table 1.9 presents regressions ran on the effects of tutoring, with a comparison of the
effects on time spent on homework help with subgroups analysis by the primary subgroups.
Around the threshold, there is a clear tradeoff between time spent on homework help and
paid tutoring. However, when broken down by subgroups, I find that the tradeoff becomes
more apparent. The negative coefficients on time spent on homework help for white parents
and negligible effect for wealthier parents might be a byproduct of the fact that these parents
have less time to spend on their children’s homework and choose to increase paid services
and decrease in-home help. On the contrary, minorities and those with less wealth tend to
increase both tutoring services and in-home help, but the control group means are lower for
these populations so they may be spending less initial time and money on these activities.
Once again, these tradeoffs would be consistent with how high and low socioeconomic parents
may perceive their educational roles differently.
C Student Engagement, Motivation, and Effort
Table 1.10 describes the impact of the G&T program on student engagement, motivation,
and effort. The first three indicators, in order by column, are “I always want to do my best
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work”, “I always finish my assignments for class”, “I make an effort to do my best work
inside and outside of class.” The results show that, in general, these measures of student
effort increase as a result of the gifted program. The first and third columns, which indicate
motivation and effort, show impacts significant at the one percent level. Additionally, when
I examine minorities and subsidized lunch subgroups, I find even stronger effects on these
indicators. Whether the results have to do with the challenging curriculum, teacher quality,
or other factors related to the program is unknown. However, it does indicate that the
program increase student motivation more generally.
Self-reported surveys, particularly those that report self-effort, can be rife with biases and
lying. To examine this possibility and to gain confidence in the parent engagement results,
I also examined available indicators that correlate with the parent engagement survey. Sim-
ilarly signed coefficients for these variables when compared to parent engagement indicators
would add confidence to the findings.
To align results, table 1.10, columns 4 through 6, also reports the effects on variables
from the student engagement surveys on some of the same subgroups as in previous sections
(I do not include all applicable subgroups here, but results are highly correlative with parent
engagement indicators). The reported indicators are“My parents care a lot about me” in
column 4, “My parents believe that I can do my best work” in column 5, and “My parents
always help me with homework” in column 6. For the most part, while the coefficients are
generally smaller in magnitude and significance when compared to the results from parent
engagement surveys, they point in the similar directions. In particular, the variable with
the strongest correlative result is the ‘time helping with homework’ variable. These results
provides complementary evidence of how parents react to a child’s giftedness. It also provides
evidence that parents are not giving completely unreliable self-reports of effort levels.
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Exposure to Teacher Characteristics
Finally, using both the student and parent surveys, I am able to examine how teacher
characteristics change as a result of entering the G&T program. Table 1.11 describes the
results of teacher-related variables from these surveys. The six questions are agree/disagree
statements based on a four-point scale, which I converted numerically so that “I strongly
agree with this statement” is a 4 and “I strongly disagree with this statement” is a 1. The
first four questions are from the student engagement survey. In order by column from left
to right are “My teacher challenges me to do my best work”, “My teacher believes I can do
well in class”, “My teacher spends a lot of time with me”, and “My teacher helps me when I
have difficulty”. The last two columns are indicators from the parent survey, which includes
“My child’s teacher communicates with me regularly”, and “My child’s teacher holds high
expectations of my child.”
Despite not having access to data on teacher observables, the results here clearly indicate
that some aspects of teachers change as a result of being in the program. G&T students
find themselves being challenged more by teachers, encouraged more, and are more helpful.
Parents also find that teachers communicate more and expectations are higher for gifted
students.
However, one limitation is that it is difficult to decipher whether students just feel better
about a teacher as a result of the program or if students actually have higher quality teachers.
Given that there are classrooms where both gifted and non-gifted students reside, I can
examine this aspect. When I limit the RD sample to only those student who are in classrooms
with gifted students, the differences largely disappear, though there are still some significant
differences. In conversations with district teachers, one teacher in particular mentioned that
she would have a tendency to spend more time and energy with gifted students, given that
they generally ask more questions and exert more effort. Combined, the results could be
an indication that teachers exert more effort towards gifted students even in cases where
teacher quality is constant within classrooms.
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VII Validity and Robustness
The internal validity of a regression discontinuity method is usually the strongest amongst
quasi-experimental methods. It has the power to produce credible causal estimates at the
margins of the threshold. However, in my context, there are three potential internal validity
issues that I must examine further beyond the basic assumptions of regression discontinuity.
The first is attrition. If there is differential attrition between treatment and control
groups, the RD design no longer mimics an experiment and estimates may be biased. Since
I have standardized test scores for grades four through eleven, I created an indicator for
missing math test score for each year after the third grade. I then regress the indicator on
my primary specification, which includes baseline school by year fixed effects and baseline
demographics, and report the reduced form in table 1.12. Although generally students below
the threshold leave the sample more often, there is no significant differential attrition between
those just above the threshold and those just below the threshold at any significance level. I
also added a missing indicator for student being sent to the National Student Clearinghouse
for a data merge after high school, and noted that there are no differences in attrition at
that point either.
A second potential issue is the control group. If students from the control group are
assigned to classrooms such that an inordinate share are placed in classrooms with G&T
students, and those classrooms are systematically different from regular classrooms in some
observable or unobservable way, there is the potential for estimates to be biased. For example,
if G&T classrooms consistently have better teachers and control group students consistently
received classroom placements with gifted clusters, then the control group could be expected
to have better outcomes. This could attenuate effect estimates for the gifted students. To test
this possibility, I run exploratory regressions by restricting specifications to the control group
and estimating coefficients by comparing the baseline covariates of control group students
inside gifted classrooms to those outside gifted classrooms. In other words, I compare the
“balance” in outcomes across different classroom types for the control group. In regressions
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not shown, I noted no significant differences in baseline covariates.
A third issue is that of robustness. I tested all of my primary outcomes using regressions
with varying optimal bandwidths, bandwidths, and kernel weights. For optimal bandwidths,
by default I estimated optimal bandwidths using the procedure from Calonico et al. (2014).
I also use the procedure proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and noted very little
differences in optimal bandwidths and estimates. Optimal bandwidths vary slightly by out-
come, but it is usually between 2 to 2.5 percentile points away from the cutoff. Additionally,
I tested out bandwidths of three, four, and five, and six percentile points away from the test-
ing threshold. Estimates are consistent at thresholds up to five percentile points away, but
weaken after that and only when using a uniform kernel. By default I use triangular kernel
weights, which weighs observations closer to the threshold more than those further from the
threshold, for all my specifications. As mentioned, I also tested out uniform weights and
obtained consistent estimates up to five percentile points away. Standard errors are clustered
at the third grade school level. Beyond varying bandwidths and kernal weights, I also tested
results without clustering. Overall results do no substantially change as a result of various
clustering.
Given the unique context, a fourth issue is the potential for reallocation of teacher time
within G&T-clustered classrooms, in a manner that might benefit either non-gifted or gifted
students. In one interview with a teacher, she noted that implementation of the curriculum
and time allocation between teachers can vary within the classroom. During teacher training
for G&T teachers, there is some guidance from the school district, but the guidelines still
allow for variation in between classrooms based on teacher judgment. In the event where
teachers with certain characteristics consistently spend more time with either groups, it may
greatly vary the effectiveness of the program between classrooms. On a related note, there is
also the potential that teachers change clusters within the classroom in such a way where non-
gifted students may be able to do classwork with gifted student. While the teachers I spoke
to does not believe that this happens, they note that it is a possibility amongst teachers. If
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this were practiced consistently among teachers, estimates could become negatively biased.
A fifth issue is the possibility of the exclusion restriction being violated. In a fuzzy RD
framework, the assumptions of an instrumental variables framework must also be fulfilled. In
this case, there is the potential for parental beliefs about students to change based on whether
the student was identified as a gifted student or not. In the case where beliefs are changed
differently by subgroups, the exclusion restriction for a proper instrument could be violated.
In this case, it may behoove the analysis to revert to a sharp RD analysis rather than a fuzzy
RD. While the fuzzy RD was selected based on noncompliance to treatment assignment,
noncompliance was only a small percentage. Thus, an analysis using sharp RD should give
similar estimates while not requiring the exclusion restriction to be fulfilled. In Appendix
X, I also show the primary student outcome estimates of the regression discontinuity sample
using a sharp RD analysis. There are no substantial differences in results.
Beyond validity checks, there are also some limitations of how this research is useful
and generalizable. The first limitation is that I cannot directly causally infer how parent
engagement might directly affect short- and long-term outcomes. My analysis examines how
changes in educational quality might affect potential mechanisms that should in turn af-
fect achievement outcomes, rather than how the mechanisms affect achievement outcomes.
Therefore, additional research will be required to directly examine the effects of parent en-
gagement on achievement. Another limitation is that the regression discontinuity framework,
by its nature, will only be generalizable for students who are just above and just below the
discontinuous cutoff. A third limitation is that the context may have limited external va-
lidity when compared to other G&T programs. In particular, the structure of the program
combines gifted and non-gifted students in the same classroom, which is a less common
practice in many areas outside of California. Relative to other studies similar to this one,
this context contains higher achieving students. For example, Cohodes (2015) studies a stu-
dent population where between 11% to 20% are identified and offered enrollment into its
gifted program, whereas Card and Giuliano (2015) studies a program that was initially an
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expanded to be inclusive of additional students. In comparison to these studies, my study
would be more generalizable to contexts where only a select few high-achievers receive offers
to attend the G&T program.
VIII Discussion
A General discussion on the effects of G&T programs
The results presented on effects of the G&T program have several implications and questions.
First, this paper adds little new information into how gifted programs affect test scores. Con-
sistent with most previous literature there are no effects on test scores (Betts and Shkolnik,
2000; Cohodes, 2015; Bui et al., 2014), yet a few others have found some test score gains
(Card and Giuliano, 2015; Bhatt, 2009). In my analysis, I examined test score outcomes
for grades four through eleven and found no robust significant effects. This includes out-
comes for the tenth grade, when the students take the high stakes California Standardized
Testing and Reporting Program (nicknamed STAR prior to 2014) or the California Assess-
ment of Student Performance and Progress (CAASPP, after 2014). These numbers add to
the evidence that there might not be conventional test score gains to be had from gifted
programs.
Second, this paper adds to the evidence that certain subgroups, especially that of blacks
and Hispanic students, tend to benefit more from gifted programs. This study find that long-
term college effects are stronger for minorities and low-income students. In addition to Card
and Giuliano (2015)’s paper, which finds that estimates for “blacks and Hispanics together
account for virtually all of the average effect observed in the pooled sample” for increases in
test scores, there is an argument to be made that minorities would benefit from an expansion
of G&T programs. However, blacks and Hispanics are consistently underrepresented in gifted
and talented education (US Department of Education, 2014).
Third, I add to the evidence that gifted programs have effects on taking advanced course-
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work. Cohodes (2015) and Bhatt (2009) both find strong effects on tracking into advanced
courses. This could be driven by school and district policies. One interesting aspect is that
Cohodes used a fuzzy RD to study Boston’s Advanced Work Class (AWC) and find that
students are not more likely to enroll in the city’s exam-based magnet schools, indicating
that the program might not improve a student’s cognitive skills or test scores. She does find
that students are more likely to take AP exams, especially calculus. I find similar results,
but my analysis also compared cumulative GPA to GPA from required courses. In this
manner, I found that cumulative GPAs did not improve for G&T students, but GPAs in
required courses increased slightly. The indication here is that there could be cognitive or
ability gains from G&T programs, but what specific skills are improved is still undiscernible
without additional data.
Fourth, while the effects on parent engagement and time investments are encouraging,
why is there an increase in parental engagement for some subgroups, but not correspond-
ing impacts on short- and medium-term academic outcomes? There are multiple possible
explanations. First, the measures used might not be appropriate measures. For example,
students might increase their assignment completion rate due to additional homework help
from parents, but I do not have outcomes at the assignment level. Additionally, standardized
examination test scores are generally fairly difficult to move if they are low-stakes (Simzar
et al., 2015). Second, the effects of parental engagement might take time to see measurable
effects, as studies of long-term trajectories of parental involvement find that it correlates with
grades, but is dependent on the type of characteristic shown by parents like warmth (Wang
et al., 2014) or expectations (Froiland et al., 2013). Froiland et al. (2013) in particular finds
that parental engagement during early childhood is important for eighth grade outcomes.
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B The Parents as Substitution/Complement to Educational Qual-
ity Debate
In the debate of whether parents view themselves as complements or substitutes to educa-
tional quality, the heterogeneous results point towards a more nuanced conclusion. In the
context of the identification for gifted and talented programs, parents across demographics
see themselves as neither complements nor substitutes where educational quality in increased.
Instead, the evidence presented here shows that it greatly depends on demographic and lan-
guage backgrounds.
A few observations are relevant. In the results presented, I noted that there is clear
evidence that white and wealthy parents do not increase, and often decrease, their levels of
effort as it relates to their children’s education. Minorities and low-income parents increase
their effort, especially in-home efforts such as homework help. I also noted that, after a child
is identified as gifted, white and wealthy parents tend to spend less time on homework help
and increase their levels of tutoring for their children, thus trading off home-based homework
help for external tutoring. Minorities and low-income parents increase their levels of both
homework time investments and tutoring investments.
There are three possible reasons I can see that can explain these results, either in full or in
part. The first is that background and culture, which includes past experiences and current
beliefs, may drive differences between parents in how they view their role in their child’s
education. While theoretical, Hornby and Lafaele (2011) provides a useful model of parental
involvement which includes a discussion of how parental ethnicity, gender, and contexts may
be one indicator of how parents approach engaging with their child’s education.
The second reason is parental beliefs of their child’s ability may change as a result of
giftedness identification. Some research has shown that parents’ investments and engage-
ment level may be driven by information and beliefs into their children’s ability and effort
levels (Bergman, 2015; Dizon-Ross, 2014). This could help explain some of the language
differences, given that report cards and information sent home is not always translated into
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the household’s preferred language. Under such a circumstance, parents may have inaccurate
beliefs about their child’s abilty, and therefore update their beliefs based on whether a child
receives an offer of enrollment in the G&T program. Since median income of non-English
speaking households is substantially lower than English speaker in this context, the results
would also be consistent with the findings of Dizon-Ross (2014), who finds in Malawi that
“poorer parents have less accurate beliefs than richer, more-educated parents, and often
respond more to information.”
The third explanation is that demographics and resources is the primary driver of par-
ticipation, time, and pecuniary decisions. An illustrative framework could be useful here.
In a labor supply context, the results paint a picture where parents may change their own
efforts (“labor”) along intensive (time spent) or extensive (participation decision) margins.
Under a scenario where parents are able to increase their their production (e.g., engaging
with their child’s education) within time and pecuniary constraints, they choose to increase
labor supply along the intensive margin. If instead parents are reaching the limits of those
constraints, they may choose to hire external services to help out, thereby either deciding
to not or minimally participate in their child’s education and/or decreasing labor along the
intensive margin. From this perspective, I would argue that parents may generally view their
role as complementary to education, yet due to constraints must make choices to allocate
the amount of various efforts related to those roles.
IX Conclusions
Using a fuzzy regression discontinuity framework, This paper estimates the effects of a con-
text where gifted students are clustered in a group of six to eight students amongst main-
stream classrooms in California. Consistent with previous literature, I find that the G&T
program have little to no effects on most short- and medium-term academic and in-school
outcomes. There are positive effects on Honors, AP, and AP Calculus course-taking, along
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with an increase in taking at least one AP course. And while there are no effects on cumu-
lative high school GPA, there are some positive impacts on GPA in required courses. There
are also strong long-term outcomes on taking SAT, college enrollment, and probability of
attending a most competitive college. Long-term effects are often driven by minorities and
low-income students. In terms of engagement, students survey results show positive effects
on motivation and effort outcomes. Parent surveys show little overall effects on multiple
in-home measures, such as helping with homework, speaking to child daily about school,
and telling the student that they believe in their abilities, but minorities and low-income
families see strong positive effects. High socioeconomic parents tend to lower in-home effort
and increase external tutoring, whereas low socioeconomic parents do the opposite.
The primary implications of this research is that effects of G&T education is limited for
the shorter-term academic outcomes, but there can be postive effects in the long-term. The
evidence presented supports the case that minority and low-income parents may be more
impacted by the the identification of being gifted. They see greater impacts on advanced
course-taking, student engagement measures, parent engagement measures, and college out-
comes. Further, this study adds to the growing evidence that there is limited or no short-term
and medium-term test score and in-school gains from gifted education. Given the consis-
tently strong benefits for minorities and the lack of academic outcome gains in general,
policymakers should be able begin to state their goals and allocated resources in a way that
aligns to their gifted student achievement goals. However, further research is necessary on
many of these topics in order to inform policy in the future.
Another implication of this research is that families react differently toward their chil-
dren being identified as gifted. While high SES and white parents treat their role as more
substitutionary to education quality, low SES and minority parents views their role as more
complementary. This is the first literature to provide a more nuanced picture into the het-
erogeneity that may exist in how parents view their role. However, the limitations of this
research requires further research to disentangle the relationship further and to provide more
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Figure 1.1: CogAT Assessment Questions
This figure shows example questions from the verbal portion of the CogAT assessment. The questions have to do with pic-
ture/verbal analogies, picture/verbal classification, and sentence completion, respectively. The answers are B, B, and A,
respectively.
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Figure 1.2: Probability of G&T Enrollment, Students close to the cutoff
This figure shows the probability of enrollment by the G&T (or ”GATE”) exam percentile. The
running variable is the exam score percentile from having taken the exam in the third grade, with
the cutoff centered at 0. Only students who took the exam in the third grade from 2001-02 through
2015-16 are included in this chart, which represents about 96%+ of all who ever took the exam.
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Figure 1.3: G&T Exam Scores around Threshold, Histogram
This figure shows the raw exam scores for the assignment variable. Assignment variable is centered at
zero, the threshold for G&T offer.
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Figure 1.4: G&T Exam Scores around Threshold, Density Plot
This figure shows the density plot raw exam scores for the assignment variable. Assignment variable
is centered at zero, the threshold for G&T offer. At the 95% confidence level, there is insufficient
evidence to reject the null hypothesis that there are significant differences between test scores below
and above the threshold.
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XI Tables
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3)
Variable All Students Enrolled in G&T RD Sample
Female 0.50 0.54 0.55
Hispanic 0.19 0.12 0.14
Black 0.06 0.02 0.04
White 0.27 0.26 0.27
Asian 0.46 0.53 0.53
ELL 0.22 0.11 0.11
Special Ed 0.05 0.01 0.01
Subsidized Lunch 0.18 0.13 0.14
Baseline ELA 0.00 1.62 1.55
Baseline Math 0.00 1.83 1.57
Baseline Attendance 0.86 0.93 0.91
Adults in Home 1.81 1.88 1.88
Observations 78,216 6,342 4,190
This table shows the demographics of (1) all sample students who have sat for the
gifted identification exam from 2001-02 through 2015-16, (2) students ever enrolled
in G&T for students who were enrolled in G&T for any period from school year
2001-02 through 2015-16, and (3) the RD sample for students who were enrolled in
G&T for any period from school year 2001-02 through 2015-16. Note that, going
forward, optimal bandwidths vary slightly depending on outcome in question. RD
Sample is measured by optimal bandwidth using Calonico et al. (2014) procedure
for fourth grade math exam.
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Table 1.2: Covariate Balance Across Threshold
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Above Cutoff Mean Difference P-value Observations
Female 0.55 0.01 0.47 4,190
Hispanic 0.14 0.00 0.88 4,190
Black 0.04 0.00 0.35 4,190
White 0.27 -0.02 0.17 4,190
Asian 0.53 0.01 0.45 4,190
ELL 0.11 -0.01 0.14 4,190
Special Ed 0.01 0.00 0.78 4,190
Subsidized Lunch 0.16 -0.03 0.06 4,190
Baseline ELA 1.25 -0.02 0.63 4,012
Baseline Math 1.27 -0.03 0.75 4,014
Baseline Attendance 0.91 -0.01 0.93 4,107
Adults in Home 1.88 0.00 0.94 4,190
This table shows the differences in summary statistics of baseline covariates for the RD sample for
students who were enrolled in G&T for any period from school year 2001-02 through 2015-16. Note
that, going forward, optimal bandwidths vary slightly depending on outcome in question. RD Sample
is measured by optimal bandwidth using Calonico et al. (2014) procedure for fourth grade math exam.
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Table 1.3: Short-Term (4th Grade) Academic Outcomes: Fuzzy RD Estimates, for RD
sample and subgroups
Panel A. Entire RD Sample
Days Absent Suspended Math Score ELA Score
2SLS -0.60 0.00 0.05 -0.03
(0.49) (0.03) (0.06) (0.08)
Control Mean 16.4 0.03 1.29 1.22
Observations 4,107 4,107 4,082 4,079
Panel B. Subgroups by Race/Ethnicity
White/Asian Subgroup
Days Absent Suspended Math Score ELA Score
2SLS -0.54 0.01 0.01 -0.02
(0.53) (0.02) (0.06) (0.08)
Control Mean 17.6 0.03 1.29 1.22
Observations 3,189 3,188 3,120 3,119
Panel C. Black/Hispanic (Minorities) Subgroup
Days Absent Suspended Math Score ELA Score
2SLS -0.70 -0.01 0.09 -0.04
(0.51) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08)
Control Mean 18.8 0.04 1.14 1.10
Observations 831 830 822 822
Panel D. Subsidized Lunch Subgroup
Days Absent Suspended Math Score ELA Score
2SLS -0.73 -0.01 0.09 0.01
(0.52) (0.04) (0.09) (0.11)
Control Mean 19.5 0.04 1.17 1.13
Observations 801 801 796 795
This table shows fuzzy regression discontinuity coefficient estimates for primary short-term
academic outcomes in the fourth grade. Robust standard errors clustered at the school level
are shown in parentheses. Regression include baseline demographic covariates and school by
year fixed effects. Regressions are generated by local linear regression with a triangular kernel
and a bandwidth of around 2.1 percentile points away from the threshold, although optimal
bandwidths vary slightly by outcome. Sample is restricted to students who took the G&T exam
in third grade during the school years 2001-02 through 2015-16. Control means are control
complier means. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 1.4: Medium-Term (8th Grade) Academic Outcomes: Fuzzy RD Estimates
Panel A. Entire RD Sample
Days Absent Suspended Math Score ELA Score GPA (cum.) GPA (req.)
2SLS -0.12 -0.03 0.07 0.07 -0.13* 0.08
(0.38) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06)
Control Mean 18.4 0.04 1.53 1.49 3.34 3.34
Observations 3,441 3,438 3,432 3,434 3,437 3,437
Panel B. Subgroups by Race/Ethnicity
White/Asian Subgroup
Days Absent Suspended Math Score ELA Score GPA (cum.) GPA (req.)
2SLS -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 0.05 -0.12 0.07
(0.36) (0.09) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.06)
Control Mean 20.9 0.07 1.44 1.39 3.40 3.39
Observations 2,804 2,804 2,799 2,801 2,804 2,804
Minorities Subgroup
Days Absent Suspended Math Score ELA Score GPA (cum.) GPA (req.)
2SLS -0.49 -0.02 0.12 0.14* -0.17* 0.09
(0.43) (0.09) (0.12) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Control Mean 20.9 0.07 1.44 1.39 3.27 3.27
Observations 629 629 607 607 627 627
Panel C. Subsidized Lunch Subgroup
Days Absent Suspended Math Score ELA Score GPA (cum.) GPA (req.)
2SLS -0.78* 0.00 0.09 0.12* -0.14 0.06
(0.40) (0.05) (0.11) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07)
Control Mean 20.1 0.07 1.37 1.33 3.29 3.30
Observations 578 578 573 576 578 578
This table shows fuzzy regression discontinuity coefficient estimates for primary medium-term academic outcomes in the
eighth grade. Robust standard errors clustered at the school level are shown in parentheses. Regressions include baseline
demographic covariates and school by year fixed effects. Regressions are generated by local linear regression with a triangular
kernel and a bandwidth of 2.1 percentile points away from the threshold, although optimal bandwidths vary slightly by
outcome. Sample is restricted to students who took the G&T exam in third grade during the school years 2001-02 through
2012-13. Control means are control complier means. GPA is calculated for the eighth grade using transcript data and are
not offical GPAs. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 1.5: High School Outcomes: Fuzzy RD Estimates
Panel A. Entire RD Sample
Honors Courses Took Any AP AP Courses AP Calculus GPA (cum.) GPA (req.)
2SLS 0.92** 0.11** 0.36* 0.21*** -0.06 0.22*
(0.24) (0.05) (0.23) (0.06) (0.22) (0.12)
Control Mean 3.27 0.68 2.10 0.26 3.27 3.29
Observations 3019 3019 3019 3019 3019 3019
Panel B. Subgroups by Race/Ethnicity
White/Asian Subgroup
Honors Courses Took Any AP AP Courses AP Calculus GPA (cum.) GPA (req.)
2SLS 0.82** 0.09* 0.31* 0.21** -0.05 0.22*
(0.24) (0.05) (0.23) (0.08) (0.21) (0.12)
Control Mean 3.39 0.70 2.18 0.28 3.28 3.31
Observations 2504 2504 2504 2504 2504 2504
Minorities Subgroup
Honors Courses Took Any AP AP Courses AP Calculus GPA (cum.) GPA (req.)
2SLS 1.53*** 0.19*** 0.71*** 0.23*** -0.08 0.24*
(0.27) (0.05) (0.22) (0.08) (0.23) (0.13)
Control Mean 2.78 0.57 1.79 0.19 3.21 3.24
Observations 467 467 467 467 467 467
Panel C. Subsidized Lunch Subgroup
Honors Courses Took Any AP AP Courses AP Calculus GPA (cum.) GPA (req.)
2SLS 1.29*** 0.14*** 0.56** 0.24*** -0.03 0.15
(0.28) (0.05) (0.25) (0.08) (0.29) (0.14)
Control Mean 2.71 0.63 2.01 0.22 3.15 3.18
Observations 445 445 445 445 445 445
This table shows fuzzy regression discontinuity coefficient estimates for high school course taking outcomes. Robust
standard errors clustered at the school level are shown in parentheses. Regressions include baseline demographic covariates
and school by year fixed effects. Regressions are generated by local linear regression with a triangular kernel and a
bandwidth of 2.1 percentile points away from the threshold, although optimal bandwidth vary slightly by outcome.
Sample is restricted to students who took the G&T exam in third grade during the school years 2001-02 through 2008-09.
Control means are control complier means. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 1.6: Long-term & College Outcomes: Fuzzy RD Estimates
Panel A. Entire RD Sample
Took SAT Any College Most Competitive
2SLS 0.09*** 0.08** 0.09**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Control Mean 0.81 0.74 0.22
Observations 2,074 1,923 1,923
Panel B. Minorities Subgroup
Took SAT Any College Most Competitive
2SLS 0.16*** 0.13*** 0.14***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Control Mean 0.61 0.53 0.15
Observations 422 406 406
Panel C. Subsidized Lunch Subgroup
Took SAT Any College Most Competitive
2SLS 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.13***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Control Mean 0.57 0.51 0.15
Observations 398 393 393
This table shows fuzzy regression discontinuity coefficient estimates for share who
took SAT, Enrollment in any college within 6 months after HS graduation, and
enrollment into the “Most competitive” colleges. “Most Competitive’ colleges are
based on Barron’s selectivity index of 1, with the most popular schools being UC-
Berkeley and UCLA. Robust standard errors clustered at the school level are shown
in parentheses. Regressions include baseline demographic covariates and school
by year fixed effects. Regressions are generated by local linear regression with a
triangular kernel and a bandwidth of 2.1 percentile points away from the threshold,
although optimal bandwidths vary slightly by outcome. For college outcomes,
Sample is restricted to students who took the G&T exam in third grade during
the school years 2001-02 through 2007-08. Control means are control complier
means. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 1.7: Parent Engagement & Time Investments: By All Parents & Racial Subgroups
Panel A. Parents of All Students
Speak w Teacher Sch Event Sch Meeting HW Help Talk to Child Borrow Books Believe
RD 0.05 -0.02 -0.05 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.14**
(0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06)
CM 2.31 2.13 2.17 2.94 3.18 3.16 2.27
Obs 2,015 2,003 2,006 2,016 2,016 2,004 2,016
Panel B. Parents of White, Non-Latino Students
Speak w Teacher Sch Event Sch Meeting HW Help Talk to Child Borrow Books Believe
RD 0.00 -0.02 -0.08 -0.08** -0.08 -0.02 -0.06
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.12) (0.11) (0.06)
CM 2.22 2.15 2.19 3.01 3.14 3.10 2.29
Obs 571 567 568 569 570 568 569
Panel C. Parents of Asian Students
Speak w Teacher Sch Event Sch Meeting HW Help Talk to Child Borrow Books Believe
RD 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.18* 0.18* 0.11 0.14**
(0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.06)
CM 2.45 2.25 2.25 3.02 3.31 3.21 2.45
Obs 908 904 902 904 903 902 905
Panel D. Parents of Minorities Subgroup
Speak w Teacher Sch Event Sch Meeting HW Help Talk to Child Borrow Books Believe
RD 0.12* 0.07 -0.02 0.23** 0.16*** 0.15 0.22***
(0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.09) (0.05) (0.11) (0.06)
CM 2.16 1.94 1.96 2.64 3.01 2.95 2.20
Obs 526 522 521 525 526 525 528
This table shows fuzzy regression discontinuity coefficient estimates for results of a student engagement survey given
during the fourth grade between the years 2001-02 through 2014-15. The questions are often/not often statements based
on a four-point scale, which I converted numerically so that “Very Often” is a 4 and “Never” is a 1. The questions, in
order by column, are “I take my child to the library to borrow books”, “During the past semester, I have attended a
school or class event”, “During the past semester, I have attended a formal school meeting”, “I help my child with their
homework”, “I speak with my child about their school work”, and “During the past semester I have spoken with my
child’s teacher”, and “I tell my child that I believe in them.” Robust standard errors clustered at the baseline school
level are shown in parentheses. Regressions include baseline demographic covariates and school by year fixed effects.
Regressions are generated by local linear regression with a triangular kernel and a bandwidth of 2.1 percentile points
away from the threshold. Control means (denoted CM) are control complier means. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 1.8: Parent Engagement & Time Investments: By Lunch Subsidization
Panel A. Parents of Unsubsidized Lunch Students
Speak w Teacher Sch Event Sch Meeting HW Help Talk to Child Borrow Books Believe
RD 0.03 -0.06 -0.07 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.09
(0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06)
CM 2.40 2.17 2.21 2.96 3.27 3.22 2.33
Obs 1,519 1,506 1,514 1,524 1,520 1,509 1,523
Panel B. Parents of Subsidized Lunch Subgroup
Speak w Teacher Sch Event Sch Meeting HW Help Talk to Child Borrow Books Believe
RD 0.11* 0.07 -0.02 0.25*** 0.13** 0.15* 0.21***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06)
CM 2.03 2.00 2.03 2.72 2.92 2.98 2.09
Obs 496 497 492 492 496 495 493
This table shows fuzzy regression discontinuity coefficient estimates for results of a student engagement survey given
during the fourth grade between the years 2001-02 through 2014-15. The questions are often/not often statements
based on a four-point scale, which I converted numerically so that “Very Often” is a 4 and “Never” is a 1. The
questions, in order by column, are “I take my child to the library to borrow books”, “During the past semester,
I have attended a school or class event”, “During the past semester, I have attended a formal school meeting”,
“I help my child with their homework”, “I speak with my child about their school work”, and “During the past
semester I have spoken with my child’s teacher”, and “I tell my child that I believe in them.” Robust standard
errors clustered at the baseline school level are shown in parentheses. Regressions include baseline demographic
covariates and school by year fixed effects. Regressions are generated by local linear regression with a triangular
kernel and a bandwidth of 2.1 percentile points away from the threshold. Control means (denoted CM) are control
complier means. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 1.9: Tutoring vs. Parental Homework Help
Panel A. By All Parents & Race
All RD Parent Sample RD White Parents Sample RD Minority Parents Sample
Parent HW Help Tutoring Parent HW Help Tutoring Parent HW Help Tutoring
RD 0.13 -0.02 -0.08** 0.15* 0.23** 0.15*
(0.09) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08)
Control Mean 2.94 0.48 3.01 0.59 2.64 0.38
Observations 2,016 2,001 569 565 525 519
Panel B. By Subsidized Lunch
Unsubsidized Lunch Subsidized Lunch
Parent HW Help Tutoring Parent HW Help Tutoring
RD 0.02 0.17* 0.25*** 0.12*
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Control Mean 2.96 0.58 2.72 0.34
Observations 1,524 1,517 492 484
This table shows fuzzy regression discontinuity coefficient estimates for results of a student engagement survey given
during the fourth grade between the years 2001-02 through 2014-15. The first question are often/not often statements
based on a four-point scale, which I converted numerically so that “Very Often” is a 4 and “Never” is a 1, whereas the
latter question is a binary Yes/No question where 1 refers to a Yes. The questions, in order by column, are “I help my child
with their homework” and “in the past year, have you paid for tutoring services for your child?.” Robust standard errors
clustered at the baseline school level are shown in parentheses. Regressions include baseline demographic covariates and
school by year fixed effects. Regressions are generated by local linear regression with a triangular kernel and a bandwidth
of 2.1 percentile points away from the threshold. Control means are control complier means. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.10
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Table 1.10: 4th Grade Student Engagement Survey
Panel A. All Students
Motivation Finish Assign. Effort Parents Care Parent Believe in You Help HW
2SLS 0.27** 0.12 0.28*** 0.15 0.11 0.13
(0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.16) (0.09) (0.10)
Control Mean 3.11 2.91 3.02 2.45 2.39 2.36
Observations 3,561 3,563 3,551 3,557 3,558 3,553
Panel B. Minorities Subgroup
Motivation Finish Assign. Effort Parents Care Parent Believe in You Help HW
2SLS 0.46*** 0.26** 0.34*** 0.29* 0.21** 0.22**
(0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.18) (0.09) (0.10)
Control Mean 2.99 2.91 2.85 2.22 2.17 2.00
Observations 651 648 656 648 648 644
Panel C. Subsidized Lunch Subgroup
Motivation Finish Assign. Effort Parents Care Parent Believe in You Help HW
2SLS 0.43*** 0.18* 0.31*** 0.31* 0.25** 0.29***
(0.11) (0.10) (0.13) (0.17) (0.10) (0.10)
Control Mean 3.01 2.96 2.99 2.08 2.13 2.11
Observations 622 623 622 623 624 619
This table shows fuzzy regression discontinuity coefficient estimates for results of a student engagement survey given
during the fourth grade between the years 2001-02 through 2014-15. The questions are agree/disagree statements based
on a four-point scale, which I converted numerically so that “I strongly agree with this statement” is a 4 and “I strongly
disagree with this statement” is a 1. The questions, in order by column, are “I always want to do my best work”, “I always
finish my assignments for class”, “I make an effort to do my best work inside and outside of class”, “My parent cares a lot
about me”, “My parent believes that I can do my best work”, and “My parents always help me with homework.” Robust
standard errors clustered at the baseline school level are shown in parentheses. Regressions include baseline demographic
covariates and school by year fixed effects. Regressions are generated by local linear regression with a triangular kernel
and a bandwidth of 2.1 percentile points away from the threshold. Control means are control complier means. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 1.11: Teacher Characteristics
Panel A. All Students
Challenge Believes Time Helps Communicate Expectations
2SLS 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.13** 0.34***
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Control Mean 2.25 2.10 2.07 2.12 1.96 2.31
Observations 3563 3554 3561 3560 2006 2010
Panel B. Minorities Subgroup
Challenge Believes Time Helps Communicate Expectations
2SLS 0.32*** 0.22*** 0.19*** 0.15*** 0.11* 0.41***
(0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Control Mean 2.28 2.04 2.02 2.03 1.91 2.19
Observations 650 648 651 652 524 524
Panel C. Subsidized Lunch Subgroup
Challenge Believes Time Helps Communicate Expectations
2SLS 0.30*** 0.22*** 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.11* 0.38***
(0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Control Mean 2.27 2.05 2.02 2.05 1.94 2.21
Observations 623 619 623 623 494 496
This table shows fuzzy regression discontinuity coefficient estimates for results of both a student engagement
survey and a parent engagement survey given during the fourth grade between the years 2001-02 through
2014-15. The questions are agree/disagree statements based on a four-point scale, which I converted numer-
ically so that “I strongly agree with this statement” is a 4 and “I strongly disagree with this statement”
is a 1. The first four questions are from the student engagement survey. In order by column from left to
right are “My teacher challenges me to do my best work”, “My teacher believes I can do well in class”, “My
teacher spends a lot of time with me”, and “My teacher helps me when i have difficulty”. The last two
columns are indicators from the parent survey, which includes “My child’s teacher communicates with me
regularly”, and “My child’s teacher holds high expectations of my child.” Robust standard errors clustered at
the baseline school level are shown in parentheses. Regressions include baseline demographic covariates and
school by year fixed effects. Regressions are generated by local linear regression with a triangular kernel and
a bandwidth of 2.1 percentile points away from the threshold. Control means are control complier means.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 1.12: Reduced-Form Estimates of Leaving the Sample
All Students
4th Gr 5th Gr 6th Gr 7th Gr 8th Gr
Reduced form -0.009 -0.020 -0.042 -0.013 -0.002
(0.031) (0.032) (0.035) (0.036) (0.037)
Observations 4,190 4,190 4,190 4,190 4,190
9th Gr 10th Gr 11th Gr Sent NSC
Reduced Form -0.043 0.007 -0.009 -0.023
(0.045) (0.045) (0.042) (0.036)
Observations 4,190 4,190 4,190 4,190
This table shows reduced-form estimates for attrition. I created an indicator for
missing math standardized test scores for grades four through eleven and then
regress the indicator on the primary specification, which includes baseline school
by year fixed effects and baseline demographics. The last column is an indicator
for if the student was not sent to NSC for matching college outcomes. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Chapter 2
Leveraging Technology in Education: An Experiment Reducing
Parent-Child-School Information Problems at Scale
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I Introduction
Families are both one of the greatest sources of inequality and a powerful determinant of
academic achievement (cf. Heckman 2006; Cunha and Heckman 2007; Todd and Wolpin
2007). While leveraging families has the potential to improve child outcomes, most programs
that do so focus on skills-based intervention, are difficult to scale due to high costs, and often
focus on families with young children (Belfield et al., 2006; Olds, 2006; Nores and Barnett,
2010; Heckman et al., 2010; Avvisati et al., 2013; Duncan and Magnuson, 2013; Gertler et
al., 2014; York and Loeb, 2014; Mayer et al., 2015). There is a dearth of interventions that
can successfully improve education outcomes for children during middle and high school,
especially ones that can be implemented and maintained at a low cost (Cullen et al., 2013).1
In addition to the importance of parent skills, parents also face a range of information
frictions that make it difficult to foster their child’s human capital, including biased beliefs
about their child’s effort in school, ability, and the education production function (Bonilla
et al., 2005; Cunha et al., 2013; Bergman, 2014; Rogers and Feller, 2016; Dizon-Ross, 2016;
Andrabi et al., 2017).2 In a small experiment, Bergman (2014) finds that providing high-
frequency information to parents about their child’s academic progress makes it easier for
parents to monitor their children and reduces the bias in their beliefs, which improves stu-
dents academic performance. However, the potential to replicate these findings cheaply and
at scale has not been realized. For instance, the Bergman (2014) study randomized the
provision of bimonthly text messages on missed assignments to parents of 279 students by
collecting and sending this information by hand. Kraft and Dougherty (2013) conducted an
experiment in a Boston charter school with 140 students and find that personalized, daily
phone calls home to parents from their child’s teachers improve assignment completion and
student behaviors. Kraft and Rogers (2014) show that personalized messages written by
1Important exceptions in the US context include the ability for charter schools to improve the outcomes
of high school students (cf. Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. 2011; Dobbie and Fryer 2011, 2015; Angrist et al. 2016)
and more recent research on school management (Fryer, 2017).
2Fryer Jr (2011) also writes that students may not accurately assess the education production function
as well.
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teachers and sent by research staff to the parents of 435 students helps retain students in
a high school credit recovery program during the summer. In theory, placing student in-
formation online could help resolve these information issues, however Bergman (2016) finds
that parent adoption and usage of this technology is low, especially in schools serving lower-
income and lower-achieving students, which could exacerbate socio-economic gaps in student
achievement.
In this paper, we use a field experiment in 22 middle and high schools to test whether a
novel education technology can push information to parents at scale and improve outcomes
at low cost. We partner with a Learning Management System company to develop and
test a technology that synchronizes with districts’ Student Information Systems and teacher
gradebooks to push information to parents about their child’s absences, missed assignments
and low grades via automated weekly text messages. This medium has been tested in a
number of education settings, often with positive results (Kraft and Rogers, 2014; Bergman,
2014; Castleman and Page, 2015, 2016; Page et al., 2016; Berlinski et al., 2016; Oreopoulos
and Petronijevic, 2016; Castleman and Page, 2017). The intervention automates sending
out three types of alerts. First, an absence alert was sent weekly detailing the number of
classes a child missed by each course in the last week. This by-class alert contrasts with how
districts typically report absences to parents, as they are usually reported in terms of full
day absences. We show that students have a higher rate of absence for classes than they
do for full days.3 Similarly, if a student missed any assignments, a weekly alert was sent
stating the number of assignments missed in each class the past week. Lastly, a low-grade
alert was sent once per month if the child had a class grade average below 70% at the end
of the month. Messages were randomly assigned to be delivered to either the mother or the
father, when possible.
We find that existing contact between schools and parents widely varies. Our surveys
indicate that nearly 50% of parents were contacted less than one time in three months by the
3The definition of a full day can vary from district to district. In this district, it constitutes 70% of the
school day.
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school about their child’s academic progress. We confirm that parents tend to overestimate
their child’s grades and to underestimate their child’s missed assignments. The intervention
increases the likelihood parents were contacted by schools at least once per month by 17
percentage points. In all, we sent 32,472 messages to treatment group families in the first
year, or an average of 52 messages per treated family.
As a result of this additional contact, we find substantial decreases in the number of
courses students failed. In the first year, students fail one course on average and the text-
message intervention reduces this by nearly 40%. GPA improves by a 0.10 of a point.
Treatment group students attend 17% more classes and district retention increases by 2
percentage points. We do not find any improvements in standardized math and English
test scores. However, these exams were no stakes for students; students spent roughly 100
minutes less time than the test provider said is required to finish the exams, on average.
The district subsequently discontinued using these standardized tests.4 In contrast, we do
find a significant, positive effect on in-class exam scores. Most of these positive impacts are
driven by students with below-average GPAs and high school students. Moreover, we find
the positive effects for these subgroups persists into the second year of the intervention. We
find no differential effects of alerting mothers versus fathers.
Related to our paper is ongoing work by Berlinski et al. (2016), who are conducting a
texting intervention in 8 elementary schools Chile.5 They are sending information to parents
about their child’s math test scores, grades and attendance. One difference between their
intervention and the one studied in this paper is the information they are providing to
parents is about math-specific test scores and class behaviors. These data were gathered
4The West Virginia Schools superintendent’s commission expressed concerns that the exams are not “an
accurate gauge of student achievement” and “doesn’t give much reason for students to take it seriously.” See
the Charleston Gazette-Mail.
5Castleman and Page (2017) also provide information to parents and students via text messages, though
their focus is helping students during the college matriculation process. They conduct a multi-arm,
randomized-controlled trial that sends automated text messages to parents and students designed to assist
with the requisite matriculation tasks and to connect students with counselors. The authors find positive
effects on college enrollment but there are no additional benefits to texting parents in addition to students.
In contrast, our study focuses on academics during middle and high school.
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from schools and entered by their research team into a digital platform, which is used to
send out the texts to parents. A second difference, which relates to the contexts, is that we
are able to automate this process by scraping data that is frequently entered into district
student information systems, which includes grades, attendance and missed assignments,
though not class behaviors or exam scores.
The promise of automation is that, relative to other interventions, communicating with
parents via automated text messages is extremely low cost. The marginal cost of each text
message is a fraction of a cent. Despite sending more than 32,000 text messages, the total
cost of all of these messages was approximately $63. The gradebook and personnel training
cost an additional $7 dollars per student. With low overall and marginal costs in terms of
time and effort relative to other education interventions, automated messaging has a high
potential to scale.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the background and the
experimental design. Section III describes the data collection process and outcome variables.
Section IV presents the experimental design and the empirical specifications. Section V shows
our results and Section VI concludes.
II Background and Experimental Design
The experiment took place in 22 middle and high schools during the 2015-2016 school year
in Kanawha County Schools (KCS), West Virginia, and we were subsequently able to extend
the intervention through the 2016-2017 school year. As a state, West Virginia ranks last in
bachelor degree attainment and 49th in median household income among US states and the
District of Columbia. It is the only state where less than 20% of adults over 25 years of age
have a bachelors degree and households have an overall median income of $42,019.6 The
state populations is 93% white, 3.6% African-Americans, 1% Asians, and 1.5% Hispanic or
Latino as of 2015. Data from the 2015 NAEP showed that 73% of West Virginia students
6American Community Survey one-year estimates and rankings by state can be found here.
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were eligible for free or reduced lunch. Students also scored significantly below the national
average on all National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) subjects tested, with
the exception of 4th grade science, which was in line with national averages.7
KCS is the largest school district in West Virginia with over 28,000 enrolled students
as of 2016. The district’s four-year graduation rate is 71% and standardized test scores
are similar to statewide proficiency rates in 2016. In the school year previous to the study,
2014-2015, 44% of students received proficient-or-better scores in reading and 29% received
proficient-or-better scores in math. At the state level, 45% of students were proficient or
better in reading and 27% were proficient in math. 83% of district students are identified as
white and 12% are identified as Black. 79% of students receive free or reduced priced lunch
compared to 71% statewide.8
The district has a gradebook system for teachers. Teachers are required by the district
to record by-class attendance and mark missed assignments and grades using this web-
based platform. We worked with the Learning Management System (LMS) provider of this
gradebook to design a tool to automatically draw data from this platform on students’ missed
assignments for each class, their percent grade by class and their class-level absences from
the gradebook. This information was coupled with parents’ contact information so that the
system could pull the information on academic progress from the gradebook and push it
out to families using a text-messaging API developed by Twilio. These text messages form
our parent-alert system. Each of the text messages is designed to be a consistent weekly
or monthly update to the parents of students who had at least one absence or missing
assignment during the week or who have a low course average over the course of a month.
The gradebook application also has a “parent portal,” which is a website that parents
can log into to view their child’s grades and missed assignments. All parents in the study
could access the parent portal and any parent could turn on our alerts by logging into the
portal and turning on the alert feature. As we discuss further below, only 2% of parents in
7NAEP Results by state can be found here.
8These summary statistics come from the state education website, which can be found here.
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the control group received any alert. Bergman (2016) finds that, in general, very few parents
ever use the parent portal and we find this is true in KCS as well; roughly a third of parents
had ever logged in to view their child’s grades. Moreover, usage of the parent portal tends
to be higher for higher-income families and families with higher-performing students.
We test three types of parent alerts: Low-grade alerts, missed assignment alerts, and
by-class attendance alerts. On Mondays parents received a text-message alert on the num-
ber of assignments their child was missing (if any) for each course during the past week.
These assignments included homework, classwork, projects, essays, missing exams, tests,
and quizzes. On Wednesdays parents received an alert for any class their child had missed
the previous week. Lastly, and normally on the last Friday of each month, parents received
an alert if their child had a cumulative average below 70% in any course during the current
marking period. Each alert was sent at 4:00 P.M. local time and the text of each alert is
provided in Figure 2.1. The text messages also included a link to the website domain of the
parent portal, where the parent could obtain specific information on class assignments and
absences if necessary.
Experimental Design
The initial sample began with approximately 14,000 total students who were enrolled in
grades five through eleven during the end of the 2014-2015 school year. Recruitment was at
the household level, and, as a number of these students lived in the same households, the final
sample frame was just under 11,000 households. During the summer of 2015, one consent
letter was sent to each household in the sample frame, which was specifically addressed to one
randomly selected parent or guardian when contact information was available for more than
one parent in the data provided by the district. The letter contained the name of a randomly
selected student living in the household.9 Trained interviewers followed up the letter with
a phone call to each selected parent to confirm their participation and contact information,
9Students were in grades 5-11 the previous year and were expected to be in grades 6-12 during the school
year of the study.
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as required by our Institutional Review Board. We then asked their language preference
and preferred modes of contact—text message or phone calls. As a result, the parent or
guardian of 1,137 students consented to the study and provided their contact information
for inclusion as a participant.10 Of these participants, 96% of the treatment and control
groups preferred to receive text messages. Though it deviated from our original design, to
simplify our intervention and to save on costs we chose to implement a text-only intervention
and those who could only be contacted by phone did not receive the intervention even if they
were randomized into treatment.11
Random assignment was at the school-by-grade level to minimize the potential for spillovers
into the control group. The data were initially collapsed at the grade-by-school level and
randomization was subsequently stratified by indicators for below-median grade point aver-
age (GPA) and middle versus high school grades. All school employees were blinded to the
randomization process.
Previous research on cash transfers suggests that intra-household divisions of labor and
bargaining power could lead to differential effects if information does not flow perfectly
between parents (Doepke and Tertilt, 2011; Duflo, 2012; Yoong et al., 2012; Akresh et al.,
2016). To account for this possibility, we randomized which parent or guardian received the
text-message alerts if we had contact information available for both the mother and father
of a child, or if we had multiple listed guardians. The selected parent was the same as
the parent to whom the consent letter was addressed and the parent who trained personnel
obtained consent from on the phone.
10Overwhelmingly the primary reason we could not consent families was because we could not reach them
by phone within three attempts—the maximum number of times we were permitted to call by our IRB.
This accounted for 88% of non-consents, while active declines accounted for the remainder. Consent into the
study is not significantly correlated with predictors of student achievement or parental involvement: baseline
GPA, absences, English Language Learner Status, IEP status, gender, an indicator for being suspended, or
baseline parent logins. Consent is significantly and positively correlated with an indicator for the student
being Black however (results available upon request). In a separate study, which did not require parental
consent, Bergman and Rogers (2017) examine how take up of this intervention is largely determined by
opt-in versus opt-out offers to receive it. The latter results in 96% take up and effects similar to those found
in this paper.
11No families are dropped from the analysis however.
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Parents in the control group received the default level of information that the schools
and teachers provided. This included report cards that are sent home after each marking
period every six to nine weeks along with parent-teacher conferences and any phone calls
home from teachers. As discussed above, all parents had access to the online gradebook.
Figure 2.2 shows the timeline of the experiment and data collection. Baseline data were
collected from June to July 2015. We obtained demographic and enrollment data for the
2014-2015 school year from KCS along with contact and address information. Consent
letters were sent out beginning August 2015 during the beginning of the school year. Calls
requesting verbal consent were completed in September. Randomization into treatment and
control was completed in early October 2015. For parents who were selected into treatment,
introductory text messages were sent late that same month. Included in the texts was the
option to stop at any point by replying “stop” or any equivalent variation.12 Over the course
of the study, nine parents or guardians requested the messages stop.13 The intervention ran
between the end of October 2015 through the end of May when the school year was expected
to conclude. Officially, the academic school year ended in early June, but varied slightly
based on weather-induced make-up days at each school. After the end of the school year we
proceeded to collect endline survey data both by phone and by mail as described below.
At the end of the 2015-2016 year, we asked KCS whether we could continue the inter-
vention for a second year, which was not originally planned. KCS agreed, however we were
only able to collect outcomes originating from the gradebook.
III Data Collection
We gathered data from multiple sources: administrative data, gradebook data, survey data,
and texting data. We collected initial baseline data from administrative records on student
grades, courses, attendance, race and ethnicity, English language status, and contact infor-
12We manually tracked replies to ensure the service was shut off when requested.
13These parents were included as “treated” families in all analyses.
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mation. We also obtained data from the gradebook application, which includes student’s
grades, assignments and assignments scores, class-level attendance and parent logins into
the parent portal. These baseline data were available for all students in our sample frame.
During the intervention we obtained monitoring records on the text messages. We used these
data to track messaging stop rates, whether text messages were received by phone numbers,
and the total number of text messages that went out weekly.
After the 2015-2016 school year concluded we surveyed parents. The surveys took place
during between June and August 2016. Initially, households were sent a letter stating that
they would be called for a survey. This letter included a $5 unconditional award as an
appreciation for their participation in the study. Households were then called by trained
interviewers to conduct the survey. Around this time, West Virginian residents were afflicted
by severe flooding during several torrential storms in June 2016. Sadly, more than 1,000
people were left homeless in Kanawha County alone. During the summer, KCS had multiple
schools declared “total losses” by the Federal Emergency Management Agency because of the
flooding. As a result, we decided to mail surveys home instead of proceeding with subsequent
rounds of calling. We provided a reward of $30 for paper surveys returned postmarked by
August 8th, 2016. Our total response rate was 40%. A copy of our survey can be found
in Figure 2.10. The goal of the endline surveys was to examine parent responses to the
intervention not captured by administrative data. Parents were primarily asked about their
communication habits with the school in recent months, their perception of the child’s effort
and achievement, and their communication and motivational habits with their child.
In the summer we obtained administrative data from the district and the gradebook
application once again. These included standardized exam scores and suspension data,
students’ final grades and assignment scores, daily class-level attendance, alerts received by
treatment and control group, and parent and student logins into the parent portal.
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Outcome Measures
Prior to obtaining outcome data, we registered our analysis plan, which specified subgroups
of interest, regression specifications and primary outcomes. Primary achievement-related
outcomes are from both the gradebook application and the KCS administrative data. In-
cluded in the gradebook data are outcomes related to the number of missing assignments,
assignment scores, and class grades. Administrative data contained standardized test scores
in math and English.
The standardized test scores are from the Smarter Balanced assessment, which is aligned
to the Common Core. We received scaled standardized test scores for Math and ELA for
2015 and 2016 examinations. These were the first two years in which the assessment was
given after the state switched from the previous standardized test in West Virginia, the
Westest. At the time, students in grades 3-11 were required to take the Smarter Balanced
assessment.
We also obtained behavior-related outcomes from the gradebook application and KCS.
These provided data on suspension rates, measured as the quantity of occurrences and the
number of days suspended as well as attendance measures at the class level. Following our
analysis plan, we convert the latter into “number of classes present” (number of classes
marked either present or tardy) because effects on retention potentially cause an increase in
absences while increasing the number of days enrolled. We code suspensions into an indicator
for ever being suspended.
Lastly, we use the assignment-level data to examine the effects on missed assignments,
assignment scores, and class test scores. We identify tests and exams by the assignment titles
containing the words “test” or “exam.” Assignment scores and test scores are standardized
according to the classroom means and standard deviations for each assignment or test.
We restrict the analyses to those scores three standard deviations or less away from the
mean to remove outliers.14 We had not anticipated being able to obtain data for individual
14Analyses are robust to various other restrictions to handle outliers, such as excluding observations 4 or
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assignments and class tests, so these outcomes were not specified in our analysis plan.
The survey of parents was designed to examine parent and student responses to the
intervention not captured by administrative and gradebook data. Parents were asked about
their communication with and from the school, their perceptions about how their child was
performing academically, and household behavior such as talking with their child about
their academic progress or taking privileges away as a result of their performance in school.
We use a number of these survey measures, along with other gradebook and administrative
measures, as secondary outcomes in this paper. Tables 2.21 and 2.22 summarize all the
secondary outcomes variables used in our analysis, their sources, and their construction.
Table 2.23 summarizes the hypothesized effect on each outcome; we make did pre-specify
hypotheses for subgroups however.
IV Empirical Strategy & Experimental Validity
We estimate treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) effects, as registered in our analysis plan, via
two-stage least squares. In the first stage we instrument an indicator for parent i receiving
at least one text message alert with the randomly assigned treatment indicator as follows15
alertedi = α0 + α1Treatmenti +Xiα2 + ηi
Standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment, which is the grade level
in a given school. Xi is a set of pre-specified, individual-level covariates, which are fraction
of days absent in the previous year, baseline GPA, an indicator for a student identified
as Black, an indicator for English-Language Learner status, an indicator for having ever
been suspended in the previous year, an indicator for gender, and an indicator for having
5 standard deviations away from the mean, or removing all scores from a particular assignment or exam if
even one score is an outlier.
15The dependent variable in the first stage is an indicator for ever being alerted post-treatment and not
the number of alerts a family receives. Using the latter slightly increases precision but is less intuitive to
interpret.
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special needs. When the outcome in the second stage is test scores, the baseline test score is
included as well. Missing covariates are imputed with the mean baseline value and indicators
for missing are added to the regression. All regressions include strata indicators as controls.
The second stage then regresses an outcome on the instrumented alertedi variable. There
are 76 clusters, and standard errors are always clustered at the level of treatment assignment
as described above.
When looking at assignments and class test scores there are multiple observations—
more than 70,000 assignments and 7,000 tests across the entire sample and all courses—post
treatment. This means there are multiple observations per student. The baseline control
variables remain the same as above when we analyze these outcomes.
We analyze subgroups by restricting the sample to each subgroup and studying outcomes
in the same way as described above. We specified several subgroups of interest: students with
below-median GPA, students with male versus female parents or guardians, and students in
middle versus high school.
Finally, in our analysis plan we hypothesized the intervention will have positive treatment
effects for our primary outcomes. For each of these outcome measures all tests are one-
sided tests for improvements in outcomes, though the positive, significant results we find on
primary outcomes and class test scores would pass two-sided tests at the 5% level as well.
Since we do not always have a strong hypothesis about the direction of any potential effect
for our secondary outcomes and subgroups, we use two-sided tests. Figure 2.23 lists out our
secondary outcomes and hypothesized effects.
Baseline Treatment-Control Balance
Table 2.1 presents baseline summary statistics for the control group, the difference in means
from the treatment group and the p-value showing the statistical significance of these differ-
ences. Demographically, the sample is 49% female, 16% black, and the majority of students
live in two-parent households. On average, students’ baseline GPA is 2.8, they have missed
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6% of school days, and 20% have been suspended in the last year. The contrast between
by-class and full-day absences is stark: students miss 10% of all classes as opposed to 6% of
full days. As in Bergman (2016), many more students have logged into the online gradebook
portal than parents. Finally, randomization appears to have created a treatment and control
group that are similar in terms of observable variables; no treatment-controls differences are
statistically significant at the 10% level. We also regress baseline covariates on our treatment
indicator and conduct an F-test for whether these baseline covariates are jointly equal to
zero. The test cannot reject that the coefficients on these covariates are jointly equal to zero
(p-value equals 0.61).
Attrition and Non Response
There are several sources of attrition and non response in this study: missing academic
outcomes, missing behavior outcomes, and survey non response. A particular concern is
whether there is differential attrition by treatment status, which would invalidate our ability
to make causal inferences from the data.
Table 2.10 shows the effect of treatment status on several measures of attrition as well
as other correlates of attrition. The first column shows there is no treatment effect on the
likelihood a parent responds to the survey: the point estimate is both small and statistically
insignificant. Academic and demographic characteristics are generally poor predictors of
survey response as well, with the exception of “percent of days missed” the previous academic
year, which is significant at the 5% level. This is encouraging because it provides some
suggestive evidence that our survey sample may be representative of many families in the
study.
This pattern generally remains true across the remaining indicators of missing data:
school suspensions, math scores and reading scores. There are no treatment effects on any
of these indicators. Only the percent of days missed the previous year is a strong predictor
of missing math and reading score, which is not surprising that attendance the previous year
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predicts having measures in the current year. There are no significant predictors of missing
suspension data. Overall, there is no evidence of differential attrition or non-response by
treatment status. Additionally, attrition from course taking will be an outcome of retention




We begin by describing current communications between parents, children and schools as well
as parents beliefs about their child’s performance and their correlates. Figure 2.3 shows the
frequency of contact parents’ receive from their child’s school about their academic progress,
as measured by the control group’s response to our survey. Nearly 50% of parents hear from
the school less than once every three months. On the other hand, 25% of parents hear from
their child’s school twice per month, which shows the variation in families who are contacted
frequently and those who are not. Table 2.11 examines the correlates of infrequent contact
in column one. Surprisingly little predicts this infrequency. Neither GPA nor behaviors nor
demographics significantly correlate with an indicator for hearing from the school less than
once every three months. This question does not, however, assess whether parents find this
communication useful.16
Figure 2.4 shows how often parents talk with their child about their progress in school.
55% of parents report talking with their child every day about their schoolwork. Roughly
75% of parents talk with their child 2-3 times per week or more. At face value, it appears
their child’s schoolwork is at the top of parents’ mind. One caveat is that this communica-
tion is self-reported, which may be subject to social-desirability bias. Parent conversations
16Not shown here, we find that 40% of parents disagree with the statement that their child’s school makes
it easy to help them do well in school.
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about schoolwork is also demonstrated in Figure 2.5, which shows how often parents talk to
another adult in the household about their child’s school work. For this behavior, no parent
reports doing so every day, but 40% of respondents say they talk with another adult 2-3
times per week about their child’s schoolwork or grades. Column two of Table 2.11 shows
that, unsurprisingly, two-parent households are much more likely to have intra-household
communication about their child. Little else seems to correlate with this behavior however.
Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7 present control group parents’ beliefs about their child’s aca-
demic performance in terms of assignment completion and math grades, respectively. Figure
2.6 shows the number of assignments parents believe their child has missed in the past
semester. More than 50% of parents believe their child has not missed any assignments.
According to administrative data, only 20% of respondents’ children have missed no as-
signments. However parents have much more accurate perceptions about their child’s math
grades: 60% accurately state their child’s grade in math and around 25% overstate their
child’s grade in math. Many fewer underestimate it. Table 2.11 shows that inaccurate
beliefs strongly and negatively correlate with their child’s GPA.
Table 2.11 shows a measure of the quality of communication between parents and their
children: an indicator for whether parents believe it is difficult to be involved in their child’s
education because their child does not tell them enough about their academic progress. 48%
of parents believe their child does not disclose enough information about their academic
progress to be easily involved in their education. This indicator negatively correlates with
student’s GPA and whether or not they are in high school. Parents with older or lower
performing children are more likely to perceive that their child is not telling them enough
about their schoolwork. In results not shown, parents who report that their children do not
disclose enough also report receiving significantly fewer report cards from their child’s school
as well.
Overall, these descriptives highlight how the information flow between parents and their
children may be particularly impeded when the child is performing poorly in school. While
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many parents frequently talk with their child and another adult in the household about their
academic progress, nearly one-half of parents believe it would be easier to be involved in their
child’s education if their child told them more about their schoolwork. The latter correlates
strongly with students’ grades and the receipt of report cards. In terms of parents’ beliefs,
parents tend to have more accurate beliefs about student output—their grades—which is in
line with what is provided on report cards. However, parents have much less accurate beliefs
regarding a primary input to their child’s grades, assignment completion. A key question
is whether the automated-texting intervention studied here can increase parents access to
timely, actionable information and improve academic outcomes at scale. The next section
examines the effect of the treatment on school-to-parent communication.
School-Parent Contact
Table 2.2 shows the effect of treatment status on alert receipt. The first column shows an
increase in the share of parents who received at least one alert as a result of the treatment.
Parents in the treatment group were 71 percentage points more likely to receive an alert than
the control group. Not every family had a cell phone to receive text messages, so compliance
is imperfect. As discussed above, all parents in the study could access the platform and
any parent could turn on our alerts by logging into the platform and turning on the alert
feature. However Table 2.2 shows that only two percent of the control group received any
alert. The second column shows the additional number of alerts that the treatment group
received over the course of the school year relative to the control group. Treatment group
families received nearly 50 text-message alerts, on average. The remaining columns break
the alerts down by the number of each type parents received. Most messages were absence
and assignment alerts because these were sent out weekly; families received 21 of each of
these alerts, on average. Low-grade alerts went out monthly and so families received about
six low-grade alerts, on average.
We use survey data to examine whether parents also report receiving more contact from
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the school about their child’s academic progress. Note that this includes any form of contact
including phone call, letter, email or text message. Parents could respond: “about twice
a month,” “about once a month,” “once every two or three months,” and “less than once
every three months.” We specified that we would code this into an indicator for being con-
tacted once per month or more, but we show mutually exclusive indicators for every possible
response for completeness.
Table 2.3 shows the effects of treatment assignment on these parent-reported measures of
contact form the school. Aside from this first column outcome, the remaining columns show
effects on mutually-exclusive indicators of contact from the school. The control group means
at the bottom of the table indicate that 45% of parents hear from their school less than three
times per month about their child’s progress. Column one looks at the indicator for whether
parents are contacted at least once per month. 38% of the control group is contacted at least
once per month, and the treatment increases this by 19 percentage points. The remaining
columns show that much of the increase in contact comes from the likelihood parents are
contacted once per month (column three) and there is a 12 percentage point reduction in
the likelihood that a parent reports being contact less than once every three months.
Primary Academic Outcomes
In our analysis plan we specified five primary outcomes guided by the nature of the treatment,
which targeted attendance, low grades and missed assignments. These outcomes are the
number of classes students failed, the number of classes attended, retention in the district,
and math and reading standardized test scores.
Table 2.4 presents the effects on these outcomes. Column one shows that students, on
average, fail one course. Receiving text message alerts reduced this by 39% or 0.38 points.
The outcome in column two is class attendance. The effect of receiving text message alerts is
again large and significant: students attend roughly 50 more classes than the control group,
which is an 18% increase over the control-group mean. Column three examines retention.
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3% of students in the control group did not take at least one course in the district in the
second semester as opposed to 1% of students whose parents received alerts.
The effects on test scores are small and statistically insignificant. There are several
possible reasons for this given the results discussed above. A key concern is that the exams are
low stakes for students because they have no implications for their grades or their likelihood
of graduating. This issue is evident to district officials, who have expressed concern that
students are spending less time on the exam than is expected. Smarter Balance, the test
provider, estimated that 9th, 10th, and 11th-grade students need approximately 210 minutes
to complete the exams at each grade level. However 9th graders spent 80 minutes to complete
the exam, 10th graders spent 67 minutes, and 11th graders spent 78 minutes to complete the
exam, on average.17 The County has decided to discontinue using the test in future years.
Second, the intervention may result in additional student effort for educational inputs
that improve course grades but not standardized test scores. The outcomes discussed above
show improvements in students’ coursework and attendance. However, the curricular ma-
terial covered during this additional course time may not necessarily reflect the material
covered in the exams, especially as the exams were only recently implemented in 2015. The
superintendent stated they are “working on standards-based teaching making sure all the
standards are covered.”18 Moreover, because the exams had only recently been introduced,
no school-based accountability measures associated with the exams had been released. These
reasons may attenuate the potential to impact test scores.
Secondary Academic Outcomes and Behaviors and Robustness
Table 2.5 presents the effects on students’ marking period course grades in more detail.
Column one shows the effects on the number of failed courses, as before, but columns two
through five show the effects on the number of D’s, C’s, B’s and A’s students received as well.
The intervention appears to shift students failing grades to C grades. Column one shows
17This made the local newspaper: Charleston Gazette-Mail.
18This quote is from the Charleston Gazette-Mail.
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the large and significant negative effect in the number of F’s students receive presented
above. Column three shows a large and significant positive effect—a 0.3 point increase—
in the number of C’s students receive. The coefficients on the number of B’s and A’s are
negative and positive, respectively, but neither estimate is statistically significant. Overall,
the evidence suggests that the treatment caused students to receive fewer F’s and more C’s.
This makes sense given the nature of the intervention, one facet of which is to alert parents
when their child is getting a low grade. This is also consistent with the positive impacts on
below-average GPA students, which we discuss when we present results on heterogeneous
effects.
In Table 2.6 we look closer at assignment scores, missed assignments and class test scores.
Column one shows that assignment scores improved by 0.09 standard deviations over the
control group. On average, the control group does not submit 9% of their assignments,
which includes both classwork, exams and homework. There is a negative but statistically
insignificant reduction in the number of assignments completed. Not shown, all students
(both treatment and control) are much less likely to miss class tests—67% less likely—than
any other type of assignment.
In contrast to the state-provided standardized test scores, scores on class tests increased
by 0.13 standard deviations. One important difference between class tests and the standard-
ized tests, among several, is that these scores count for students’ grades and will contribute
to the likelihood of a students’ parent being alerted or not. The latter may provide added
incentive for students to do well on these tests as a result of the alerts, especially as parents
are alerted about low grades. Comparing column one to column three, the treatment effects
are suggestively larger for tests than assignments overall, which are worth more points than
other assignments, but this difference is not statistically significant. Lastly, Table 2.12 shows
that all of these results are robust to other treatments of outlier observations.
Table 2.7 provides the treatment effects on GPA, suspensions, and student logins. We
find a positive effect on GPA of 0.10 points, which is significant at the 10% level. The impact
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on suspensions is small and insignificant. Student log ins increase but not nearly significant
at conventional levels. Shown below, the effect on GPA is particularly strong for students
in high school and students with below-average GPAs at baseline. Overall, the improved
assignment scores and net positive impact on GPA overall is encouraging. It is possible for
students to have held their effort constant and then reallocated it toward their failing courses.
The latter would not necessarily be negative given that it would result in increased credit
completion, but the effects on attendance, assignment scores, and GPA provide evidence of
overall net increase in student effort.
One concern with these outcomes is that teachers and students, though blinded to the
random assignment, may have changed their behaviors as well. Teachers may have shifted
attention or increased the frequency with which they grade assignments, and, though the
intervention was randomly assigned at the school-by-grade level so that control students were
always in a different grade than treated students in order to mitigate spillovers, spillovers
may have occurred nonetheless.
We assess these hypostheses in several ways. First, we observe teacher logins into the
gradebook, which would allow us to discern if teachers increase the frequency with which they
record grades in their classrooms. Though this would be interesting if teachers responded in
this fashion, we find no impacts of the intervention on teacher logins into the gradebook for
teachers who taught in treated grades compared to those teachers who did not.19 Second, we
can observe gradebook outcomes for students who were not randomized into the intervention
or control. Among these students, we can compare those students who were in treated school
grades (but were not treated because they were not part of the randomization process) and
compare their outcomes to students who were not in treated grades (and were also not part of
the randomization process). Among these students who were not part of the randomization
process, we could find that students in treated grades have different outcomes than students
in untreated grades, if there were evidence of spillovers. Among students who were not part
19Results available upon request.
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of the randomization process, we only have outcomes from the gradebook. We regress these
gradebook outcomes on an indicator for being in a treated grade to look at these particular
spillovers. Table 2.13 shows that, across GPA, course failures, retention and class attendance,
we find no significant impacts—either positive or negative.
Parent Beliefs and Behaviors
We show the effects on parents’ beliefs about the number of assignments their child has missed
in Table 2.8. We asked parents whether they thought their child missed no assignments, 1-
5 assignments, 6-10 assignments, or more than 10 assignments.20 Column one shows that
53% of parents in the control group believed their child missed zero assignments in the
last semester. The treatment reduces this belief by 15 percentage points. We can see
from the remaining columns that the treatment resorts this change away from no missed
assignments across the remaining categories. There is a statistically significant, 9 percentage
point increase, in the likelihood parents respond that their child has missed 6-10 assignments.
Only 6% of the control group believes their child missed 6-10 assignments.
Figure 2.8 compares these beliefs about missed assignments to the number of missed
assignments documented in the administrative data. This figure, which depicts the abso-
lute categorical differences in parental beliefs of missed assignments minus actual missed
assignments, makes it apparent that there is no treatment effect on the accuracy of par-
ents’ beliefs about their assignment completion. Figure 2.9 shows a similar representation of
parents’ beliefs about their child’s math grades relative to the truth. Here, there is a more
visible improvement in parents’ accuracy: the share of parents accurately reporting their
child’s grade increases by 9 percentage points and the magnitude of their errors tends to be
smaller as well. We show this difference in a regression, discussed below, but a test of these
distributions finds they are significantly different at the 5% level as well.21
Table 2.9 shows several behavioral responses to the treatment by parents. Column one
20We found this phrasing reduces the potential for outlier responses.
21We use Fisher’s exact test to compare the distributions (p-value is 0.048).
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in Panel A shows that parents are much more likely to contact the school as a result of the
intervention. The share of families who contacted the school more than once over the course
of the semester increased by 17 percentage points. This is in line with Bergman (2014), who
found that parents contacted the school more often in response to additional information and
clarify discrepancies between their child’s stated performance and the performance reflected
in teacher gradebooks.
While the treatment effects on parent logins to view their child’s grades and taking
privileges are positive, neither is statistically significant, though the latter is close to conven-
tional levels of marginal significance (p-values are 0.27 and 0.14, respectively). The question
is worded slightly differently, but Bergman (2014) found parents were significantly more
likely to take away privileges from their children.22
As reported above, column two of Panel B shows parents become significantly more
accurate about their child’s grade in math class. Lastly, the third column of Panel B asks
parents if they would like to continue the text message intervention. A high share—94%—of
the control group would like to receive the intervention. The latter is not surprising, but what
is encouraging is that the treatment causes a significant increase in parents’ demand for the
text messages of four percentage points. This suggests that what new information parents
learn from receiving the alerts increases their subsequent demand for the intervention.
Heterogeneity in Effects
Given that the intervention targeted those with low grades and attendance, we are particu-
larly interested in the subgroup of students who began the study with below-average GPAs.
We also see that biased beliefs about students’ grades and poor parent-child communication
positively correlate with students in high school and students with low GPAs (Table 2.11).
We pre-specified students with below-average grades (by grade level), students whose father
received the messages versus those whose mother received the messages, and students in
22The question posed to parents in this study asks parents whether they took any privileges away as
opposed to how often they took privileges away.
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middle school compared to students in high school. Tables 2.14-2.16 present analyses for
these groups.
Table 2.14 shows that students with below-average GPA failed 0.9 fewer classes, attended
64 more classes, and saw retention rates improve by five percentage points. All of these effects
are significant at the 1% level. The bottom row of the table shows the p-value for whether
the effect for students with lower baseline GPAs is significantly different from those with
higher baseline GPAs. The effects are significantly larger for all of the outcomes just listed
except classes attended.
As before there are no effects on exam scores, but students’ GPA increases by 0.26 points,
which is also significant at the 1% level and significantly different from the effect on students
with higher baseline GPAs0. As suggested above, these results are also consistent with our
survey results showing the negative correlation between parents who believe that their child
does not disclose their academic progress sufficiently to help them and GPA. Furthermore,
for this subgroup of students, the treatment effect of message receipt on parents’ desire to
continue the intervention is 11 percentage points and significant at the 1% level (results not
shown). This effect on the desire to continue is significantly different from the effect on
parents of children with above-average GPA, who express no greater desire to continue the
intervention than the control group (however the mean for the latter is already above 90%).
This is evidence of larger benefits for families who children have lower GPAs in the sample.
Table 2.15 shows that high school students were also more positively impacted than
the average student. These students failed 0.7 fewer classes, attended 43 more classes, and
were 4 percentage points more likely to remain in the district. Moreover, these effects are
substantially different from the effects on middle school students, shown in Panel C. The
effects for the latter group are nearly all smaller and statistically insignificant, with the
exception attendance.
We examine several possible explanations for the lack of effects in middle school. First,
we examine the first stage of the treatment on the alerts for the middle and high school
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subgroups in Table 2.20. The share of parents alerted in both groups is nearly identical, but
columns two and four show how many times high school parents were alerted and middle
school parents were alerted, respectively. Parents of high school students received roughly
twice as many alerts, which is statistically different at the 1% level. This difference is largely
because middle school students perform significantly better than high school students. For
instance, middle school students’ GPAs is one half standard deviation higher than high
school students’ GPAs. In addition to receiving fewer alerts, this also implies they have less
room to improve. Second, we find that parents of high school students have more inaccurate
beliefs. For instance, parents of middle school students are 8 percentage points more likely to
accurately recall their child’s last math grades—much of this difference is explained by high
school students’ lower GPAs (results available upon request). As discussed above, parents’
beliefs about their child’s math grades become significantly more accurate as a result of
the intervention. In results not shown, this effect is driven almost entirely by high school
students and is statistically different than the effect on middle school parents’ beliefs at the
10% level.
Table 2.16 shows the effects for targeting information to mothers and the fathers. While
there are slight differences in effects by gender of the treated parent, the coefficients are
similar in sign and there is no clear pattern. Targeted fathers saw their children experience
slightly better results in terms of classes failed and classes attended. In this context, we find
no clear evidence that targeting one parent versus another yields different results.
Given the lack of effect on standardized test scores, a question is whether there were effects
on these test scores for any subgroup. We conducted exploratory analyses to answer this
question. In results not shown, we find that parents who had never logged into the gradebook
system to view their child’s grades show positive effects on math scores and larger effects
in other domains. However we checked for these larger effects in a different study on the
adoption of this texting technology and there were no differential effects according to this
subgroup in that study. Parents with less than a college education also experience positive
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effects on their child’s test scores, but this is a small subgroup as the measure of parents’
education is based on surveys. To corroborate this finding and expand the sample beyond
the survey respondents, we linked families to census-tract level data on college attainment
and household income levels. Families living in tracts with below-median income or below-
median college attainment relative to the rest of the sample experience larger effects, similar
to the effects found for high school students, but not in terms of test scores.23 These results
should be viewed with caution as they are exploratory. We note them here if they prove
useful in defining subgroups worthy of study in future research.
Second-Year Impacts
The district permitted us to continue the intervention into a second year, however we were
only allowed to collect data from the teacher gradebooks. By that year KCS had discontinued
their standardized tests in all but the 11th grade. The flooding throughout the county
significantly disrupted student learning. For instance, students attending one middle school
and one high school only attended a half days of school because of flooded school sites were
closed. Middle school students attended classes in the morning and high schools students
in the afternoon. Nonetheless, our intervention tracked students even if they moved schools
within the county, though the second-year results must be interpreted within this context.
The sample is reduced to 1,031 students because 12th-grade students from the first year
graduated.
We report results for the overall sample and the subgroups that appeared to drive the
23Results of income and parent educational attainment are shown in the Tables section. Table 2.17 shows
that students residing in census tracts where households have below-median income in Kanawha County
were more positively impacted than those from census tracts with above median income households. This
is especially true for the amount of classes failed and classes attended, where students from below median
income households showed substantially larger effects. In terms of education, there were some but not quite
as much differential effects in table 2.18, which shows the differences between students living in households
from census tracts with below- and above-median bachelors degree attainment in Kanahwha county. The
magnitude and significance of effects in classes failed and classes attended were both substantially larger for
students from below median education households. Overall, the intervention seems to affect families from
low socioeconomic backgrounds more so than better-off families. However, there are still no substantial
effects on test scores.
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initial-year results: the high school sample, the below-average GPA sample, and the middle-
school sample. The latter appeared to experience little benefit in the first year of the inter-
vention.
Table 2.19 summarizes outcomes found in the course transcripts: courses failed, classes
attended, retention, and overall GPA during the 2016-2017 school year. The reduction in
courses failed is negative, smaller in magnitude, and no longer statistically significant. The
effects on attendance are still positive and significant, the magnitude on the retention effect
is the same as year one but not statistically significant, and the effect on overall GPA is
nearly identify in magnitude and significance. The subgroup analysis by middle and high
school reveals why the effect on course failures attenuated: the effects on high school students
remains large and significant but the effects on middle school students, which was previously
zero, is now positive, though not statistically significant at conventional levels. Overall,
the subgroups whose outcomes improved in year one continued to see beneficial effects in
year two while the middle school effects remain, overall, insignificant (either positively or
negatively).
Evidence regarding the ability for behavioral interventions to persist is mixed (cf. Allcott
and Rogers 2014). Parents could have become habituated and unresponsive to a continual
stream of information over a longer period of time. Though a second year of implementation
does not provide conclusive evidence on its long-run effects, that results persist into a second
year is nonetheless encouraging.
VI Conclusion, Scalability and External Validity
Recent research has demonstrated that providing information to parents about their child’s
academic progress can produce gains in student achievement at potentially low cost. We
helped design and implement an automated-text messaging program to test the ability to
resolve parent-child information problems and improve student achievement at scale.
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Our intervention sends automated, weekly and monthly text message alerts to parents
when their child misses a class or an assignment, or if they have a low course average. Overall,
we find significant effects of receiving alerts significantly reduces course failures and class
absences, though not state test scores. These effects are larger for lower-performing students
and students in high school. Notably, the effects are small for middle school students. There
is some evidence parents’ beliefs about their child’s grades become more accurate, though
not about their child’s missed assignments. We find large increases in parents’ contact with
schools to discuss their child’s academic progress.
This intervention is cheap relative to other education interventions aimed at student
achievement. The marginal cost of each text message is less than a fraction of one cent. If a
school were to adopt the entire system in this study and receive training for how to use it,
the cost would be $7 per student.
Given the low cost and policy relevance, an important question is whether this interven-
tion works in other contexts and would be adopted by parents in practice—especially given
our need to actively consent families in this study. This paper does not specifically study the
adoption of the intervention by parents. However, Bergman and Rogers (2017) worked Wash-
ington D.C. Public Schools to examine how varying district opt-in policies can drastically
affect the adoption and, in turn, the efficacy of this particular text-message intervention.
They find that when schools opt in parents by default, fewer than 5% of parents choose to
subsequently opt out at any point during the school year. When parents have to opt in, even
when this opt in is simplified, adoption rates are significantly lower (less than 10%). For the
opt-out group, Bergman and Rogers find significant reductions in courses failed and GPA,
especially for high school students. In the current study, less than 2% subsequently opted
out over the course of the treatment period.
There are other open questions. For instance, we do not provide evidence on varying
frequencies, timing, and content of the information to send to parents. In our study, we
target messages to low-performing students and we do not know if tailored alerts could
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reach higher-performing students along other academic margins. Lastly, we do not study
how this intervention interacts with the amount of information parents already receive from
various sources, and how the presence of additional information may interact with the mode
in which it is sent.
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VII Figures
Figure 2.1: Alert Scripts
Alert Frequency Message
Low Class Average Alert monthly “Parent Alert: [Student Name] has a [X]%
average in [Class Name]. For more informa-
tion, log in to [domain]”
Absence Alert weekly “Parent Alert: [Student Name] has [X] ab-
sence(s) in [Class Name]. For more informa-
tion, log in to [domain]”
Missing Assignment
Alert
weekly “Parent Alert: [Student Name] has [X] miss-
ing assignment(s) in [Class Name]. For more
information, log in to [domain]”




This figure shows the timeline of the project, which began during the summer of 2015 and lasted through the summer
of 2016, when data collection ended.
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Parent Reported Contact from the School
This figure shows the frequency of school to parent contact regarding student academic progress for the control
group. Results are from endline parent survey.
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How often parents talk w/ their child about school
This figure shows the frequency of parents talking to their child about schoolwork for the control group. Results
are from endline parent survey.
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How often parent talks other adult about child's school
This figure shows the frequency of parents talking to another adult about schoolwork for the control group. Results
are from endline parent survey.
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Parents' Beliefs on Missed Assignments
This figure shows the fraction of parents in the control group who believe their child missed zero, between one
to five, between six and ten, or more than ten assignments in the last semester. Results are from endline parent
survey.
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-2 0 2 4
Parent Beliefs Minus True Math Grade
This figure shows the inaccuracy of parental beliefs of math grade against actual grade. Calculations are made
by subtracting actual math grade from parent’s guess of student’s math grade. Results to the right of zero shows
the fraction of parents who overestimate a student’s grade, and those to the left shows the fractions of parent who
underestimate a student’s grade. Results are calculated from endline parent survey and gradebook data.
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0 1 2 3
Parents' Beliefs about Missed Assignments v. Truth
Treatment Control
This figure shows the treatment-control comparisons of parental belief of number of missed assignments versus
actual number of missed assignments. The calculations are absolute values of the inaccuracy by categorical bins
in which parents estimate their child’s missed assignments - zero (0), one to five (1), six to ten (2), and more than
ten (3). For example, if a parent estimated that their child missed six to ten assignments, but they actually missed
more than ten, they would be off by a category of one.
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0 1 2 3
Parents' Beliefs about Math Grade v. Truth
Treatment Control
This figure shows the treatment-control comparisons of parental belief of their child’s math grade compared to
their actual grade. The calculations are absolute values of the inaccuracy by math grade GPA, based on a 4.0
scale. For example, if a child received a B, but their parent believed they received an A, the parent would be off
by an absolute value of one.
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VIII Tables
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics and Treatment-Control Group Balance
Variable Control Mean Treatment-Control Difference P-Value Observations
Female 0.49 -0.01 0.69 1137
Black 0.16 0.04 0.37 1137
ELL 0.02 0.00 0.77 1137
IEP 0.13 0.01 0.74 1137
Baseline Math 0.00 0.05 0.54 1137
Baseline Reading 0.00 0.01 0.84 1137
Suspended Last Year 0.20 0.01 0.66 1137
Baseline Parent Logins 15.26 -0.67 0.83 1137
Baseline Student Logins 93.54 -4.01 0.49 1137
Baseline GPA 2.82 0.01 0.78 1137
Baseline Percent of Days Missed 0.06 0.01 0.16 1137
Baseline Percent of Classes Missed 0.10 -0.01 0.52 1131
Parents in the Household 1.77 -0.03 0.37 1137
This table shows the balance on covariates between randomized treatment and control groups. P-values are for tests of equality
of means across the treatment and control group via a regression of the baseline covariate on an indicator for treatment status.
Standard errors clustered by student. All regressions include strata indicators.
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Figure 2.10: Endline Survey Letter
This is page 2 of 4 of the endline survey letter sent to participant parents
after the end of the treatment school year.
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Figure 2.11: Endline Survey Letter
This is page 3 of 4 of the endline survey letter sent to participant parents
after the end of the treatment school year.
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Figure 2.12: Endline Survey Letter
This is page 4 of 4 of the endline survey letter sent to participant parents
after the end of the treatment school year.
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Table 2.2: Administrative Data on Alerts
Alerted Alerts Assignment Absence Low Grade
Treated 0.71*** 48.92*** 21.61*** 20.81*** 6.46***
(0.02) (3.11) (1.19) (2.04) (0.40 )
Control Mean 0.02 0.37 0.06 0.01 0.06
Observations 1,137 1,137 1,137 1,137 1,137
This table shows the likelihood and amount of times parents are alerted due to being ran-
domized into treatment. Alerted is an indicator for ever alerted. Alerts is the number of
alerts received. Assignment, Absence, and Low Grade are the number of alerts received by
parents by alert type. All regressions include strata indicators and a set of demographic
covariates described in the text. Standard errors are clustered at the grade-school level.
Outcome variables are from gradebook and administrative data. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.10.
Table 2.3: School to Parent Contact about Child’s Academic Progress
≥ 1x / month 2x / month. 1x / month 1x / 2-3 month < 1x / 3 month
Alerted 0.19** 0.06 0.13** -0.07* -0.12*
(0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07)
Control Mean 0.38 0.25 0.13 0.16 0.45
Observations 424 424 424 424 424
This table shows the results for how often schools contacted parents in any way about their child’s academic
progress in the last semester. Results are estimated using 2SLS regressions with the instrumented alerted variable,
an indicator for parents who received at least one text. All regressions include strata indicators and a set of
demographic covariates described in the text. Standard errors are clustered at the grade-school level. The
outcome variables are all from endline parent surveys. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 2.4: Primary Academic Outcomes
Classes Failed Classes Attended Retained Math Score Reading Score
Alerted -0.38*** 48.46** 0.02** -0.01 -0.08
(0.14) (23.08) (0.01) (0.06) (0.05)
Control Mean 0.97 277.70 0.97 0.00 0.00
Observations 1,113 1,137 1,137 927 925
This table shows treatment effects on primary academic outcomes specified in the pre-registered analysis plan.
Treatment effects are estimated using 2SLS regressions with the instrumented alerted variable, an indicator
for parents who received at least one text. All regressions include strata indicators and a set of demographic
covariates described in the text. Standard errors are clustered at the grade-school level. Outcome variables are
from gradebook and administrative data. Classes failed are total failed courses after treatment started. Classes
attended is the numerical total of classes marked as present after treatment started. Retention is defined as
taking courses after the intervention began. Math and Reading scores are z scores from standardized test scores.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Table 2.5: Student Grades
F D C B A
Alerted -0.38*** 0.10 0.29** -0.17 0.25
(0.14) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.26)
Control Mean 0.97 0.84 1.32 1.79 3.33
Observations 1,113 1,113 1,113 1,113 1,113
This table shows treatment effects on the number of each grade stu-
dents received after the treatment began. Effects are estimated using
2SLS regressions with the instrumented alerted variable, an indicator
for parents who received at least one text. All regressions include strata
indicators and a set of demographic covariates described in the text.
Standard errors are clustered at the grade-school level. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 2.6: Assignment Scores, Missed Assignments, Class Exams
Assignment Scores Missed Assignments Class Exams
Alerted 0.09*** -0.02 0.13***
(0.03) (0.01) (0.04)
Control Mean 0.02 0.09 0.00
Observations 70,076 77,418 7,342
This table shows treatment effects on student assignment scores and assignment com-
pleted. Effects are estimated using 2SLS regressions with the instrumented alerted vari-
able, an indicator for parents who received at least one text. All regressions include strata
indicators and a set of demographic covariates described in the text. Standard errors are
clustered at the grade-school level. Outcome variables are calculated from the gradebook
data. Assignment and exam scores are standardized according to the control group’s
score for each assignment or exam. Outliers more than 3 standard deviations away from
the mean are excluded. Missed assignments is an indicator for a missing assignment and
include assignments and exams. There are multiple observations per student because
there are multiple assignments or exams per student after the intervention began. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Table 2.7: Other Academic Outcomes and Behaviors
GPA Ever Suspended Student Logins
Alerted 0.10* -0.01 4.81
(0.06) (0.02) (10.58)
Control Mean 2.61 0.23 210
Observations 1,137 967 1,137
This table shows treatment effects on secondary outcomes of interest.
Effects are estimated using 2SLS regressions with the instrumented
alerted variable, an indicator for parents who received at least one
text. All regressions include strata indicators and a set of demographic
covariates described in the text. Standard errors are clustered at the
grade-school level. Outcome variables are calculated from gradebook
and administrative data. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 2.8: Parent Beliefs about Missed Assignments
None 1-5 6-10 >10 Don’t Know
Alerted -0.15*** 0.07 0.09** 0.02 -0.01
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Control Mean 0.53 0.31 0.06 0.07 0.03
Observations 403 403 403 403 403
This table shows treatment effects on parent beliefs about missed assignments.
Effects are estimated using 2SLS regressions with the instrumented alerted vari-
able, an indicator for parents who received at least one text. All regressions
include strata indicators and a set of demographic covariates described in the
text. Standard errors are clustered at the grade-school level. Outcome variables
are constructed from survey results asking parents to give the number of missed
assignments by students during the last semester. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.10
103
Table 2.9: Parents’ Behavioral Responses
Panel A. Contacted the School Talked w/ Child Parent Logins
Alerted 0.17*** 0.07 7.07
(0.06) (0.06) (6.40)
Control Mean 0.33 0.74 30.1
Observations 443 438 1,137
Panel B. Took Privileges Grade Inaccuracy Continue Texts
Alerted 0.08 -0.20** 0.04**
(0.05) (0.10) (0.02)
Control Mean 0.32 0.50 0.94
Observations 401 307 433
This table shows treatment effects on parents’ behavioral responses. Effects are estimated
using 2SLS regressions with the instrumented alerted variable, an indicator for parents
who received at least one text. All regressions include strata indicators and a set of
demographic covariates. Standard errors clustered at the grade-school level. Outcome
variables here are based on survey results and gradebook data. Panel A shows results for
an indicator for whether parents contacted the school, an indicator of whether parents
talked to their child about school about schoolwork or grades, and total parent logins
into the parent gradebook portal. Panel B shows the results for parents taking privileges
away from student in the last month of school, the difference between students’ actual
math grade and parents’ estimated math grade, and an indicator for parents’ desire to
start or continue a texting service to inform them about their child’s academic progress.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 2.10: Measures of Attrition
Miss Survey Miss Suspension Miss Math Miss Reading
Treatment -0.016 -0.000 0.008 0.010
(0.029) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015)
Percent of Days Missed -0.560** 0.294 0.770** 0.830**
(0.26) (0.200) (0.320) (0.330)
Baseline GPA 0.016 -0.003 0.008 0.015
(0.022) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016)
Black 0.024 -0.007 -0.022 -0.019
(0.030) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
IEP -0.064 -0.008 0.040 0.042*
(0.040) (0.022) (0.017) (0.023)
Female -0.014 -0.010 -0.011 -0.008
(0.029) (0.009) (0.014) (0.015)
Baseline Math Score 0.034 0.004 0.026** 0.020*
(0.025) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011)
Baseline Reading Score 0.012 0.004 -0.024* -0.021*
(0.028) (0.006) (0.012) (0.011)
Observations 1,137 1,137 1,137 1,137
This table shows the correlates of several indicators of attrition and non response: survey non-response,
missing endline GPA and missing endline test scores. Standard clustered at the grade-school level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 2.11: Correlates of Communication
Contact<1x/3m. Talk Another Adult Grade Inaccuracy Child Discloses
Fraction Absent -0.29 0.37 0.30 0.14
(0.33) (0.30) (0.98) (0.36)
Ever Suspended 0.12 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04
(0.08) (0.07) (0.13) (0.08)
GPA 0.03 0.01 -0.17*** -0.18***
(0.03) (0.025) (0.06) (0.02)
Black 0.03 -0.05 -0.014 -0.07
(0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06)
IEP -0.00 0.01 0.23 0.04
(0.08) (0.07) (0.15) (0.08)
Female 0.04 -0.08* 0.10 -0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05)
Two Parents -0.03 0.18*** 0.04 -0.08
(0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.05)
Parent Female 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.05)
High School -0.05 -0.04 0.12 -0.14***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.05)
Control Mean 0.46 0.69 0.50 0.48
Observations 423 439 307 439
This table shows the correlates of several indicators of parental and student communication behavior. Standard errors clustered
by student. All regressions include strata indicators. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 2.12: Robustness: Assignment Scores, Missed Assignments, Class Exams
Panel A. Assignment Scores < 2σ Missed Assignments < 2σ Class Exams < 2σ
Alerted 0.09*** -0.02 0.12***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.04)
Observations 67,032 91,954 7,043
Panel B. Assignment Scores < 4σ Missed Assignments < 4σ Class Exams < 4σ
Alerted 0.08*** -0.02 0.11**
(0.03) (0.01) (0.05)
Observations 71,063 91,954 7,407
Panel C. Assignment Scores < 5σ Missed Assignments < 5σ Class Exams < 5σ
Alerted 0.07** -0.02 0.10**
(0.03) (0.01) (0.05)
Observations 71,512 91,954 7,439
This table shows treatment effects on student assignment scores and assignment completed with varying
exclusion criteria for outliers. Panel A excludes all observation that are plus or minus two standard deviations
from the mean. Panel B excludes all observation that are plus or minus four standard deviations from the
mean. Panel C excludes all observation that are plus or minus five standard deviations from the mean.
The estimates in the main text shows excludes outliers plus or minus three standard deviations from the
mean. Effects are estimated using 2SLS regressions with the instrumented alerted variable, an indicator for
parents who received at least one text. All regressions include strata indicators and a set of demographic
covariates described in the text. Outcome variables are calculated from the gradebook data. Assignment and
exam scores are standardized according to the control group’s score for each assignment or exam. Missed
assignments is an indicator for a missing assignment and include assignments and exams. There are multiple
observations per student because there are multiple assignments or exams per student after the intervention
began. Standard errors are clustered at the grade-school level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 2.13: Spillover Effects
Classes Failed Classes Attended Retained GPA
Treated Grade 0.06 18.78 0.01 -0.027
(0.08) (21.31) (0.01) (0.04)
Observations 9,226 9,709 9,709 9,709
This table shows treatment effects on academic outcomes for those students who were not
part of the randomization process, and therefore were not treated. The Treated Grade
variable is an indicator for students who were in the same grade as students who were
treated. All regressions and outcomes are constructed as described in the text for those
who were randomized, and therefore include strata indicators and a set of demographic
covariates described in the text. Standard errors are clustered at the grade-school level.
Outcome variables are from gradebook data. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Table 2.14: Subgroup of Below Average GPA
Classes Failed GPA Classes Attended Retained Math Score Reading Score
Alerted -0.88*** 0.24*** 64.63*** -0.05*** 0.04 0.00
(0.27 ) (0.10 ) (26.94 ) (0.02 ) (0.09) (0.08 )
Observations 550 566 566 566 445 444
P-value that
difference = 0 0.08 0.01 0.55 0.04 0.61 0.15
This table shows the results by subgroups of interest, in this case students with below-average GPA at baseline. Treatment
effects are estimated using 2SLS regressions with the instrumented alerted variable, an indicator for parents who received
at least one text. All regression include strata indicators and a set of demographic covariates described in the text. The
p-values are for a test of whether the coefficient on the interaction term between the low-GPA indicator and the treatment
variable is equal to zero. Standard errors are clustered at the grade-school level. All regressions include strata indicators.
Outcome variables are from gradebook and administrative data. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 2.15: Subgroup of High School and Middle School Students
Panel A. High School
Classes Failed GPA Classes Attended Retained Math Score Reading Score
Alerted -0.68*** 0.25*** 45.51 -0.04** 0.00 -0.07
(0.22) (0.09) (29.89) (0.02) (0.08) (0.07)
Observations 581 597 597 597 419 417
Panel B. Middle School
Classes Failed GPA Classes Attended Retained Math Score Reading Score
Alerted -0.06 -0.10 49.50 0.01 -0.02 -0.08
(0.15) (0.09) (34.42) (0.01) (0.09) (0.08)
Observations 532 540 540 540 508 508
P-value that
difference = 0 0.01 0.00 0.94 0.03 0.75 0.55
This table shows the results by subgroups of interest, in this case high school and middle school students. Treatment
effects are estimated using 2SLS regressions with the instrumented alerted variable, an indicator for parents who received
at least one text. All regression include strata indicators and a set of demographic covariates as described in the text.
The p-values are for a test of whether the coefficient on the interaction term between the high-school indicator and the
treatment variable is equal to zero. Standard errors are clustered at the grade-school level. All regressions include strata
indicators. Outcome variables are from gradebook and administrative data. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 2.16: Subgroup of Mothers and Fathers Texted
Panel A. Mothers Texted
Classes Failed GPA Classes Attended Retained Math Score Reading Score
Alerted -0.34** 0.09 30.02* -0.02* -0.01 0.10*
(0.16) (0.09) (20.55) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07)
Observations 423 431 431 431 345 346
Panel B. Fathers Texted
Classes Failed GPA Classes Attended Retained Math Score Reading Score
Alerted -0.51** 0.06 41.22* 0.01 0.10 -0.08
(0.23) (0.12) (29.10) (0.02) (0.09) (0.09)
Observations 319 324 324 324 266 266
P-value that
difference = 0 0.03 0.37 0.29 0.65 0.51 0.40
This table shows the results by subgroups of interest, in this case students with either their mothers or
fathers receiving the text messages, as indicated on our pre-analysis plan. The sample is restricted to those
households with two parents. Treatment effects are estimated using 2SLS regressions with the instrumented
alerted variable, an indicator for parents who received at least one text. All regression include strata
indicators and a set of demographic covariates as described in the text. The p-values are for a test of
whether the coefficient on the interaction term between the mother indicator and the treatment variable is
equal to zero. Standard errors are clustered at the grade-school level. All regressions include strata indicators.
Outcome variables are from gradebook and administrative data. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 2.17: Subgroup of Below- and Above-Median Household Income
Panel A. Below-Median Household Income
Classes Failed GPA Classes Attended Retained Math Score Reading Score
Alerted -0.56** 0.17** 82.08*** -0.04* -0.10 0.01
(0.21) (0.09) (28.68) (0.02) (0.09) (0.10)
Observations 549 563 563 563 455 453
Panel B. Above-Median Household Income
Classes Failed GPA Classes Attended Retained Math Score Reading Score
Alerted -0.12 0.00 13.80 -0.02 0.05 -0.10*
(0.18) (0.10) (23.10) (0.01) (0.07) (0.06)
Observations 564 574 574 574 472 472
This table shows the results by subgroups of interest, in this case students whose household income at the census tract
level is below or above the median for Kanawha County. Treatment effects are estimated using 2SLS regressions with
the instrumented alerted variable, an indicator for parents who received at least one text. All regression include strata
indicators and a set of demographic covariates as described in the text. Standard errors are clustered at the grade-school
level. All regressions include strata indicators. Outcome variables are from gradebook and administrative data. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 2.18: Subgroup of Below- and Above-Median Proportion Households with minimum
Bachelors Degree
Panel A. Below-Median Education
Classes Failed GPA Classes Attended Retained Math Score Reading Score
Alerted -0.61*** 0.17* 64.08*** -0.03 -0.02 0.03
(0.24) (0.11) (27.22) (0.02) (0.10) (0.10)
Observations 543 558 558 558 446 444
Panel B. Above-Median Education
Classes Failed GPA Classes Attended Retained Math Score Reading Score
Alerted -0.26** 0.06 35.21* -0.02 -0.06 -0.12*
(0.15) (0.08) (26.65) (0.01) (0.07) (0.08)
Observations 570 579 579 579 481 481
This table shows the results by subgroups of interest, in this case students whose household’s highest edu-
cation is bachelors or higher at the census tract level is below or above the median for Kanawha County.
Treatment effects are estimated using 2SLS regressions with the instrumented alerted variable, an indicator
for parents who received at least one text. All regression include strata indicators and a set of demographic
covariates as described in the text. Standard errors are clustered at the grade-school level. All regressions
include strata indicators. Outcome variables are from gradebook and administrative data. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 2.19: Academic Outcomes: Year 2
Panel A. Entire Year 2 Sample
Classes Failed Classes Attended Retained GPA
Alerted -0.21 51.28* 0.02 0.09*
(0.24) (36.14) (0.01) (0.06)
Observations 964 1,031 1,031 1,031
Panel B. High School
Classes Failed Classes Attended Retained GPA
Alerted -0.87*** 62.40 0.02 0.20**
(0.34) (56.35) (0.02) (0.10)
Observations 440 492 492 492
Panel C. Middle School
Classes Failed Classes Attended Retained GPA
Alerted 0.28 40.400 0.01 -0.01
(0.28) (44.25) (0.01) (0.09)
Observations 524 539 539 539
Panel D. Below-Average GPA
Classes Failed Classes Attended Retained GPA
Alerted -0.84** 54.50** -0.02 0.19**
(0.44) (25.43) (0.02) (0.11)
Observations 467 513 513 513
This table shows treatment effects on academic outcomes during the second year of the inter-
vention. Treatment effects are estimated using 2SLS regressions with the instrumented alerted
variable, an indicator for parents who received at least one text. All regressions include strata
indicators and a set of demographic covariates described in the text. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the grade-school level. Outcome variables are from gradebook data. Classes failed are
total failed courses during the 2016-2017 academic year. Classes attended is the number of total
of classes marked as present during the 2016-2017 academic year. Retention is defined as taking
courses during the 2016-2017 academic year. The sample size is smaller than the Year 1 sample
because Year 1 12th-grade students graduated. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 2.20: Alerts by Middle v. High School
Alerted HS Alerts HS Alerted MS Alerts MS
Treatment 0.72*** 66.10*** 0.69*** 31.21***
(0.02) (3.22) (0.02) (2.19)
Control Mean 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.72
Observations 597 597 540 540
This table shows the likelihood and amount of times parents are alerted due to
being randomized into treatment, where HS indicates students in high school and
MS indicates students in middle school. Alerted is an indicator for ever alerted.
Alerts is the number of alerts received. All regressions include strata indicators
and a set of demographic covariates described in the text. Standard errors are
clustered at the grade-school level. Outcome variables are from gradebook and
administrative data. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 2.21: Secondary outcomes and their sources
Outcome Source
Number of alerts sent Administrative Data
Number of parent logins Administrative Data
Number of student logins Administrative Data
Ever suspended Administrative Data
GPA Administrative Data
Total number of missed assignments Administrative Data
School-to-parent contact Survey Q3
Parent-to-school contact Survey Q6
Accuracy of grade beliefs Survey Q9 & Admin Data
Accuracy of missed assignment beliefs Survey Q16 & Admin Data
Parent talks to child about schoolwork Survey Q12
Parent takes privileges from child over schoolwork Survey Q14
Desire to continue intervention Survey Q19
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Table 2.22: Secondary outcomes and their construction
Outcome Construction
Number of alerts sent Total alerts sent post intervention start
Number of parent logins Total parent logins post intervention start
Number of student logins Total student logins post intervention start
Ever suspended Indicator for a suspension of any length oc-
curring post intervention start
GPA Average of 2nd semester grades using a 4-
point scale imputing zeros for missing.
Total number of missed assign-
ments
Total number of assignments missed in the
2nd semester
School-to-parent contact Indicator for once per month or greater
Parent-to-school contact Indicator for above median contact
Accuracy of grade beliefs Survey Q9 minus grade from last report card
and indicator for “I don’t know”
Accuracy of missed assignment
beliefs
Survey Q16 minus number from 2nd semester
data and indicator for “I don’t know”
Parent talks to child about
schoolwork
Indicator for 2-3 times per week and above.
Parent takes privileges from child
over schoolwork
Indicator for true or not
Desire to continue intervention Indicator for true or not
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Table 2.23: Secondary outcomes and hypothesized effect
Outcome Test
Number of alerts sent ATE> 0
Number of parent logins ATE!=0
Number of student logins ATE!=0
Ever suspended ATE< 0
GPA ATE> 0
Total number of missed assignments ATE< 0
School-to-parent contact ATE!=0
Parent-to-school contact ATE!=0
Accuracy of grade beliefs ATE> 0
Accuracy of missed assignment beliefs ATE> 0
Parent talks to child about schoolwork ATE!=0
Parent takes privileges from child over schoolwork ATE!=0
Desire to continue intervention ATE> 0
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Chapter 3
The Everlasting Quest of ‘Preschool for All’: Enrollment and
Maternal Labor Supply Implications of Bilingual Pre-K
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I Introduction and Motivation
This paper studies the effects of a bilingual prekindergarten (pre-K) mandate on preschool
enrollment and maternal labor supply of non-White Hispanic and immigrant families. Us-
ing nationally-representative data sources, I provide evidence on the implications of state-
mandated public bilingual classrooms for English language learners (ELLs). The question of
whether such a mandate could increase enrollment into preschool for children of non-English
speaking families and induce their mothers to enter the workforce is of immense importance
for policy due to the substantial achievement gap between English speakers and English lan-
guage learners, the growing evidence of academic and social benefits of preschool, and the
potential for mothers to increase the welfare of low-income families by increasing the amount
time they are able to be in the labor force. Beyond the immediate policy relevance of this
question, this paper also contributes to the understanding of racial heterogeneity in mater-
nal labor supply effects and their choices between consumption and leisure in a traditional
two-good model.
Bilingual Pre-K in the United States
A recent push for expansion of universal pre-K across the United States has been driven by
child advocates' belief that voluntary preschool for all children would grant more children
the opportunity to derive positive academic and social outcomes often associated with early
childhood education. Research has documented moderate-to-large impacts of pre-K on short-
and medium-term cognitive outcomes, such as language, literacy, numeracy and mathematics
skills (Weiland et al., 2013; Gormley Jr et al., 2005; Hustedt et al., 2007; Wong et al., 2008)
and mixed to small impacts on socioemotional skills such as attentiveness (Gormley, 2008;
Magnuson et al., 2007). Additionally, advocates speak of the need and duty to maximize
the education and opportunities for society's children. Even the government has increased
their involvement in pushing for early childhood education as recently as the Obama ad-
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ministration, who had proposed instruments to establish high-quality early learning centers
and proposing a voluntary, federal-state partnership Preschool for All program that would
provide substantial funding for starting up public centers of early education.
Yet some have questioned the sufficiency of universal pre-K, as universal access to pre-
K does not necessarily equate to access for students of all types. In particular, questions
surround access, equity, and quality for families with limited English proficiency. Between
2005 and 2009, a precipitous and unexplained drop occurred in Latino children's pre-K
enrollment in the United States (Fuller and Kim, 2011). While there is little evidence of why
the decrease occurred, some potential explanations include a declining political environment
for immigrants, particularly along the Mexican border, and dissatisfaction in the quality of
pre-K programs.
Since the turn of the century, the issue of increasing or stagnant achievement gaps between
ELL and non-ELL stduents has arisen through both mainstream and academic forums, from
newspaper and advocate organization articles (Ang, 2014), academic publications (Rear-
don and Galindo, 2009), to influential lawsuits. These add growing evidence of substantial
achievement gaps and inequitable distribution of resources between English-speaking and
ELL students. For example, in California, the class-action lawsuit Williams vs. State of
California in 2000 alleged that the state allocated funding based on both wealth and lan-
guage status. The lawsuit resulted in a major settlement requiring the state to allocate
nearly a billion dollars in additional funding for facility repairs and resources to schools in
the two lowest deciles of achievement (of Education, 2014a). Further, the think tank Califor-
nia Common Sense noted that the descriptive achievement gap in the reading levels of ELL
and non-ELL students grew 23% between 2003 and 2013, which they partially attribute to
the quickly growing population of immigrants in the state (Ang, 2014).
As a result of such debates, some have advocated for expansion of requiring districts to
open up bilingual pre-K classrooms, whereby districts would be required to offer bilingual
classrooms if a school has a minimum level of non-English speaking students. These debates
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have arisen primarily in states and cities with large immigrant populations, particularly in
areas where Spanish-speakers, the second largest language population in the United States,
are prominent. In New York City, a city with roughly 53,000 pre-K seats available as
of September 2014, former Chancellor Carmen Farina expanded many of the city's dual
language offerings (Shapiro, 2014). Yet bilingual at the pre-K level in NYC is still a rarity
and not yet a district requirement. A small but growing chorus of parents and schools has
been pushing for more of these classrooms, but often cite finding eligible teachers as a major
issue (Cummings, 2014). A similar grassroots movement started in Texas, where over 50
percent of the state's public school students are Latinos yet state-level funding for bilingual
classrooms has been an inhibiting factor (Olivera, 2015).
Similarly, certain districts and schools have implemented a design for students to receive
a bilingual education regardless of their language status. In Andrews Independent School
District in Texas, administrators use what they refer to as a 50/50 model where all students,
beginning in pre-K and ending in fifth grade, are required to be in classrooms taught in both
English and Spanish. The two primary goals in the design is first to have half their classes
taught in English and half in English, and second to have each classroom composed of half
English speakers and half Spanish speakers. The long-term goal is for each student to have a
second fluent language to rely on when entering the labor market. This represents evidence
that even English proficient families may demand bilingual pre-K for their children.
Context and Research Questions
In this study, I begin the first examination into the enrollment and maternal labor supply
effects of the first statewide bilingual pre-K requirement in Illinois. Initially passed by the
Illinois state legislature to be effective as of January 1, 2009, the original law extended the
designation of “children of limited English-speaking ability” in public schools to include
3- and 4-year olds (Zehr, 2010). This law change then prompted the Illinois state board
of education to adopt regulations requiring all publicly-funded preschool programs to (a)
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identify children with limited English proficiency and (b) to provide transitional bilingual
classrooms for those students, beginning in September 2010. The requirement covered all
585 preschool programs in publicly funded schools and districts with enrollment of twenty
or more ELLs who speak the same language in pre-K.
Here, I examine the policy's effects on two types of outcomes: (1) probability of enroll-
ment by 3- and 4-year olds for the policy's target population, and (2) maternal labor supply
of those same students in Illinois. My identification strategy exploits the variation created
by the policy. Specifically, I use a difference-in-differences empirical strategy in two manners:
(1) by time and by state using bordering contiguous states as the control, and (2) by time
and treatment population within the state, where I use target populations as the treated
subjects and all others in the state as control. I find evidence of higher enrollment for target
students and none-to-small effects on maternal labor supply.
II Relevant Literature
Effects of Pre-K in General
Since the 1960s, much experimental research has been completed on the effects of pre-K on
various outcomes. The original and most well known project to date has been the High/Scope
Perry Preschool Project, in which 3- and 4-year old African-American subjects were randomly
divided into treatment group receiving high-quality preschool and control group receiving no
preschool program between 1962 to 1967. Educational researchers have studied the short-,
medium-, and long-term effects of the project and found that African Americans treatment
participants born into poverty and labeled as “high-risk” of failing in school were more likely
to be committed to school, have better academic outcomes in fourth grade, have better
relationships with friends, have better marriage outcomes for girls, graduate high school,
have higher earnings, to hold a job, and committed fewer crimes relative to their peers in the
control group (Weikart et al., 1978; Manning and Patterson, 2006; Schweinhart et al., 1993).
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These studies, along with most studies of its kind, suffered greatly from limited samples
sizes and attrition. However, a literature review by Barnett (1995) of thirty-six such studies
conclude that large-scale public early childhood care and education programs can induce
positive long-term academic and social outcomes for disadvantaged children.
Recent quasi-experimental research supports the general findings of the experiments.
Studies generally rely on the variation from discontinuities to identify causal estimates. For
example, Weiland et al. (2013) exploited age discontinuities to estimate the short-term effects
of a quality pre-K program in Boston on cognitive and socioemotional outcomes. They study
differences between students just above and below the birthdate cutoff and as a result were
close in age but only those above the cutoff had experienced the program. Their analysis
finds mostly moderate-to-large impacts on mathematics, literacy, language outcomes, and
mixed-to-small effects on socioemotional outcomes, such as attention shifting, emotional
recognition, and impulse control. In their subgroup analysis, the most statistically significant
and robust results were for Hispanic students and free-or-reduced-priced lunch students. In a
study using variation created by funding discontinuities, Ludwig and Miller (2007) identified
substantial and lasting effects of the Head Start program in future mortality rates and
educational attainment.
Similar to the aforementioned literature, various other studies have also found moderate-
to-large impacts of pre-K on short- and medium-term cognitive outcomes, such as language,
literacy, numeracy and mathematics skills (Gormley Jr et al., 2005; Hustedt et al., 2007;
Wong et al., 2008) and mixed to small impacts on socioemotional skills (Gormley, 2008;
Magnuson et al., 2007). A growing body of literature has provided evidence that Hispanic
students benefit more than most other racial and ethnic groups (Currie and Thomas, 1998;
Garces et al., 2002; Gormley Jr et al., 2005; Loeb et al., 2007). These examples represent
only a small subset of the early childhood literature finding wide-ranging causal effects from
such programs in various contexts and for specific populations.
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Effects of Bilingual Education
Despite the substantial amount of research done on the positive effects of pre-K, it is not
without question that the effects generalize to an immigrant or bilingual population. Re-
cent causal literature on bilingual education has been limited in quantity and rigor. Rossell
and Baker (1996), a highly cited literature review on bilingual education, reviewed over 300
evaluations, only 72 of which were considered quantitatively rigorous at the time1. Among
those considered rigorous, they find limited effectiveness of transitional bilingual education.
A follow-up meta-analysis of the evaluations used in Rossell and Baker's literature review,
though, analyzed eleven highly quantitative projects and noted only small effects in language
outcomes, primarily stemming from all-English approaches to bilingual education (Greene,
1997). Further, Robinson (2011) suggested that in cases where OLS methods, a dominant
method in many of those supposedly rigorous studies, are used to evaluate the effects of
bilingual education, belief in such estimates might be naive. He develops a regression dis-
continuity method combined with an instrumental variable and shows that reclassification
of a bilingual student to full-English classes could negatively affect English assessment out-
comes, despite positive OLS estimates. While the history of bilingual education has been
as contentious and enduring as preschooling, the limited causal evidence has been driven by
the ethical and legal implications of assigning ELL students to non-ELL programs. Thus,
no study has yet successfully determined the true causal effects of ELL programs relative to
non-ELL programs for ELL students.
Effects of Universal Pre-K Policies
The novelty of universal-type policies in preschool also means limited causal evidence on
how these policies affect outcomes. Maria Fitzpatrick has multiple studies on this topic.
Her 2008 study uses a difference-in-differences framework to find that a universal pre-K
1The authors described rigorous studies as those that included a treatment and control group, and where
participants were either randomly assigned or pre-treatment differences were at a minimum controlled for
when not randomly assigned.
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policy in Georgia increases fourth grade reading and math scores for disadvantaged children
residing in rural and small town contexts. Since her estimates are intent-to-treat estimates,
she notes that much of the results are driven by higher enrollment gains in rural areas
relative to urban areas. Her second study in 2010 examined two universal pre-K programs
in Georgia and Oklahoma using restricted-access Census data. Her identification strategy
focused on regression discontinuities in birthdate cutoffs and she finds that universal pre-
K availability increases preschool enrollment by about 14-17%, with mixed-to-no effects
on maternal labor supply. Gormley Jr et al. (2005) also used birthdate discontinuities in
Oklahoma to find improvements of enrollment in specific cognitive assessment scores, such
as spelling and word identification. In another study, William Gormley (2008) specifically
examined the effects of Oklahoma's universal pre-K program on Hispanic students in Tulsa,
Oklahoma. Using a regression discontinuity design, he found Hispanic students benefited
greatly academically, experiencing test score gains in reading, writing, and mathematics.
These studies give policymakers limited external validity, since there has only been few
contexts studied.
Effects of Pre-K on Maternal Labor Choice
In order to ponder maternal decisions, a traditional two-good framework modeling labor
supply choices as a tradeoff between consumption and leisure may be applied. In this model,
mothers derive utility from either consumption purchased with labor income or leisure itself
(Browning et al., 2011). Leisure here can implicitly include taking care of children, whereas
labor income would mean that child-care be purchased. Child-care availability at a partial- or
fully-subsidized rate, such as the public education context we are examining, should provide
incentive for mothers to both enroll their child in pre-K and to either enter work or increase
the number of hours they work. The number of hours worked, however, may be limited to
the time a mother's child in in care. On the other hand, the child-care subsidy may also
be perceived as an income subsidy for mothers, which in such a case would exert downward
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pressure on the amount of hours worked in the labor market. Previous works have shown
that theoretical predictions from such models on working women typically find that the
effects of child care subsidies are ambiguous (Gelbach, 2002).
In limited contexts, there is evidence that preschool enrollment have a positive effect on
maternal labor supply. Gelbach (2002) uses a quarter of birth instrument to estimate that
free public schooling for both single and married mothers whose youngest child is five years of
age increased labor supply significantly. For single mothers with an additional younger child
under five, though, no significant effects were found. Studies have also consistently found
that married mothers have significant negative labor-supply response to child care prices
(Blau and Robins, 1988; Connelly, 1992; Kimmel, 1998). Among single mother, elasticities
found have typically been mixed (Kimmel, 1998).
Contribution to Literature
This study contributes to this literature in two significant ways. The first contribution is
that it is the first to study a statewide bilingual pre-K mandate. This is important for a
few reasons. First, given that households with young non-English speakers should be greatly
different from those who do speak the language and the substantial educational achievement
gap between ELLs and non-ELLs, it is paramount to understand the nuanced differences
between presenting opportunities to parents for pre-K versus presenting opportunities to
parents for bilingual pre-K. Additionally, despite Illinois already having a “universal” pre-K
policy in place, such mandates may promote the notion that such generalized policies aren't
inclusive enough to give sufficient opportunities to a universe of citizens. We must then figure
out whether there is a genuine and substantial demand for bilingual pre-K beyond universal
pre-K. The second contribution is that this study presents additional evidence of the effects of
increased pre-K availability in a context not studied before. Much of the previous evidence
on universal Pre-K policies used policies from Georgia and Oklahoma, whereas studying
Illinois - given the presence of Chicago - includes a significant urban presence. Third, it also
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presents additional evidence on maternal labor market effects for Hispanic mothers resulting
from a form of free child care.
III The Context: Bilingual Pre-K in Illinois
In 1985, Illinois legislation established the availability of preschool for eligible children be-
tween ages 3 to 5 considered at-risk of academic failure in the future. The legislation
greatly increased funding for preschool programming and professional development. Over
the decades that followed, funds were used to expand child care, Head Start programs, and
community-based preschool organizations.
In 2006, the Preschool for All program was formally introduced with the goal of giving
every 3- and 4-year olds (and 5-year olds whose date of birth prevented them from kinder-
garten eligibility) in the state an opportunity to enroll in high-quality public pre-K. Thus,
beginning in Fall 2007, Illinois officially enacted a universal pre-K policy mandating that
public pre-K be offered to all parents with three- and four-year olds in the state. One of
the primary goals of this policy was to close persistent achievement gaps between those who
could and those who could not afford pre-K for their children. Soon after, policymakers and
districts arrive at the realization that the policy may still perpetuate the vast achievement
gaps that have persisted between English language learners (ELLs) and English speakers
for many years2. Anecdotes of how immigrants and limited English speaking parents either
found that programs were not well-equipped to teach their children or did not send their
child to pre-K at all perpetuated, especially as bilingual pre-K were rarely offered in public
schools (Severns, 2012). The importance of closing this gap in Illinois is due to the quickly
growing immigrant population; there was an increase of 200,000 foreign-born in Illinois's
population during the 2000s, with many immigrant families moving to the suburbs where
2The language achievement gap is vast in Illinois. 97% of fourth graders with limited English proficiency
(LEP) in 2008-09 scored in the two lowest levels of the statewide standardized assessment, compared to 58%
of White students. For the senior class of 2008-09, 63% of students with limited English proficiency and 28%
of migrant students graduated from high school, compared to 93% White/Asians, 77% of Blacks/Hispanics,
and even 78% of special education students (Illinois Board of Education, 2009).
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school districts were not accustomed to serving an immigrant population (Severns, 2012).
Therefore, in 2009 the state legislature established first statewide bilingual pre-K require-
ment in Illinois. The law, to be effective as of January 1, 2009, extended the designation of
“children of limited English-speaking ability” in public schools to include all 3- and 4-year
olds. This law change then prompted the Illinois state board of education to adopt reg-
ulations requiring all publicly-funded preschool programs to identify children with limited
English proficiency and to provide transitional bilingual classrooms for those students, be-
ginning in September 2010 in time for the start of the 2010-11 school year. The requirement
covered all 585 preschool programs in publicly funded schools and districts with enrollment
of twenty or more ELLs who speak the same language in pre-K (Zehr, 2010).
There were three major requirements of the mandate. The first major requirement,
under 23 Illinois Administrative Code Part 228 Traditional Bilingual Education, is for public
districts to identify children who are ELLs. This process involve the administration of
a home language survey to the parents of children new to the district and conducting an
English language proficiency screening process for children whose home language or language
background is not English. Those who do not demonstrate English language proficiency
during the screening process would be considered ELLs. The second major requirement of
the mandate is for all 585 state-funded preschool programs to provide bilingual classrooms
for those students classified as ELL students if a minimum of twenty such students enrolled
speaking the same language. The third major requirement is that by the beginning of
the school year in 2014, any teacher in bilingual preschool classrooms must be certified in
bilingual instruction or English as a second language, in addition to being a certified in early
childhood education.
Given the implied costs and scope of the mandate, the implementation of the mandate
in September 2010 was not without its hurdles. As with many others matters of schooling,
mandated increases in resource requirements often compel districts to make difficult decisions
on allocation of limited resources. One limitation of the mandate is that it arrived without
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additional funding, forcing districts to comply using “dwindling reserves and funding delays,”
much of it a result of the Great Recession (Malone, 2010). Another limitation is that districts
must scramble to hire qualified bilingual aides, who were used as an assistant in a majority
of classrooms due to the lacking supply of fully certified bilingual teachers in early childhood
education. Additionally, the supply of teachers with both certifications is highly limited as
the requirements to obtain both are difficult to reach. An analysis of the internal validity
implications of these issues is discussed later.
Descriptively, there was an increase in the raw numbers of ELL students enrolling into
pre-K in Illinois at the time of implementation. Figure 3.1, based on numbers from the
Illinois Department of Education, shows more than a doubling in both enrollments - from
7,260 students during the 2009-10 school year to 17,564 during the 2010-11 school year -
and the proportion of pre-K ELL students relative to the total ELL students in the state
at the time of the mandate. While we can hypothesize that the policy may have increased
enrollment, we cannot determine a causal interpretation without experimental or quasi-
experimental methods. Therefore, the primary goal of this paper is to develop an estimate
of enrollment increase with causal interpretation due to the mandate itself.
IV Data and Descriptive Statistics
To estimate the initial effects of bilingual PK in Illinois, I use publically available data
from the 2008-2013 American Community Survey (ACS)3. The ACS is an annual survey
given by the US Census Bureau and provides a cross-sectional representative snapshot of
US inhabitants each year. The survey solicits information on subjects such as household
demographics and relationships, income and public benefits, education, disabilities, and
employment information.
The mandate is specifically targeted at families with young English language learners in
3ACS datasets are publically available and can be obtained from IPUMS for research purposes. Here, I
used the 1% nationally-representative samples from 2008-2013 (Ruggles and Sobek, 2015).
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Illinois, of which well over 80% are from Spanish-speaking families. Given this, I generate
a single analytical sample by restricting the dataset to three targeted groups of interest:
non-white Hispanics, recent immigrant families who immigrated within 5 years of their child
becoming eligible for pre-K, and children of families where both parents are of limited English
speaking ability4. The latter two categories captures families who generally have limited
English proficiency, and I include in the sample only non-white Hispanic families rather
than white Hispanic families (which makes up 57% of Hispanics in Illinois) primarily due
to large differences in demographics. White Hispanic mothers with pre-K age children,
according to the ACS data, speaks English either “well” or “very well” at a 88% rate and
have mean household incomes 340% of the poverty level status. Only 47% of non-white
Hispanic mothers speaks English well, with household incomes only 183% of the poverty
level on average. It is clear that most white Hispanic families, at least demographically, are
not a part of the main target population for this policy in Illinois. For the most part, white
Hispanic families in Illinois should have been able to take advantage of the initial universal
pre-K policy5.
I also limit my main analysis to three years before and after the implementation of the
policy (2008-10 before, 2011-2013 after). As a check of robustness, I test estimates when
timeframes are varied. In analyses of enrollment, I use three- and four-year old children6
from the three treated groups, as these are the primary interest groups of the mandate. The
outcome variables of interest are enrollment in public pre-K for three- and four-year olds,
and probability of being in the labor force, usual hours worked last week, and wage and
salary income for mothers.
Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics for pre-K age children and their mothers during
4In the sample, a large majority of non-English speaking families are from non-White Hispanic families.
Because of that, around 95% of the samples are composed of non-English speaking Hispanic households.
5This can be tested by examining how non-White and White Hispanics compare when it comes to the
effects of the initial 2007 universal pre-K policy. It will be a part of future drafts.
6While officially, five-year olds are also eligible to be in a pre-K program, most are eligible for kindergarten
based on birth date cutoffs. For the most part, five-year olds in pre-K are those who started when they were
four. Therefore, the effects for five-year olds may not be seen in the estimates and may attenuate estimates
so I leave them out of the analyses.
130
the three years before and after the policy change. Observably, there is little different about
children and mothers before and after the policy change. Admittedly, there could be unob-
servable differences between parents, especially if migration patterns become unique around
the timeframe of the mandate. Demographically, though, there are no substantial differ-
ences in children or mothers' age, mothers' education, or ethnic/racial makeup. Mothers,
on average, are slightly older and more educated, after the mandate, but these differences
are not significant. In terms of outcome variables, there are little descriptive differences in
maternal labor supply outcomes and several percentage point increase in pre-K attendance
for children of pre-K age.
V Empirical Strategy
I exploit the sudden variation in pre-K enrollment induced by the bilingual mandate to use a
difference-in-differences (DD) strategy in order to credibly estimate the effects of the mandate
on pre-K enrollment and maternal labor supply of the population of interest. The primary
strength of a difference-in-differences approach is that it differences out biases in comparisons
between treatment and control that may be the result of both permanent differences between
groups and trends over time. In this manner, the result can give us credible estimates of
treatment effects. To study the said outcomes, I first estimate the following regression:
Yist = β0 + β1 ∗ Treatis + β2 ∗ Postit + β3 ∗ (Treatis ∗ Postit) +X ′ist + εist,
where Yist is the outcome of interest for child or mother i living in state s during time t.
Treatis is a dummy referring to the treatment or control state, Postit is a dummy referring
to the before and after of policy implementation, and X ′ist is a vector of covariates. The
coefficient of interest will be β3, which interacts the treatment dummy with the time dummy
and gives us an average treatment effect of the bilingual pre-K policy. This specification
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restricts the sample to only the three group of interest and uses neighboring contiguous7
states as a control group. I use neighboring states as a control group as they should typically
be a representative counterfactual due to proximity, similarity in culture and values, and face
similar natural, economic, and social issues.
To test for robustness and provide more comfort of estimates, I also estimate the spec-
ification using non-treatment group individuals (e.g., Caucausians and African-Americans
who speak English) within the state of Illinois, such that:
Yigt = β0 + β1 ∗ Treatig + β2 ∗ Postgt + β3 ∗ (Treatig ∗ Postgt) +X ′igt + εist,
where g denotes the target group as 1 and the counterfactual group as 0. The use of coun-
terparts within the state as the counterfactual is slightly less intuitive, as White families and
target families are different in observables and unobservables. However, they should hypo-
thetically experience similar laws and events and any variation caused by these similarities
would be differenced out. The two specifications presented have different interpretations:
The first compares the treatment group to their similar peers in neighboring states; the
second compares the treatment group to the to their counterparts and neighbors within the
state. However, the combination of studying across-state peers and within-state counterparts
provides for both a robustness test and additional believability of results.
VI Results
Effects on Pre-K Enrollment
In order to support the reasoning behind the bilingual policy, effects of the mandate on
pre-K enrollment for its targeted populations should be substantial. Without its intended
primary effects of increasing enrollment, the mandate would have no alternative mechanism
of improving academic achievement for English language learners. The estimation results
7The counterfactual states used in this specification are Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri, and Wisconsin.
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of the bilingual mandate on enrollment are reported in Table 3.2. Three specifications are
reported here: (1) a basic DD without covariates, (2) a DD specification with background and
socioeconomic status as covariates, and (3) the same specification with state and urbanicity
fixed effects. Additionally, the results are delineated by control strategy.
The effects of the bilingual pre-K mandate on enrollment are estimated to be an increase
of approximately seven to eight percentage points. Given that pre-mandate enrollment levels
for these groups were between 38 to 41 percent, the estimations approximately equates to
an 18 to 20 percent increase in preschool enrollment for the groups of interest. My estimates
are robust to additional controls and control strategy. In the across-state comparison of
targeted populations and its similar counterfactual group, standard errors are calculated by
aggregating year-group cell means.
A significant threat to internal validity is the presence of a previous universal pre-K
policy enacted for the Fall 2007 school year. The bilingual pre-K policy of interest went into
effect three years later during the Fall of 2010. Given that the data runs from 2008-2013,
it is possible that such a policy may affect estimates as one would expect. For example,
if the additional pre-K availability from 2007 induces a Hispanic parent to send their first
child to pre-K and finds a good experience, they are more likely to also send a second child
to pre-K when the second child is of age three years later. This enrollment effect would
be derived from the first policy rather than the latter. However, the consistent estimates
by varying timeframe thresholds should also provide confidence that the estimates are not
significantly biased by the presence of the first policy. One way to test both the robustness
and whether there are larger coefficients around time of the mandate is to restrict samples
by year. Table 3.3 shows the results of such an analysis. Here, I find that while estimates
closer to the mandate8 are higher, it is not substantially higher. The consistent estimates
between 7.6 to 8.3 percentage points increase from the furthest to the closest margin around
8The estimates using ACS data is limited to the 2010-2011 timeframe, but the 2010 data includes a
portion of surveys completed during both the prior and after mandate implementation in September 2010,
which may cause attenuation of estimates. As a secondary test, I also ran DD estimates by restricting data
to just 2009 and 2010 ACS data. Once again, the estimate is similarly in the 8% range.
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the mandate gives us an indication that lasting effects of the initial universal pre-K policy
should be minimal.
While I have confidence that the enrollment increase is credible according the Illinois
context three years after universal pre-K, it does not preclude the possibility that effects of
the bilingual mandate would have been even larger in alternative contexts where universal
pre-K is not available. This notion limits external validity of this study.
Overall, estimates show a substantial increase in pre-K enrollment. However, as figure
3.1 had shown, there was an even larger increase in pre-K enrollment of English language
learners, from 7,260 to 17,564 (an increase of 142%), between the schools years starting
2009 and 2010. My results does not substantiate such a strong increase in enrollment,
requiring that other major factors be at work, such as large increases in immigrant or Hispanic
populations in Illinois or vast amounts of students who would not have been assessed to be
ELL students prior to the mandate were suddenly being assessed and categorized as such.
In the latter case, since my estimates are independent of ELL classification, they would not
capture a similar measurement as that of the Illinois Board of Education and so would not
be an apples-to-apples comparison.
Effects on Maternal Labor Supply
While the effects of the mandate on enrollment are a direct effect, effects on maternal labor
supply tend to be more indirect in the sense that any effects could only be realized if a
mother sends their child to pre-K and subsequently choose to find or increase labor. An
estimation of an effect on maternal labor supply therefore must follow a couple of general
assumptions about the average household. First, economists assume that it is the mother,
rather than the father or someone else in the family, who assumes primary responsibility
as caretaker of their children. This is believable in the Illinois context, where well over 70
percent of households with preschool age children have a woman listed as the household
head. Second, we assume that mothers often choose not to work or limit their work to take
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care of their child during the early years. Under these assumptions, we may be able to detect
effects on maternal labor supply. Since the target population of this policy, demographically,
is of lower socioeconomic class than the general population, I would expect that there is a
better chance that a public subsidization of their child's education in pre-K should lead to
an increase in the choice to work over leisure.
The DD estimates for the effects of the mandate on maternal labor supply are shown
in Table 3.4. Three dependent variables are examined here: the probability of being in the
labor force, the amount of usual hours worked per week, and wage and income salary. The
estimates show that there are little, if any, effects on maternal labor supply. While the
estimates show significance for an increase of the mothers' probability of being in the labor
force by two percentage points under the first control strategy, it is not robust to neither the
second control strategy nor varying time frames (the latter of which is shown in Table 3.5.
Coefficients for usual hours worked per week range from -1.1 to +2.5, though insignificant.
Wage income for mothers are also insignificant, with positive coefficients in the hundreds
using the first control strategy and negative coefficients in the thousands from the second
control strategy.
VII Discussion of Results and Internal Validity
Underlying Assumptions
The two primary assumptions of the DD method are parallel trends and stability of group
composition. The first assumption means that, under a counterfactual world in which the
treatment condition did not occur, the trend of the treatment group will parallel that of the
control group. One indicator of parallel trends is for the treatment and control group to
display similar trends in the dependent variable prior to the implementation of the policy.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 shows the annual changes in enrollment percentage rates for the first
and second control strategy, respectively. The validity of the DD method is strengthened
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by the visually similar enrollment trends prior to the first year of implementation. In the
first control strategy, the changes in enrollment rate for the years prior to the mandate's
implementation had the same signs for two of three years and were very similar in magnitude
for all three year. In the second control strategy, the same can be said of all three years.
The second assumption is that the groups prior to and after the mandate remain un-
changed. While I am unable to test the strict compliance of this assumption, I am able to
examine the observable characteristics of the treatment and control groups prior to and after
implementation. If we find that the treatment group is different under observable dimen-
sions before and after the policy implementation, then internal validity will be limited. As
stated prior, Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the treatment groups. Here, we
find little variation in baseline covariates, and so I would be confident that there were no
major changes, at least observably, in demographic makeup of the treatment group before
and after the policy change.
Discussion of Enrollment Effects
Due to the strong evidence of effectiveness of early childhood education, one hypothetical
method of closing achievement gaps between student groups is to increase availability to
preschool. However, universal pre-K in itself, while celebrated, often does not go far enough
to grant access to its most disadvantaged populations.
In this study, I estimate that the 2010 Illinois bilingual pre-K mandate increased preschool
enrollment for children of non-White Hispanic, recently immigrated, and limited English-
speaking families by 18-20 percent. Given the specific higher need population, it is not
surprising to find that it is slightly higher than the estimates of Fitzpatrick (2010) of 14-
17 percent for general universal pre-K policies in Georgia and Oklahoma. However, two
primary reasons may have limited the effectiveness of Illinois's bilingual mandate. First, a
universal pre-K policy preceded the bilingual mandate in Illinois three years earlier. While
the robustness of estimates by various timeframes lend credence to my estimates, it does not
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preclude the fact that many of the target families had already been induced to send their
child to preschool based on the previous policy. This could have led to higher proportions
of enrollment for target groups relative to the proportion that would have occurred under a
universal pre-K-less world, which would in turn lead to smaller effect estimates in this study.
The second major reason was that there were probably various implementation-based
biases, many of which were the subject of media attention in Illinois. There were three
primary implementation-related reasons that lead me to believe enrollment estimates could
have been biased.
One issue is that the requirement for all districts to determine the language skills of poten-
tial pre-K students suffers from inconsistency. In particular, districts and programs are given
the autonomy to choose a process by which to judge English skills. While the department
of education provided a limited amount of guidance, including rules about using multiple
measures and minimal ‘English skills’ on which to measure (of Education, 2014b), the rel-
atively high level autonomy could restrict the consistent accuracy of language assessments
and could assign some limited-English children into full English classrooms and vice-versa.
An inconsistent process combined with lax accountability could skew towards Type II error,
whereby ELL students are incorrectly classified and assigned to English classrooms. Parents
of bilingual children may then unenroll them, thereby negating effects.
A second issue is that the perceived quality of bilingual pre-K in Illinois may hinder
enrollments. As previously stated, due to the limited supply of fully-qualified teachers many
districts made the choice at time of implementation to add a bilingual aide to classrooms to
assist teachers instead. Since this was a publicized issue, it could be seen by parents as poor
implementation of bilingual classrooms and as a result forgo enrolling their children.
A third issue is the lack of funding for implementation of the mandate. Districts, espe-
cially large urban districts, may be constrained by both limited budgets and high amounts
of bilingual enrollees. Of particular concern is the potential for displacement of English-
speaking students. For example, if the mandate led to larger class sizes and lower-quality,
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middle-class white parents may elect to remove their child from public pre-K. This would
lead to an overestimation of effects using the second control strategy, as the gap in enrollment
between the treatment group and control groups becomes larger than it would be under a
scenario where additional resources are devoted to the implementation.
Overall, though, effects of the bilingual mandate on pre-K enrollments for non-White
Hispanic and other limited English speaking families in the Illinois context provide for strong
support for similar policies around the country. The finding that the bilingual mandate have
strong effects on enrollment of targeted groups even after the recent introduction of universal
pre-K implies two important piece of information: (1) universal pre-K in itself may not have
the fully intended effects on disadvantaged populations and (2) even after the introduction
of universal pre-K, there can still be improvements made upon it to induce parents to enroll
their child into pre-K.
Discussion of Maternal Labor Supply Effects
The second finding of this study is that there is little-to-no effects in maternal labor supply.
While this is consistent with the findings of Fitzpatrick (2010) in her analysis of general
universal pre-K policies, my hypothesis would be that more effects should be found in a
low-SES population. There are multiple reasons why estimates do not suggest effects for
maternal labor supply. One significant concern of estimating the effects of the mandate on
maternal labor supply is the timing of the effects. It is possible that, as of the time of
the ACS survey, mothers either have not chosen to work yet, they have not yet been able
to find a job, or they have not been able to increase their hours worked because of a lack
of opportunity. In such cases, the effects of maternal labor supply would not be seen in
the data. A second concern is that the literature often does not find effects for mothers
who have multiple young children. In my sample restricted to non-White Hispanic, recently
immigrated, and non-English families, 37% of households have multiple children five and
under. Given that a substantial amount of mothers may choose to provide childcare rather
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than work, the effects may again be limited without limiting estimates to households with a
single young child. Third, recent literature has pointed to a decline in female labor supply
elasticities over time (Heim, 2007). This, combined with the fact that a majority of mothers
in the baseline sample (51%) were already working may mean that mothers who wish to
work are already working regardless of whether they send their child to school.
Other Implications: Potential for Displacement and Sorting
In order to develop a more nuanced understanding of the bilingual mandate, we must dive
deeper into the specific implication at the school- and student-levels. Many studies have
studied the potential for public preschool crowding out existing supply of private provision
(Bassok et al., 2014). Given the specific target of low-SES populations from the bilingual
mandate, I would not expect that to be the case. However, one key observation suggests two
important areas for further research. Figure 3.3 - a year-to-year comparison of changes in
pre-K enrollment between the groups of interest compared to all other demographic groups in
Illinois - documents an unusual observation. Prior to implementation, both groups experience
similar patterns in annual enrollment levels. Post implementation, a new pattern emerges:
The two groups experience opposite trend signs from 2010 to 2013.
This pattern forces us to question whether there is any displacement or sorting effects. In
terms of displacement, an explanation of the pattern based on economic supply is possible:
Allocation of district resources may be tipped towards either English-limited or English-
proficient students on a year-to-year basis, an especially important notion during a time
when public advocates and parents may be forcing administrators to find a balance in serving
groups equally. Media attention in Illinois lends credence to this possibility: Funding for
Illinois preschools peaked in 2009 with $327 million and dropped considerably in years after.
In 2013, the budget was down to $241 million and funding was used to “target the neediest”
(Neufield, 2014). This would be consistent with a theory of displacement, whereby perceived
inequitable allocation of resources pushes one group out. Under scarce and limited resources,
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improving quality for one group over another can become a zero-sum game.
Alternatively, the chart may also be partially explained by sorting. On the demand
side, year-to-year variance in perception of changes in pre-K quality could drive swings in
enrollment. For example, if White parents were afraid of decreasing quality during the first
year of implementation, they may be more inclined to enroll their children in private school,
keep them at home, or move them to a low-ELL district. Hispanic parents, though, may
send their children given the supposedly expanded resources for bilingual students. During
the second year, White parents may have noticed that quality for their group did not decline,
and so decide to enroll their children into public preschool. Hispanic and Immigrant parents,
on the other hand, may have noticed that resources for bilingual students were insufficient
and preschool quality suffered and unenroll their children as a result, or move them to a
high-ELL district.
While these hypotheses are intriguing, as knowing the answer can help us design better
policy going forward, further analyses of these factors are required to fully determine the
unexpected side effects and costs of such a policy.
VIII Conclusions
Given the perceived limitations of universal pre-K policies in granting equal access to pre-
K for all disadvantaged populations, many states and cities have started turning towards
discussions over universal bilingual pre-K policies. Large achievement gaps between English
language learners and English-proficient students point toward the need for educational
reform in closing the gaps. However, are bilingual pre-K mandates, which might attract
more limited-English families to enroll their children, be a part of the solution?
This study adds two primary contributions to the literature. First, it is the first causal
analysis of the effects of a statewide bilingual pre-K mandate. Second, it adds to the literature
to give a more nuanced understanding of how universal- or supplementary-type pre-K policies
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can affect enrollment and maternal labor supply. My estimates find significant effects on
student enrollment for target populations in Illinois, and little-to-no effects on maternal labor
supply. These findings are consistent with the universal pre-K findings of Fitzpatrick (2010).
They also support the need for similar policies to be assessed based on enrollment and future
student outcomes rather than its potential for closing labor market gaps, which seemingly
require alternative policies to become a factor in family welfare. More importantly, while
there were 18-20 percent increases in enrollment for targeted groups, I conclude that there
is still a long way to go in fulfilling Illinois's wish to have ‘Preschool for all.’ The evidence
shows that it is not sufficient to just develop a one-size-fits-all solution to giving all children
an opportunity into preschool, but that it is important to develop nuanced opportunities for
the many children with specific needs. These may include more than just bilingual students;
it can also mean limitations in the system in serving students with special education needs.
Finally, for states, cities, and districts, this evidence may add to the notion that there is in
fact demand for bilingual preschool classrooms, even in a context where the proportion of




Figure 3.1: Percentage and Number of English Language Learners in Illinois
This figure shows the amount students identified as ELLs in pre-K in Illinois publicly-funded
programs from 2008-2011 school years. Percentages are shown as number of ELL pre-K students
divided by total number of pre-K students. Source: Illinois Department of Education
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Figure 3.2: Annual Percentage Changes in Pre-K Enrollments of target groups: Illinois vs. Neigh-
boring States
This figure shows the percentage change in pre-K student enrollments over time from non-white
Hispanic, immigrant, and limited English speaking families, and a comparison between the
mandate-treated target groups and control target groups from the neighboring states. Source:
Author calculations from ACS data.
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Figure 3.3: Annual Percentage Changes in Pre-K Enrollments: Mandate-Treated Target Group
vs. Control Group within Illinois
This figure shows the percentage change in pre-K student enrollments over time from the
mandate-treated target group (non-white Hispanic, immigrant, and limited English speaking
families) and control group (all other races and English-speaking families) within Illinois. Source:




Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Children and Mothers of Pre-K Age in Illinois, Pre- &
Post-Mandate
Children of Pre-K Age Mothers, PK Age Children
Variable 2008-2010 2011-2013 2008-2010 2011-2013
Female 0.48 0.49 1.00 1.00
Age 3.50 3.52 29.90 30.50
Education
Less than HS - - 0.31 0.29
HS Grad - - 0.32 0.31
Some College - - 0.22 0.25
College + - - 0.15 0.15
Hispanic
Hispanic Origin 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.95
Race
White 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Black 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02
Asian 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Native American 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Other/Multi Race 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.81
SES
Family in Poverty Status - - 0.49 0.49
Outcome Varibles
Total Personal Income Earned (Annual) - - 12,891 13,108
Usual Hours/Week - - 19.7 19.3
In Labor Force - - 0.54 0.58
Attends Pre-K 0.37 0.43 - -
Notes: Descriptive Statistics calculated from American Community Survey Data (2007-2010). The first two columns
represent the entire ACS population of pre-K age children in Illinois. The third and fourth columns represent
only those included in the analytic sample, which is composed of non-White Hispanics, recent immigrants, and
children/mothers of children in households where parents do not speak English well.
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Table 3.2: Diff-in-Diff Estimates of Bilingual Pre-K on Enrollment
Strategy 1: Compare Target Groups Across States
Specification
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)




Socioeconomic Status Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes
Urbanicity Yes
N (students) 2,620 2,620 2,620
Strategy 2: Compare Target and Control Groups w/n Illinois
Specification
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)




Socioeconomic Status Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes
Urbanicity Yes
N (students) 3,100 3,100 3,100
Notes: Estimates are based on difference-in-differences specifications as detailed in paper
text. Dependent variable is a binary enrollment variable from American Community
Survey data in which parents state whether their child of each age are enrolled in pre-K
or preschool. Data are restricts to the years between 2008 to 2013. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the state level in the first control strategy and are shown in parenthesis.
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Table 3.3: Diff-in-Diff Estimates of Bilingual Pre-K on Enrollment using different timeframes
Strategy 1: Compare Target Groups Across States
Timeframe Restriction
Dependent Variable 2008-2013 2009-2012 2010-2011
Enrollment 0.076** 0.076** 0.083**
(0.030) (0.032) (0.032)
Covariates
Demographic Yes Yes Yes
Socioeconomic Status Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Urbanicity Yes Yes Yes
N (students) 2,620 1,827 1,053
Strategy 2: Compare Target and Control Groups w/n Illinois
Timeframe Restriction
Dependent Variable 2008-2013 2009-2012 2010-2011
Enrollment 0.079** 0.078** 0.081**
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
Covariates
Demographic Yes Yes Yes
Socioeconomic Status Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Urbanicity Yes Yes Yes
N (students) 3,100 2,071 1,023
Notes: Estimates are based on difference-in-differences specifications as detailed in paper
text. Dependent variable is a binary enrollment variable from American Community
Survey data in which parents state whether their child of each age are enrolled in pre-K
or preschool. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level in the first control
strategy and are shown in parenthesis.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.4: Diff-in-Diff Estimates of Bilingual Pre-K on Mothers’ Labor Supply
Strategy 1: Compare Target Groups Across States
Specification
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Prob of being in Labor Force 0.0197* 0.023** 0.024**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Usual Hours Worked per week 1.7 2.6 2.5
(2.2) (3.8) (3.8)




Socioeconomic Status Yes Yes
Year x State Yes
Urbanicity Yes
N (mothers) 2,465 2,465 2,465
Strategy 2: Compare Target and Control Groups w/n Illinois
Specification
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Prob of being in Labor Force -0.011 -0.016 -0.016
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Usual Hours Worked -0.85 -0.67 -0.63
(1.13) (1.11) (1.11)




Socioeconomic Status Yes Yes
Year x State Yes
Urbanicity Yes
N (students) 2,303 2,303 2,303
Notes: Estimates are based on difference-in-differences specifications as detailed in paper
text. Dependent variables are from American Community Survey data. Data are restricts
to the years between 2008 to 2013. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level
in the first control strategy and are shown in parenthesis.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.5: Diff-in-Diff Estimates of Bilingual Pre-K on Mothers’ Labor Supply using various
timeframes
Strategy 1: Compare Target Groups Across States
Timeframe Restriction
Dependent Variable 2008-2013 2009-2012 2010-2011
Probabilily of being in Labor Force 0.024** 0.022 0.017
(0.012) (0.014) (0.020)
Usual Hours Worked 2.5 5.1 3.8
(3.8) (4.5) (6.4)
Wage and Salary Income 452.18 162.71 -233.05
(677.19) (818.17) (1134.9)
Covariates
Demographic Yes Yes Yes
Socioeconomic Status Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Urbanicity Yes Yes Yes
N (mothers) 2,465 1,823 1,025
Strategy 2: Compare Target and Control Groups w/n Illinois
Timeframe Restriction
Dependent Variable 2008-2013 2009-2012 2010-2011
Probabilily of being in Labor Force -0.016 -0.007 0.02
(0.033) (0.04) (0.06)
Usual Hours Worked -1.1 -0.95 -0.86
(1.11) (1.30) (1.88)
Wage and Salary Income -401.24 -516.57 -433.09
(845.56) (795.11) (696.50)
Covariates
Demographic Yes Yes Yes
Socioeconomic Status Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Urbanicity Yes Yes Yes
N (mothers) 2,303 1,812 1,102
Notes: Estimates are based on difference-in-differences specifications as detailed in paper
text. Dependent variables are from American Community Survey data. Robust stan-
dard errors are clustered at the state level in the first control strategy and are shown in
parenthesis.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
151
Bibliography
Abdulkadirog˘lu, Atila, Joshua Angrist, and Parag Pathak, “The elite illusion:
Achievement effects at Boston and New York exam schools,” Econometrica, 2014, 82
(1), 137–196.
, Joshua D Angrist, Susan M Dynarski, Thomas J Kane, and Parag A Pathak,
“Accountability and flexibility in public schools: Evidence from Boston’s charters and
pilots,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2011, 126 (2), 699–748.
Akresh, Richard, Damien De Walque, and Harounan Kazianga, “Evidence from a
randomized evaluation of the household welfare impacts of conditional and unconditional
cash transfers given to mothers or fathers,” 2016.
Allcott, Hunt and Todd Rogers, “The short-run and long-run effects of behavioral
interventions: Experimental evidence from energy conservation,” The American Economic
Review, 2014, 104 (10), 3003–3037.
Andrabi, Tahir, Jishnu Das, and Asim Ijaz Khwaja, “Report Cards: The Impact of
Providing School and Child Test Scores on Educational Markets,” American Economic
Review, June 2017, 107 (6), 1535–63.
Ang, M., “Achievement Gap is the State’s Widest,” http://cacs.org/research/
part-2-english-learner-achievement-gap 2014.
Angrist, Joshua D., Sarah R. Cohodes, Susan M. Dynarski, Parag A. Pathak,
and Christopher R. Walters, “Stand and Deliver: Effects of Boston’s Charter High
Schools on College Preparation, Entry, and Choice,” Journal of Labor Economics, April
152
2016, 34 (2).
Avvisati, Francesco, Marc Gurgand, Nina Guyon, and Eric Maurin, “Getting
parents involved: A field experiment in deprived schools,” Review of Economic Studies,
2013, 81 (1), 57–83.
Banerjee, Abhijit V, Shawn Cole, Esther Duflo, and Leigh Linden, “Remedying
education: Evidence from two randomized experiments in India,” The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 2007, 122 (3), 1235–1264.
Barnett, W Steven, “Long-term effects of early childhood programs on cognitive and
school outcomes,” The future of children, 1995, pp. 25–50.
Bassok, Daphna, Maria Fitzpatrick, and Susanna Loeb, “Does state preschool crowd-
out private provision? The impact of universal preschool on the childcare sector in Okla-
homa and Georgia,” Journal of Urban Economics, 2014, 83, 18–33.
Belfield, Clive R, Milagros Nores, Steve Barnett, and Lawrence Schweinhart,
“The High/Scope Perry Preschool Program cost–benefit analysis using data from the age-
40 followup,” Journal of Human resources, 2006, 41 (1), 162–190.
Bergman, Peter, “Parent-Child Information Frictions and Human Capital Investment: Ev-
idence from a Field Experiment,” Columbia University Teachers College Working Paper,
2014.
, “Parent-child information frictions and human capital investment: Evidence from a field
experiment,” 2015.
, “Technology Adoption in Education: Usage, Spillovers and Student Achievement,”
Columbia University Teachers College Working Paper, 2016.
and Todd Rogers, “Is This Technology Useless? How Seemingly Irrelevant Factors
Affect Adoption and Efficacy,” 2017.
Berlinski, Samuel, Matias Busso, Taryn Dinkelman, and Claudia Martinez, “Re-
ducing parent-school information gaps and improving education outcomes: Evidence from
high frequency text messaging in Chile,” Unpublished Manuscript, 2016.
153
Betts, Julian R and Jamie L Shkolnik, “The effects of ability grouping on student
achievement and resource allocation in secondary schools,” Economics of Education Re-
view, 2000, 19 (1), 1–15.
et al., “The economics of tracking in education,” Handbook of the Economics of Educa-
tion, 2011, 3 (341-381), 4.
Bhatt, Rachana R, “The impacts of gifted and talented education,” 2009.
Blau, David M and Philip K Robins, “Child-care costs and family labor supply,” The
Review of Economics and Statistics, 1988, pp. 374–381.
Bonilla, Sheila, Sarah Kehl, Kenny YC Kwong, Tricia Morphew, Rital Kachru,
and Craig A Jones, “School absenteeism in children with asthma in a Los Angeles inner
city school,” The Journal of pediatrics, 2005, 147 (6), 802–806.
Browning, Martin, Pierre-Andre Chiappori, and Yoram Weiss, “Family economics,”
2011.
Bui, Sa A, Steven G Craig, and Scott A Imberman, “Is gifted education a bright idea?
Assessing the impact of gifted and talented programs on students,” American Economic
Journal: Economic Policy, 2014, 6 (3), 30–62.
Calonico, Sebastian, Matias D Cattaneo, and Rocio Titiunik, “Robust nonparamet-
ric confidence intervals for regression-discontinuity designs,” Econometrica, 2014, 82 (6),
2295–2326.
Card, David and Laura Giuliano, “Can universal screening increase the representation
of low income and minority students in gifted education?,” Technical Report, National
Bureau of Economic Research 2015.
Carrell, Scott, Bruce Sacerdote, and James West, “From natural variation to optimal
policy? An unsuccessful experiment in using peer effects estimates to improve student
outcomes,” Unpublished Manuscript, 2012.
Castleman, Benjamin L and Lindsay C Page, “Summer nudging: Can personalized
text messages and peer mentor outreach increase college going among low-income high
154
school graduates?,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2015, 115, 144–160.
and , “Freshman Year Financial Aid Nudges.,” Journal of Human Resources, 2016, 51
(2).
Castleman, Benjamin L. and Lindsay C. Page, “Parental Influences on Postsecondary
Decision Making,” Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 2017, 20 (10), 1–17.
Cattaneo, Matias D, Michael Jansson, and Xinwei Ma, “rddensity: Manipulation
testing based on density discontinuity,” The Stata Journal (ii), 2016, pp. 1–18.
Clark, Damon, “Selective schools and academic achievement,” The BE Journal of Eco-
nomic Analysis & Policy, 2010, 10 (1).
Cohodes, Sarah, “The Long-Run Impacts of Tracking High-Achieving Students: Evidence
from Boston’s Advanced Work Class,” Harvard Kennedy School, thesis chapter, May, 2015.
Connelly, Rachel, “The effect of child care costs on married women’s labor force partici-
pation,” The review of Economics and Statistics, 1992, pp. 83–90.
Cullen, Julie Berry, Steven D Levitt, Erin Robertson, and Sally Sadoff, “What Can
Be Done To Improve Struggling High Schools?,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives,
2013, 27 (2), 133–152.
Cummings, M., “Push for bilingual Pre-K classrooms gains strength as
city expands both programs,” www.chalkbeat.org/posts/ny/2015/01/16/
push-for-bilingual-pre-k-classrooms-gains-strength-as-city-expands/ 2014.
Cunha, Flavio and James Heckman, “The technology of skill formation,” Technical
Report, National Bureau of Economic Research 2007.
Cunha, Fla´vio, Irma Elo, and Jennifer Culhane, “Eliciting maternal expectations
about the technology of cognitive skill formation,” Technical Report, National Bureau of
Economic Research 2013.
Currie, Janet and Duncan Thomas, “School quality and the longer-term effects of Head
Start,” Technical Report, National Bureau of Economic Research 1998.
Dizon-Ross, Rebecca, “Parents’ perceptions and children’s education: Experimental ev-
155
idence from Malawi,” Unpublished Manuscript. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
http://web. mit. edu/rdr/www/perceptions. pdf, 2014.
, “Parents’ perceptions and children’s education: Experimental evidence from Malawi,”
Unpublished Manuscript. University of Chicago., 2016.
Dobbie, Will and Jr. Fryer Roland G., “Are High-Quality Schools Enough to Increase
Achievement among the Poor? Evidence from the Harlem Children’s Zone,” American
Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2011, 3 (3), 158–87.
and Roland G. Fryer, “The Medium-Term Impacts of High-Achieving Charter
Schools,” Journal of Political Economy, 2015, 123 (5), 985–1037.
and Roland G Fryer Jr, “The impact of attending a school with high-achieving peers:
Evidence from the New York City exam schools,” American Economic Journal: Applied
Economics, 2014, 6 (3), 58–75.
Doepke, Matthias and Michele Tertilt, “Does female empowerment promote economic
development?,” 2011.
Duflo, Esther, “Women empowerment and economic development,” Journal of Economic
Literature, 2012, 50 (4), 1051–1079.
, Pascaline Dupas, and Michael Kremer, “Peer effects, teacher incentives, and the
impact of tracking,” American Economic Review, 2011, 101 (5 (August 2011)).
Duncan, Greg J. and Katherine Magnuson, “Investing in Preschool Programs,” The
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2013, 27 (2), 109–132.
Fan, Xitao and Dana L Nowell, “Using propensity score matching in educational re-
search,” Gifted Child Quarterly, 2011, 55 (1), 74–79.
Fitzpatrick, Maria Donovan, “Preschoolers enrolled and mothers at work? The effects
of universal prekindergarten,” Journal of Labor Economics, 2010, 28 (1), 51–85.
Froiland, John Mark, Aubrey Peterson, and Mark L Davison, “The long-term
effects of early parent involvement and parent expectation in the USA,” School Psychology
International, 2013, 34 (1), 33–50.
156
Fryer, Roland, “The Production of Human Capital in Developed Countries,” Handbook of
Economic Field Experiments, 2017, 2, 95 – 322.
Fuller, Bruce and Anthony Y Kim, “Latino Access to Preschool Stalls after Earlier
Gains: Certain to Harden Achievement Gaps, Erode Workforce Quality. New Journalism
on Latino Children.,” Institute of Human Development (NJ1), 2011.
Garces, Eliana, Duncan Thomas, and Janet Currie, “Longer-term effects of Head
Start,” American economic review, 2002, 92 (4), 999–1012.
Gelbach, Jonah B, “Public schooling for young children and maternal labor supply,”
American Economic Review, 2002, 92 (1), 307–322.
Gertler, Paul, James Heckman, Rodrigo Pinto, Arianna Zanolini, Christel Ver-
meersch, Susan Walker, Susan M Chang, and Sally Grantham-McGregor, “La-
bor market returns to an early childhood stimulation intervention in Jamaica,” Science,
2014, 344 (6187), 998–1001.
Gormley, William T, “The effects of Oklahoma’s pre-k program on Hispanic children,”
Social Science Quarterly, 2008, 89 (4), 916–936.
Greene, Jay P, “A meta-analysis of the Rossell and Baker review of bilingual education
research,” Bilingual Research Journal, 1997, 21 (2-3), 103–122.
Grissom, Jason A and Christopher Redding, “Discretion and disproportionality: Ex-
plaining the underrepresentation of high-achieving students of color in gifted programs,”
Aera Open, 2015, 2 (1), 2332858415622175.
Hahn, Jinyong, Petra Todd, and Wilbert Van der Klaauw, “Identification and es-
timation of treatment effects with a regression-discontinuity design,” Econometrica, 2001,
69 (1), 201–209.
Hanushek, Eric A, John F Kain, Jacob M Markman, and Steven G Rivkin, “Does
peer ability affect student achievement?,” Journal of applied econometrics, 2003, 18 (5),
527–544.
Heckman, James J, “Skill formation and the economics of investing in disadvantaged
157
children,” Science, 2006, 312 (5782), 1900–1902.
, “Schools, skills, and synapses,” Economic inquiry, 2008, 46 (3), 289–324.
, Seong Hyeok Moon, Rodrigo Pinto, Peter A Savelyev, and Adam Yavitz, “The
rate of return to the HighScope Perry Preschool Program,” Journal of public Economics,
2010, 94 (1), 114–128.
Heim, Bradley T, “The incredible shrinking elasticities married female labor supply, 1978–
2002,” Journal of Human resources, 2007, 42 (4), 881–918.
Hoekstra, Mark, “The effect of attending the flagship state university on earnings: A
discontinuity-based approach,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2009, 91 (4),
717–724.
Hornby, Garry and Rayleen Lafaele, “Barriers to parental involvement in education:
An explanatory model,” Educational review, 2011, 63 (1), 37–52.
Hoxby, Caroline, “Peer effects in the classroom: Learning from gender and race variation,”
Technical Report, National Bureau of Economic Research 2000.
Hoxby, Caroline M and Gretchen Weingarth, “Taking race out of the equation: School
reassignment and the structure of peer effects,” Technical Report, Working paper 2005.
Hustedt, Jason T, W Steven Barnett, Kwanghee Jung, and Jessica Thomas, “The
effects of the Arkansas Better Chance Program on young children’s school readiness,”
New Brunswick, NJ: National Institute for Early Education Research (NIEER). Accessed
March, 2007, 19, 2007.
Imbens, Guido and Karthik Kalyanaraman, “Optimal bandwidth choice for the re-
gression discontinuity estimator,” The Review of economic studies, 2012, 79 (3), 933–959.
Imberman, Scott, Adriana D Kugler, and Bruce Sacerdote, “Katrina’s children:
evidence on the structure of peer effects from hurricane evacuees,” Technical Report,
National Bureau of Economic Research 2009.
Jackson, C Kirabo, “Do Students Benefit from Attending Better Schools? Evidence from
Rule-based Student Assignments in Trinidad and Tobago,” The Economic Journal, 2010,
158
120 (549), 1399–1429.
Jr, Roland G Fryer, “Financial incentives and student achievement: Evidence from ran-
domized trials,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2011, 126 (4), 1755–1798.
, Steven D Levitt, and John A List, “Parental incentives and early childhood achieve-
ment: a field experiment in Chicago heights,” Technical Report, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research 2015.
Jr, William T Gormley, Ted Gayer, Deborah Phillips, and Brittany Dawson, “The
effects of universal pre-K on cognitive development.,” Developmental psychology, 2005, 41
(6), 872.
Kimmel, Jean, “Child care costs as a barrier to employment for single and married moth-
ers,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 1998, 80 (2), 287–299.
Kraft, Matthew A and Shaun M Dougherty, “The effect of teacher–family communi-
cation on student engagement: Evidence from a randomized field experiment,” Journal of
Research on Educational Effectiveness, 2013, 6 (3), 199–222.
Kraft, Matthew and Todd Rogers, “The Underutilized Potential of Teacher-to-Parent
Communication: Evidence from a Field Experiment,” 2014.
Lee, David S and Thomas Lemieux, “Regression discontinuity designs in economics,”
Journal of economic literature, 2010, 48 (2), 281–355.
Loeb, Susanna, Margaret Bridges, Daphna Bassok, Bruce Fuller, and Russell W
Rumberger, “How much is too much? The influence of preschool centers on children’s
social and cognitive development,” Economics of Education review, 2007, 26 (1), 52–66.
Ludwig, Jens and Douglas L Miller, “Does Head Start improve children’s life chances?
Evidence from a regression discontinuity design,” The Quarterly journal of economics,
2007, 122 (1), 159–208.
Magnuson, Katherine A, Christopher Ruhm, and Jane Waldfogel, “Does prekinder-
garten improve school preparation and performance?,” Economics of Education review,
2007, 26 (1), 33–51.
159
Malone, T., “In Illinois, bilingual learning for non-English speakers now starts in
preschool.,” Chicago Tribune, Sep 2010.
Manning, Maryann and Janice Patterson, “LIFETIME EFFECTS: The High/Scope
Perry preschool study through age 40,” Childhood Education, 2006, 83 (2), 121.
Marsh, Herbert W, “Simulation study of nonequivalent group-matching and regression-
discontinuity designs: Evaluations of gifted and talented programs,” The Journal of ex-
perimental education, 1998, 66 (2), 163–192.
, Danuta Chessor, Rhonda Craven, and Lawrence Roche, “The effects of gifted
and talented programs on academic self-concept: The big fish strikes again,” American
educational research journal, 1995, 32 (2), 285–319.
Matthews, Michael S, Scott J Peters, and Angela M Housand, “Regression discon-
tinuity design in gifted and talented education research,” Gifted Child Quarterly, 2012, 56
(2), 105–112.
Mayer, Susan E, Ariel Kalil, Philip Oreopoulos, and Sebastian Gallegos, “Using
behavioral insights to increase parental engagement: The parents and children together
(PACT) intervention,” Technical Report, National Bureau of Economic Research 2015.
McCrary, Justin, “Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity
design: A density test,” Journal of econometrics, 2008, 142 (2), 698–714.
Murphy, Patrick Ryan, Essays on gifted education’s impact on student achievement, The
Florida State University, 2009.
Neufield, S., “In Illinois, Preschool Access Worst for Latinos,” The Hechinger Report, Sep
2014.
Nores, Milagros and W Steven Barnett, “Benefits of early childhood interventions
across the world:(Under) Investing in the very young,” Economics of education review,
2010, 29 (2), 271–282.
of Education, California Department, “The Williams Case - An Expla-
nation. California Department of Education.,” http://cacs.org/research/
160
part-2-english-learner-achievement-gap 2014.
of Education, Civil Rights US Department, “Data Snapshot: College and Career
Readiness. Issue Brief No. 3,” 2014.
of Education, Illinois Board, “Preschool For All: Nurturing Illinois's Promise, Imple-
mentation Manual.,” Illinois Board of Education 2014.
Olds, David L, “The nurse–family partnership: An evidence-based preventive interven-
tion,” Infant Mental Health Journal, 2006, 27 (1), 5–25.
Olivera, M., “Educators: Funding Texas bilingual programs more vital than ever,” The
Dallas Morning News., Mar 2015.
Oreopoulos, Philip and Uros Petronijevic, “Student Coaching: How Far Can Technol-
ogy Go?,” Technical Report, National Bureau of Economic Research 2016.
Page, Lindsay C, Benjamin Castleman, and Katharine Meyer, “Customized Nudg-
ing to Improve FAFSA Completion and Income Verification,” 2016.
Patacchini, Eleonora, Edoardo Rainone, and Yves Zenou, “Heterogeneous peer ef-
fects in education,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2017, 134, 190–227.
Pop-Eleches, Cristian and Miguel Urquiola, “Going to a better school: Effects and
behavioral responses,” The American Economic Review, 2013, 103 (4), 1289–1324.
Rambo-Hernandez, Karen E and Russell T Warne, “Measuring the outliers: An
introduction to out-of-level testing with high-achieving students,” Teaching Exceptional
Children, 2015, 47 (4), 199–207.
Reardon, Sean F and Claudia Galindo, “The Hispanic-White achievement gap in math
and reading in the elementary grades,” American Educational Research Journal, 2009, 46
(3), 853–891.
Robinson, Joseph P, “Evaluating criteria for English learner reclassification: A causal-
effects approach using a binding-score regression discontinuity design with instrumental
variables,” Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 2011, pp. 267–292.
Rogers, Todd and Avi Feller, “Reducing student absences at scale,” Unpublished paper,
161
2016.
Rossell, Christine H and Keith Baker, “The educational effectiveness of bilingual edu-
cation,” Research in the Teaching of English, 1996, pp. 7–74.
S., Genadek K. Goeken R. Grover J. Ruggles and M. Sobek, “Integrated Public
Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0,” Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 2015.
Saavedra, Juan Estaban, “The learning and early labor market effects of college quality:
A regression discontinuity analysis,” Investigaciones del ICFES, 2009.
Sacerdote, Bruce, “How large are the effects from changes in family environment? A
study of Korean American adoptees,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2007, 122 (1),
119–157.
Schweinhart, Lawrence J et al., Significant Benefits: The High/Scope Perry Preschool
Study through Age 27. Monographs of the High/Scope Educational Research Foundation,
No. Ten., ERIC, 1993.
Sekhri, Sheetal, Yona Rubinstein et al., “Do public colleges in developing countries
provide better education than private ones? evidence from general education sector in
india,” Technical Report, University of Virginia, Department of Economics 2010.
Severns, Maggie, “Starting Early with English Language Learners: First Lessons from
Illinois.,” New America Foundation, 2012.
Shapiro, E., “Ready for Pre-K?,” http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/magazine/
2014/04/8544392/ready-pre-k 2014.
Simzar, Rahila M, Marcela Martinez, Teomara Rutherford, Thurston Domina,
and AnneMarie M Conley, “Raising the stakes: How students’ motivation for math-
ematics associates with high-and low-stakes test achievement,” Learning and individual
differences, 2015, 39, 49–63.
Todd, Petra E and Kenneth I Wolpin, “On the specification and estimation of the
production function for cognitive achievement,” The Economic Journal, 2003, 113 (485).
and , “The production of cognitive achievement in children: Home, school, and racial
162
test score gaps,” Journal of Human capital, 2007, 1 (1), 91–136.
Wai, Jonathan, David Lubinski, Camilla P Benbow, and James H Steiger, “Ac-
complishment in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) and its rela-
tion to STEM educational dose: A 25-year longitudinal study.,” Journal of Educational
Psychology, 2010, 102 (4), 860.
Wang, Ming-Te, Nancy E Hill, and Tara Hofkens, “Parental involvement and African
American and European American adolescents’ academic, behavioral, and emotional de-
velopment in secondary school,” Child development, 2014, 85 (6), 2151–2168.
Weikart, DP et al., “The Ypsilanti Perry Preschool Project: Preschool Years and Longi-
tudinal Results Through Fourth Grade. Monograph Number 3.,” 1978.
Weiland, Christina, Kchersti Ulvestad, Jason Sachs, and Hirokazu Yoshikawa,
“Associations between classroom quality and children’s vocabulary and executive function
skills in an urban public prekindergarten program,” Early Childhood Research Quarterly,
2013, 28 (2), 199–209.
Weinhardt, Felix and Richard Murphy, “Top of the class: The importance of ordinal
rank,” 2016.
Wong, Vivian C, Thomas D Cook, W Steven Barnett, and Kwanghee Jung, “An
effectiveness-based evaluation of five state pre-kindergarten programs,” Journal of policy
Analysis and management, 2008, 27 (1), 122–154.
Yoong, Joanne, Lila Rabinovich, and Stephanie Diepeveen, “The impact of eco-
nomic resource transfers to women versus men: A systematic review,” Technical Report,
University of London, 2012.
York, Benjamin N and Susanna Loeb, “One step at a time: the effects of an early
literacy text messaging program for parents of preschoolers,” Technical Report, National
Bureau of Economic Research 2014.
Zehr, M., “Illinois Board votes to Require Bilingual Ed In Preschool,” Education Week,
Mar 2010.
163
Zimmer, Ron, “A new twist in the educational tracking debate,” Economics of Education




Table A.1: Short-Term (4th Grade) Academic Outcomes: Sharp RD Estimates
Entire RD Sample
Days Absent Suspended Math Score ELA Score
2SLS -0.55 -0.01 0.02 -0.03
(0.50) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07)
Control Mean 16.4 0.03 1.30 1.21
Observations 4,309 4,309 4,280 4,281
This table shows sharp regression discontinuity coefficient estimates for primary short-term
academic outcomes in the fourth grade. Robust standard errors clustered at the school level
are shown in parentheses. Regression include baseline demographic covariates and school by
year fixed effects. Regressions are generated by local linear regression with a triangular kernel
and a bandwidth of around 2.1 percentile points away from the threshold, although optimal
bandwidths vary slightly by outcome. Sample is restricted to students who took the G&T exam
in third grade during the school years 2001-02 through 2015-16. Control means are control
complier means. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table A.2: Medium-Term (8th Grade) Academic Outcomes: Sharp RD Estimates
Entire RD Sample
Days Absent Suspended Math Score ELA Score GPA (cum.) GPA (req.)
2SLS -0.10 -0.02 0.07 0.07 -0.12* 0.07
(0.39) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
Control Mean 18.4 0.04 1.53 1.49 3.34 3.34
Observations 3,672 3,775 3,767 3,764 3,767 3,767
This table shows sharp regression discontinuity coefficient estimates for primary medium-term academic outcomes in
the eighth grade. Robust standard errors clustered at the school level are shown in parentheses. Regressions include
baseline demographic covariates and school by year fixed effects. Regressions are generated by local linear regression
with a triangular kernel and a bandwidth of 2.1 percentile points away from the threshold, although optimal bandwidths
vary slightly by outcome. Sample is restricted to students who took the G&T exam in third grade during the school
years 2001-02 through 2012-13. Control means are control complier means. GPA is calculated for the eighth grade using
transcript data and are not offical GPAs. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
167
Table A.3: High School Outcomes: Sharp RD Estimates
Entire RD Sample
Honors Courses Took Any AP AP Courses AP Calculus GPA (cum.) GPA (req.)
2SLS 0.92** 0.10* 0.33* 0.22*** -0.02 0.22*
(0.23) (0.06) (0.21) (0.06) (0.23) (0.13)
Control Mean 3.28 0.68 2.10 0.26 3.27 3.29
Observations 3278 3279 3279 3279 3279 3276
This table shows sharp regression discontinuity coefficient estimates for high school course taking outcomes. Robust
standard errors clustered at the school level are shown in parentheses. Regressions include baseline demographic covariates
and school by year fixed effects. Regressions are generated by local linear regression with a triangular kernel and a
bandwidth of 2.1 percentile points away from the threshold, although optimal bandwidth vary slightly by outcome.
Sample is restricted to students who took the G&T exam in third grade during the school years 2001-02 through 2008-09.
Control means are control complier means. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table A.4: Long-term & College Outcomes: Sharp RD Estimates
Entire RD Sample
Took SAT Any College Most Competitive
2SLS 0.10*** 0.08** 0.09**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Control Mean 0.81 0.74 0.22
Observations 2,268 2,221 2,221
This table shows sharp regression discontinuity coefficient estimates for share who
took SAT, Enrollment in any college within 6 months after HS graduation, and
enrollment into the “Most competitive” colleges. “Most Competitive’ colleges are
based on Barron’s selectivity index of 1, with the most popular schools being UC-
Berkeley and UCLA. Robust standard errors clustered at the school level are shown
in parentheses. Regressions include baseline demographic covariates and school
by year fixed effects. Regressions are generated by local linear regression with a
triangular kernel and a bandwidth of 2.1 percentile points away from the threshold,
although optimal bandwidths vary slightly by outcome. For college outcomes,
Sample is restricted to students who took the G&T exam in third grade during
the school years 2001-02 through 2007-08. Control means are control complier
means. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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